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This thesis is comprised of three empirical studies on health care reforms in rural China. It specifically 
examines the determinant of enrolment in the social health insurance program, the effects of the 
insurance on health care utilization, and the extent of income-related inequity in the use of health care 
before and after the reforms.  
Chapter 2 analyses the determinant of enrolment in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) 
from 2004 to 2006. The results show that people who use low-level public health facilities (village clinics 
or town hospitals) are more likely to be insured while people who use high-level public health facilities 
(county or city hospitals) are less likely to be covered. The relationship remains strong and significant 
after controlling for various groups of independent variables, such as demographics, socio-economic 
characteristics and health variables. The results may be attributed to generous reimbursements for 
health services delivered by low-level health facilities, making insurance more attractive for people who 
use primary care.  However, the fact that people who use high-level facilities are less likely to purchase 
the NRCMS may indicate problems related to weak health systems at the primary level and a breakdown 
in the referral system. 
Chapter 3 provides evidence on the effectiveness of the NRCMS on health care utilization to explore 
whether the insurance has helped patients to obtain more and better quality health services. As the 
program is a non-random policy initiative rolled out nationally, various matching methods with 
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difference-in-difference (DID) models are employed based on data from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS). The results show that the introduction of the NRCMS was not clearly related to the 
overall use of medical care, but it may have directed patients from town hospitals towards village clinics 
and county hospitals. On the one hand, the NRCMS appears to partly rationalise the use of health services, 
with some increase in the use of primary care. On the other hand, the insurance may also alleviate 
financial barriers to accessing higher levels of medical facilities and help patients to obtain better quality 
health care.  
Chapter 4 examines how the income-related inequity of health care utilization in China develops from 
2000 to 2009, the period before and after the health care reforms. The first part of the analysis uses 
Concentration Indices and Erreygers’ Indices of the need-standardized use of different types of health 
services and different levels of health facilities. Pro-rich inequity emerges with respect to the use of 
preventive care and county hospitals, and pro-poor inequity is found in the use of folk doctors and village 
clinics. The results indicate that the rich are more likely to obtain formal and better quality health 
services. The second part of the analysis assesses the contribution of various need and non-need factors 
to total inequity in health care use and shows that inequity is mainly driven by income. Therefore, 
policies that address the unequal distribution of income would help to reduce the degree of horizontal 
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During the late 1970s, China began the process of transforming itself from a closed centralized planned 
economy to a market economy. The market-liberalization policies brought dramatic changes to China’s 
health care system within a few years. The health system was faced with various problems such as a 
reduction of people’s access to health services, increases in the risk of large out-of-pocket payments and 
widened disparities in health and health care. In 2003, the Chinese government publicly acknowledged 
the limitations of such a system and began to implement a series of reforms aimed at achieving universal 
health coverage. A series of measures have been taken from 2003 onwards. The first was the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) introduced between 2003 and 2008, which aimed at providing 
insurance to more than 800 million people living in rural areas. In 2007, another social health insurance 
program was introduced, targeted at 420 million urban residents not covered by the Urban Employer 
Basic Medical Insurance Scheme (UEBMI) who are mainly the elderly, students, children and the 
unemployed. On the supply side, the reform mainly develops a primary health care system, strengthening 
the quality and funding for low-level health facilities, such as village clinics and town hospitals in rural 
areas and community health centres in urban areas. The aim is to encourage people to seek and receive 
treatment in lower-level facilities and stop them from being admitted to hospitals unnecessarily or from 
staying there longer than required (Wagstaff et al., 2009b).  
Over the last decade, there has been an increased interest in the evaluation of the health care reforms 
which have occurred in China after 2003. Due to the timing of the reforms, most evidence to date focuses 
on the NRCMS rather than the UEBMI. Since the objective of the NRCMS is to improve equity and access 
to health care and provide financial protection by reducing large out-of-pocket health payments, previous 
studies have investigated whether the insurance has achieved these goals. However, the findings appear 
to be mixed and inconclusive across data sources and study periods. For example, some literature that 
examines the impact of the NRCMS on health care utilization have found an increase in the use of 
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outpatient and inpatient care among the insured (Wagstaff et al., 2009a), while others have found little 
evidence that having insurance increases overall utilization (Lei and Lin, 2009; Babiarz et al., 2010; 
Babiarz et al., 2012). However, the NRCMS appears to encourage utilization at primary health facilities 
(village clinics and town hospitals), especially among the poor (Babiarz et al., 2010; Babiarz et al., 2012; 
Hou et al., 2014; Wagstaff et al., 2009a). The existing literature also offers mixed evidence on the effects 
of the NRCMS on medical expenditure. Some studies have shown that the program successfully lowers 
out-of-pocket spending or reduces the fraction of households who suffer from financial catastrophe 
related to large medical expenditure (Babiarz et al., 2010; Babiarz et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2009; Sun et al., 
2010; Yip and Hsiao, 2009b), while other studies have found little or no impact of the NRCMS on 
households’ financial burden (Cheng et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2014; Lei and Lin, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 
2009a; Yang, 2015). A possible reason for the limited impact of the NRCMS in alleviating major financial 
risk is that the insurance may encourage access to care and use of high-level providers while the benefit 
packages are insufficient to offset the increase in medical expenditure associated with this. Few studies 
until now have considered the impact of the NRCMS on health outcomes. Two studies have found that the 
NRCMS had no impact on improving self-reported health, sickness or injuries in the last four weeks or the 
mortality rate of pregnant women and young children (Lei and Lin, 2009; Chen and Jin, 2012). However, 
Hou et al. (2014) demonstrate a beneficial impact of the NRCMS among the rural elderly in terms of 
health outcomes. In addition, some studies have also examined the distribution of health and health care 
across income groups before and after the health care reforms in rural areas and have found a pro-rich 
inequity after the reform in the use of outpatient and inpatient care (Chen et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2012; 
Xie, 2011; Zhang et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2011), preventive care (Yang, 2013), maternal health services 
(Li et al., 2015; Shen et al., 2014) and treatment of major chronic conditions (Elwell-Sutton et al., 2013; 
Xie et al., 2014). The results suggest various challenges remaining within the health care system in rural 
China, such as inadequate insurance coverage, relatively low reimbursement rates and lack of portability 
of benefits (Barber and Yao, 2010; Eggleston, 2012). 
This thesis contributes to the debate on whether the rural health care reforms have achieved the 
objectives of improving access to health services and reducing income-related inequity in health care use. 
Based on a large panel dataset – the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the thesis first shows 
how the NRCMS is rolled out across regions and what type of population groups it has covered. It then 
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measures the effects of the NRCMS on the use of different types of health services and different levels of 
health facilities. The last chapter looks at potential income-related inequity on the use of health services 
before and after the health care reforms. I provide new evidence for the NRCMS which also adds to a 
more general literature on the impact of health care reforms aimed at achieving universal coverage in 
developing countries. A detailed summary of the empirical chapters is presented below.  
Chapter 2 explores the determinant of enrolment in the NRCMS in rural China. This is the first study to 
focus on the relationship between purchasing insurance and facility preference in this setting. Facility 
choice should affect the demand for the insurance since it reflects both the price and quality of medical 
services covered and not covered by the NRCMS. Given various reimbursement rates and quality of care 
at different levels of health facilities, people who go to low-level health facilities (village clinics or town 
hospitals) are faced with lower price but also lower quality health services than people who go to high-
level facilities (county or city hospitals). Therefore, the NRCMS appears to be more attractive to people 
who use low-level services since it reduces the cost of medical care. However, since the insured patients 
are required to seek care from primary level and can only be referred to hospitals if their conditions are 
complicated/serious, people who use high-level health facilities may not be willing to purchase the 
insurance if they do not want to risk obtaining low quality health services at primary health centres. They 
may rather go to better hospitals and incur full treatment fees.  
 The primary finding of chapter 2 confirms the expected results. People who use village clinics or town 
hospitals (low-level public health facilities) are more likely to be insured while people who use county or 
city hospitals (high-level public health facilities) are less likely to be covered. The unwillingness of people 
who use high-level facilities to purchase the NRCMS may indicate problems related to a perceived low 
quality of health care delivered by village clinics and town hospitals and a potentially inefficient referral 
system.  
Many previous studies have examined the impact of the NRCMS on health care utilization, but little is 
known concerning whether the insurance has had an impact on people’s treatment-seeking behaviour in 
terms of the use of different levels of health facilities. Chapter 3 evaluates the effects of insurance 
enrolment on the use of different types of health services and different levels of health facilities. The 
analysis exploits the phasing design of the NRCMS introduced in different rural counties across time and 
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employs a difference-in-difference analysis combined with propensity score matching. The results show 
that the NRCMS does not affect the overall use of medical care, but it may have directed patients from 
town hospitals towards village clinics and county hospitals. On the one hand, the NRCMS appears to 
partly rationalise the use of health services, with some increase in the use of primary care. On the other 
hand, the insurance may also alleviate financial barriers to accessing higher levels of medical facilities 
and help patients to obtain better quality health care.  
Establishing the impact of health insurance is difficult because it is very rare that insurance coverage is 
allocated randomly. In most cases, the insured and uninsured are different from each other in terms of 
individual characteristics that influence both their decision to participate in the program and their health 
outcomes. The analysis in Chapter 2 adopts an approach that first pre-processes data with propensity 
score matching and then applies parametric difference-in-difference analysis on the pre-processed 
dataset. The method provides estimates based on the subsequent parametric analysis that is less 
dependent on modelling choices and specifications. The chapter seeks to advance previous literature by 
using a large panel of data and rigorous evaluation methods to measure the impact of the NRCMS on 
people’s treatment-seeking behaviour. Compared with previous studies, I use a richer set of control 
variables, including people’s risk preference and health facility characteristics. These variables are 
important confounders that may influence the effect of the NRCMS on health care utilization. Unlike 
previous research, I find substitution effects of the NRCMS from town hospitals to village clinics and 
county hospitals, suggesting that the insurance has helped patients to access health services more 
conveniently and of potentially better quality.  
The issue of inequity in health care utilization has raised great interest since the market reforms in 1978 
widened health care disparities between the rich and poor in China. The poor suffered from higher rates 
of mortality and morbidity compared with the rich, as well as using fewer health services despite their 
greater needs. Chapter 4 investigates the research question of whether inequities still exist in rural 
China’s health care system after a series of reforms, and to what extent any observed differentials in use 
across income groups cannot be accounted for by differences in health needs. Inequity is defined as 
horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care, which is equal treatment for equal medical need, 
irrespective of other characteristics such as income, race, place of residence and so on (Van Doorslaer et 
al., 2000; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). The concentration index for need-standardized health care 
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utilization is used to measure horizontal inequity. Concentration indices are calculated for the use of 
formal medical care, preventive care, folk doctors, inpatient care and the utilization of different levels of 
health facilities before and after the health care reforms (from 2000 to 2009). The results suggest that 
there is pro-rich inequity in the use of preventive care and county hospitals, while pro-poor inequity in 
the use of folk doctors and village clinics. Inequity is further decomposed into the contribution of various 
need and non-need factors to total inequity in health care use, and income appears to be the most 
important contributor for the unequal distribution of health care use. The results indicate that the rich 
are more likely to use formal and better quality health services than the poor, and income plays an 
important role in driving total inequity in health care use.  
Chapter 3 adds significantly to the existing literature on income-related inequity in terms of the use of 
different levels of health facilities, including public (village clinics, town hospitals and county hospitals) 
and private ones (private clinics). Since various health facilities indicate different quality levels of health 
services, the findings provide new evidence on the differences in the quality of health care received by 
rich and poor people. Although the overall utilization of formal medical care appears to be fairly equally 
distributed, people with higher incomes are significantly more likely to obtain better quality health 
services from high-level health facilities.  
The thesis provides empirical evidence about the impact of the health care reforms on the access to 
different types of health services and on the distribution of medical utilization across income groups in 
the context of rural China. The findings add to the current debate concerning whether the health care 
reforms have achieved the intended goals in rural areas. The results and associated policy implications 
may be useful for other developing countries that are in the process of achieving universal coverage. 
However, caution should also be exercised since the conclusions reached in this thesis may be related to 






DEMAND FOR VOLUNTARY SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE IN 




In recent years, several developing countries have expanded, or are in the process of expanding, social 
health insurance with the ultimate aim of achieving universal coverage. Health insurance is commonly 
considered as a desirable way of enabling households to access health care and reduce potentially large 
out-of-pocket health expenditure. Many governments in developing countries have established a 
compulsory scheme for formal sector employees and, recently, aimed to promote voluntary schemes for 
other population groups, such as the unemployed and informal sector workers (Nguyen and Knowles, 
2010). However, targeting people working in informal sectors is challenging. Demand-side barriers 
include adverse selection, lack of knowledge of health insurance and high transportation cost, while 
supply-side barriers include limited access to good quality health care, cumbersome paperwork involved 
in accessing insurance benefits and limited portability of insurance schemes (Sepehri et al., 2009). 
Therefore, government organised voluntary schemes are usually faced with low demand among the 
targeted population groups. For this reason, better understanding of factors driving demand for 
voluntary health insurance in developing countries is important.  
China has adopted both compulsory and voluntary social health insurance programs: the compulsory 
scheme targets at urban formal-sector workers, including civil servants and employees of state and 
private enterprises; while the voluntary schemes focus on the remaining population groups who are not 
eligible for the compulsory scheme, including rural residents, the unemployed, children, the disabled and 
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the elderly. The compulsory scheme has been mandatory in urban areas since 1990s, while the voluntary 
schemes were introduced from 2003 onwards. The first program was the New Rural Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (NRCMS), a heavily subsidized voluntary health insurance program targeted at more than 800 
million people in rural China. The program was launched in 2003 and expanded to all rural counties by 
2008. Another voluntary social health insurance program, known as the Urban Resident Basic Medical 
Insurance scheme (URBMI), was introduced in 2007 and targeted at 420 million urban residents who 
were not covered by the compulsory scheme. The URBMI was initially piloted in 79 cities, and since 2010 
the coverage was extended to all cities. Both voluntary programs are heavily subsidized by central and 
local governments in order to get poor and vulnerable people involved.  
Several features of the NRCMS are unique to the developing country setting. The targeted population of 
the NRCMS were previously not covered by any other health insurance at all; the insurance premium is 
heavily subsidized by both central and local governments; the program offers a single plan to everyone 
living in the same county; the reimbursement varies by different levels of public health facilities; and 
insured patients may be faced with a wide range of barriers to access health care and insurance benefits. 
Since more than 80 percent of the rural residents were not covered by any health insurance before the 
introduction of the NRCMS (Liu and Cao, 1992), the demand for the program was expected to be high, 
and the generous government subsidies should incentivise poor people to take part in the program. In 
addition, given the single plan in each county, consumers can only decide whether or not to purchase the 
NRCMS but not how much to purchase. Since different levels of health facilities have various 
reimbursement rates and quality of care, the effect of facility choice is a worthwhile consideration in 
analysing health insurance enrolment decisions. People who choose low-level health facilities would 
enjoy higher reimbursement rates compared with those who use high-level ones. However, health 
services delivered by low-level public health facilities are usually perceived to be of poor quality, and 
many patients tend to seek treatments at high-level hospitals even for minor diseases (Yip et al., 2012; 
Yip and Hsiao, 2014). Therefore, the NRCMS would be more attractive to people who use more primary 
level care, but people who need to seek care at high-level hospitals may give up insurance benefits 
because of low quality of covered services and limited referral ability of primary health providers. 
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This paper assesses the determinants of enrolment in the NRCMS at the individual, household and 
community levels. The period analysed lasts from 2004 to 2006 when the NRCMS was in its pilot phase1. 
This is the first study to focus on the relationship between insurance purchase and health facility choice. 
Facility choice is an important factor affecting people’s demand for the NRCMS because it reflects both 
the price and quality of health services covered and not covered by the insurance. Due to various 
reimbursement rates and quality of care at different levels of health facilities, the benefits of the NRCMS 
would appear to be different for people who use different facilities. To figure out the relationship 
between facility choice and insurance enrolment, the initial approach is to estimate a series of logit 
regressions with the purchase of the NRCMS as the dependent variable. People who go to village clinics 
or town hospitals (low-level public health facilities) are significantly more likely to be enrolled while 
people who go to county or city hospitals (high-level public health facilities) are less likely to be covered. 
The relationship is strong and significant across various specifications. The latter relationship appears to 
be insignificant after conditioning on county fixed effects, however, the relationship between insurance 
enrolment and the use of low-level health facilities still remains significant. Further analysis confirms the 
finding and shows that households with male head, larger size and a low wealth level are more likely to 
use low-level health facilities and also more likely to be insured. The insurance appears to be particularly 
attractive among poor households, indicating that the rich tend to give up insurance benefits rather than 
risking low quality health services. The results should be attributed to various reimbursement rates at 
different levels of health facilities, low quality of health services at primary health facilities and poorly 
working referral system.  
The following section provides some background information on the features of the NRCMS. Existing 
studies of the demand for health insurance in developing countries are then reviewed. Section 4 specifies 
the model and introduces the dataset, and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes with the 
implications of the findings for the ongoing efforts to expand SHI in China as well as many other 
developing countries.  
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
                                                                    
1 The NRCMS was expanded to nearly all rural counties by 2008. The enrolment rate is over 90 percent in waves after 2008, making 
it difficult to identify the determinants of demand for the NRCMS.  
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The New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) is the only health insurance scheme available to 
most rural residents in China. The coverage of other insurance programs, such as commercial health 
insurance and free medical care, was very limited.  
The NRCMS was first implemented in 2003 and initially covered only 10 percent of rural counties in 
China (Sun et al., 2009). The placement of the program was not random, and a set of criteria, such as local 
interest and capacity, development of economic status and health care delivery systems, were considered 
when selecting pilot counties. Up to 2006, the program was implemented in 1,451 counties and covered 
more than 400 million rural residents, accounting for nearly 50 percent of the total rural population. All 
rural residents are eligible for the program and nobody can be rejected based on health status or other 
considerations.  
The NRCMS operates at the county level, and local governments have a degree of autonomy over 
premium levels. The central government only formulates the lower limit on individual contributions, and 
each county office decides on the premium for its own county within the national range (Liu and Tsegai, 
2011). The insurance is financed partly through flat-rate household contributions and partly through 
subsidies from four levels of governments: central, provincial, county and township. The minimum 
requirement of the annual premium in 2006 was 50 RMB (US$6.27) per person, with 10 RMB (US$1.25) 
from households supplemented by a subsidy of 20 RMB (US$2.51) from local governments and 20 RMB 
(US$2.51)  from the central government2 (Ministry of Health et al., 2006). The premiums are not risk-
rated at the individual level, and all insured individuals within the same county are offered the same 
premium level.  
The benefit package of the NRCMS varies across counties and over time according to local resources and 
priorities.  County governments have the authority to define local policy details, such as services covered 
and reimbursement rates. In most counties, the program refunds a fraction of inpatient care to patients3, 
but not all counties cover outpatient services. Approximately 72 percent of the counties cover outpatient 
                                                                    
2 In 2006, the average annual disposable income of rural population was 3,587 RMB (US$450).  
3 Detailed reimbursement rules of inpatient services were not specified in national guidelines until 2007. According to “Advices on 
Developing Reimbursement Rules of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme” issued by , deductibles should be set from twice 
to four times higher than the average outpatient expense per visit in the last year, and no more than 100 RMB (US$13.14) in central 
and western areas. Maximum reimbursement caps should amount to six times the annual average per capita income of farmers 
according to (Ministry of Health, 2009), and increased to eight times plus no less than 60,000 RMB (US$7884.36) in 2012 by 
(Ministry of Health et al., 2012). The reimbursement rate was targeted at 50 percent in 2009 according to (Ministry of Health, 
2009), and increased to 70 percent in 2011 and 75 percent in 2012 based on the document issued by (Ministry of Health et al., 
2012). 
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services through a household account or on a pooled basis. Among the rest, 11 percent of the counties 
cover outpatient services only for catastrophic diseases, and 17 percent does not subsidize outpatient 
services at all (Liu et al., 2014; Lei and Lin, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 2009a; You and Kobayashi, 2009)4. Both 
the reimbursement for inpatient and outpatient expenses is subject to separate deductibles, coinsurance 
rates and spending caps. The rates vary across facility types: reimbursements are usually less generous 
for health care delivered in higher-level facilities (Wagstaff et al., 2009a). Detailed reimbursement rules 
for inpatient care are shown in Table 2.1. In addition, the enrolees can only visit certain approved 
facilities to be eligible for the insurance benefits, and can be repaid immediately or later on at a health 
facility or other agency, depending on local policies (Liu et al., 2014).  
[Tables 2.1 about here] 
On the supply side, the government aimed to develop a health care delivery system based on primary 
health facilities, such as village clinics and town hospitals in rural areas. These providers are expected to 
take on a gate-keeping role and manage referrals to specialist care and high-level hospitals (county/city 
hospitals) in order to reduce the medical care cost arising from the overuse of expensive hospital 
services (Liu et al., 2011). In this case, patients could seek care from low-level health facilities for minor 
illnesses and be referred to specialized hospitals for more complex problems. Under the NRCMS, the 
reimbursement rates are more generous for health services provided by low-level facilities, creating 
incentives for rural patients to seek care at a primary care contractor first and be referred to secondary 
and tertiary care if needed. Those who bypass the primary care provider are responsible for full 
treatment fees. However, due to poor quality of care offered by primary health facilities and a breakdown 
of the referral system, many patients still prefer to visit high-level hospitals even for simple health 
problems (Yip et al., 2012). Whether the task-shifting to clinicians and doctors at primary health care 
level will be successful remains to be seen.  
The rural China’s public health care system consists of three tiers: village clinics, town hospitals and 
county (and higher level) hospitals. Village clinics form the base of the system and offer preventive and 
                                                                    
4 According to (Barber and Yao, 2010), there are four basic types of benefit packages. The first model is called the “inpatient and 
household medical saving accounts (MSA)”: it includes the formula-based reimbursement of inpatient services and an MSA for 
outpatient services and preventive care. Households are expected to make contributions to MSAs, which are shared among all 
household members. The second model uses the same inpatient reimbursement rule, but doesn’t cover outpatient services. 
Therefore, it is called the “inpatient only” model. The third model is called the “inpatient and catastrophic care”: it reimburses 
medical expenses of inpatient services and treatment of catastrophic diseases in outpatient departments. The fourth model 
reimburses both inpatient and outpatient services from pooled funds, and is called the “inpatient and outpatient pooling” model. 
Both inpatient and outpatient expenses are subject to separate deductibles, coinsurance rates and reimbursement caps. 
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primary health services.  County hospitals provide the most specialized inpatient and outpatient medical 
care, and town hospitals provide both primary and specialized services. Of these three tiers, county 
hospitals are usually perceived to offer the highest quality care. They are staffed by physicians with four 
or five years of medical school training as well as nurses and technicians. In contrast, village clinics are 
staffed by clinicians and doctors with only three to six months of training after junior middle school (Yip 
et al., 1998). Therefore, there is quite large quality difference of health services provided by different 
levels of health facilities.  
Another key consideration is whether different levels of public health providers can work together to 
form an effective referral system. China has a fragmented delivery system in which the provision of 
preventive care, primary care and tertiary care are separated and uncoordinated. To vertically integrate 
the delivery system, it requires a single financing system for all services instead of the existing separate 
financing systems for different levels of services. At present, the government sponsors only a small share 
of the facility spending and staff salaries, and the rest of the fund is from fee-for-service revenue (You and 
Kobayashi, 2009). Although the majority of Chinese health facilities are publicly owned, they act like 
private and profit seeking entities since they rely heavily on revenue-generating activities for financial 
survival. To achieve higher profits, health providers tend to over-prescribe drugs and tests and to race to 
attract patients. This leads to a poorly working referral system since each supplier aims to retain patients 
at their own facility instead of referring them to other providers.  
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is considerable variation in the enrolment rates of social health insurance in developing countries. 
The voluntary health insurance program for informal sector workers in Nicaragua with no co-payment 
has a take-up rate of only 20% (Thornton et al., 2010), while social health insurance in Costa Rica 
achieved a 56% coverage rate among agricultural workers through a concerted government effort to 
reach all salaried and self-employed workers, pensioners, and their dependents (Dow and Schmeer, 
2003). The enrolment rates of the same program also differ markedly across time and regions. In 
Colombia, the Regimen Subsidiado health insurance for the poor increased its enrolment rates from 20 
percent in 1993 to 80 percent in 2007 (Miller et al., 2009). In Ghana, the enrolment rate of National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) varies from 24 percent to 72 percent according to region.  
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Although the enrolment rates differ greatly across country and time, factors on which the uptake of 
insurance depends appear to be similar. There is much evidence that the decision to purchase social 
health insurance in developing countries is mostly determined by socio-economic variables such as 
income, marital status, education, wealth and employment status (Axelson et al., 2009; Mensah et al., 
2010; Thornton et al., 2010; Trujillo et al., 2005), and health status (Trujillo et al., 2005; Thornton et al., 
2010). The demand for health insurance is also sensitive to features of the insurance plans, such as 
program costs and streamlined bureaucratic procedures such as on-site affiliation (Thornton et al., 2010). 
In an analysis of the demand for a health insurance program targeting at school-age children and 
adolescent student (aged 6-20) in Vietnam, Nguyen and Knowles (2010) also find that demand increases 
significantly with the expected benefits of insurance, as measured by closeness to and quality of tertiary 
hospitals. 
Many social health insurance programs in developing countries are targeted specifically at poor and 
vulnerable people, and therefore the demand function may behave in a different way from the one in 
developed countries. Trujillo et al. (2005) show that participants in the Colombian subsidized health 
insurance program for the poor are usually individuals with less education and living in households with 
lower levels of wealth, fewer rooms, bigger family sizes and without telephones or bathrooms. Sparrow 
et al. (2013) examine the demand for the Askekin program in Indonesia and find that the Askeskin has 
been allocated to the poor and to those households that are expected to require a relatively high health 
spending budget share.  
There is not much evidence on the demand for social health insurance in rural China. Wang et al. (2006) 
and Zhang and Wang (2008) find that individuals with worse health status, based either on self-reported 
health status or on chronic condition history, are more likely to enrol in the insurance. The adverse 
selection mainly occurs in partially enrolled households (Wang et al., 2006), and the magnitude remains 
similar over time (Zhang and Wang, 2008). However, both studies analyse the demand for Rural Mutual 
Health Care (RMHC), an experimental scheme only introduced in Fengshan township (with a population 
size around 37,000) in Guizhou province (the poorest province in China) in 2002. Therefore, the results 
may not represent the demand among rural residents living in other parts of the country. Liu et al. (2014) 
examine the enrolment in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) based on the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) dataset and find that the demand for health insurance is affected by 
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the insurance decisions of co-villagers through social learning. A 10-percentage point increase in the 
enrolment rate in a village increases one’s take-up probability by 5 percentage points. However, their 
paper only focuses on the impact of social learning and does not discuss other factors affecting demand. 
Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by examining various factors affecting the enrolment in 
the NRCMS, and the analysis mainly focuses on the relationship between facility choice and insurance 
enrolment. Facility choice is very important in modelling the demand for the NRCMS because it reflects 
both the expected benefits of the insurance given various reimbursement rates and quality levels across 
different levels of health facilities. The results have policy implications in that the supply-side factors can 
play an important role in the success of insurance expansion in developing countries.  
2.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION SURVEY (CHNS) 
The data used in this study is drawn from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), a large-scale 
longitudinal dataset on Chinese households and their surrounding communities. CHNS is an international 
collaborative project between the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention. The data is not designed to be representative of China but to be randomly 
selected to capture a range of demographic, socio-economic and health-related characteristics (Popkin et 
al., 2010). The sample is selected from nine provinces: Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong. In each province, a multi-stage random cluster process was used 
to draw the sample. Counties are initially stratified by income (low, middle and high), and four in each 
province are randomly selected based on a weighted sampling approach. Villages and townships within 
the counties, and urban and suburban neighbourhoods within the cities, are also selected randomly. The 
available rounds until now are in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011.  Surveys 
were conducted at individual, household and community levels, with detailed information on health care 
utilization, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, health insurance, health facility, food 
markets, family planning practices and other social services. 
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This study mainly focuses on the household demand for the NRCMS among rural residents in China. We 
use two waves of CHNS data (2004 and 2006) and estimate the probability of taking up the insurance in 
2006. The sample is restricted to rural residents who were not covered by any health insurance in 2004, 
and the analysis is only conducted among households living in counties where the NRCMS has been 
introduced between 2004 and 2006. Although the CHNS survey question does not distinguish between 
the old Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) and the current New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(NRCMS), the community head or health workers report the implementation date of the CMS in the 
community. As the NRCMS was first introduced in rural areas in 2003, the community that starts the CMS 
in 2003 or later should be considered as an NRCMS community. A county with any community 
implementing the NRCMS is defined as a NRCMS county given that the insurance program is managed at 
the county level. As a result, 12 non-NRCMS counties are excluded, and the final sample consists of 22 
NRCMS counties and 1,285 households in total5.  
2.4.2 FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH INSURANCE AVAILABILITY IN THE COMMUNITY 
The determinants of demand for the NRCMS may not be generalizable to the entire population if the 
availability of insurance is systematically selective. For example, if the NRCMS targets first  at areas with 
easier access to health facilities, better quality health services or higher socioeconomic status, the high 
enrolment rates in these regions may not be easily achieved when the insurance is rolled out to other 
more challenging regions. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the availability of the NRCMS 
is correlated with factors that might affect household demand for the insurance. In this section, the 
community-level characteristics are compared between counties with and without the NRCMS in 2004 
and 20066. The summary statistics would provide a better understanding of the rolling out process of the 
NRCMS and show the difference between the insured and the uninsured communities in early waves. The 
variables included represent 12 broad areas that reflect the urbanicity level of the community, such as 
population density, economic activity, traditional/modern markets, transportation infrastructure, 
sanitation facilities, communications, housing, education, diversity, health infrastructure and social 
service (Jones-Smith and Popkin, 2010). Detailed variable selection in these 12 areas is as follows:  
(1) Population density: total population of the community divided by community area; 
                                                                    
5 More detailed description on sample selection can be found in Table A 2.1 in Appendix.  
6 Only summary statistics results are presented here since there is a too small sample size to run the regressions.  
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(2) Economic activity: daily wage of an ordinary male worker (RMB), proportion of workforce engaged in 
non-agricultural work; 
(3) Traditional markets: Distance to the nearest free market (km), the longest opening hours (days/week) 
of the available free markets;  
(4) Modern markets: number of supermarkets in the community, number of modern markets (cafes, 
internet cafes, indoor restaurants, outdoor fixed and mobile eateries, bakeries, ice cream vendors, fruit 
and vegetable stores and vendors, bars) in the community; 
(5) Transportation infrastructure: type of the most commonly used roads in or around the 
village/neighbourhood7, distance to the nearest bus stop (km), distance to the nearest train station (km); 
(6) Sanitation: proportion of households with treated water, proportion of households without excreta 
present outside the home; 
(7) Communications: availability of cinema, daily newspaper, postal service, telephone service in the 
village/neighbourhood, percent of households with a computer, television or cell-phone; 
(8) Housing: average number of days a week that electricity is available in the community, percent of 
households in the community with indoor tap water, percent of households in the community with flush 
toilets, percent of households in the community with gas cooker; 
(9) Education: average education level among adults older than 21 years old8; 
(10) Diversity: variance in community education level, variance in community income level;  
(11) Health infrastructure: presence of public health facilities in or near the community (<12km), highest 
level of public health facilities in or near the community (<12km)9, number of health facilities in or near 
the community (<12km), presence of pharmacy in the community; 
(12) Social service: provision of preschool for children under 3 years old and availability of commercial 
medical insurance.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the factors associated with insurance availability in the community in 2004 and 
2006. The results indicate that the 2004 pattern is different from that in 2006. In 2004, only 10 out of 
                                                                    
7 Type of the most commonly used roads is represented by a categorical variable: it is defined as 1 for dirt road, 2 for stone, gravel 
or mixed material road and 3 for paved road.  
8 Average education level is defined as a categorical variable: 0 if no education, 1 if graduating from primary school, 2 if having 
lower middle school degree, 3 if having upper middle school degree, 4 if having technical or vocational degree, 5 if having university 
or college degree and 6 if having master’s degree or higher.  
9 The highest level of public health facilities in or near the community is denoted by a categorical variable: 1 for village clinics, 
private clinics and other clinics; 2 for town hospitals, town family planning service and other hospitals; 3 for county hospitals, 
county maternal and child clinics, work unit clinics and county maternal and child hospitals; and 4 for neighbourhood clinics, 
community hospitals, work unit hospitals, district hospitals, city hospitals, army hospitals, university/provincial/specialized 
hospitals, private hospitals and city maternal and child hospitals. 
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140 communities introduced the NRCMS, and the insured ones were more developed in economic terms 
(more people working in non-agricultural sectors) and transportation facilities (better constructed 
roads). In 2006, the number of insured communities has increased to 64 out of 10910. More vulnerable 
communities were targeted, and the insured ones appeared to be less developed in economic terms (with 
fewer people working in non-agricultural sectors and fewer modern markets) and housing facilities (with 
fewer households with flush toilets).  The results indicate that the insurance was introduced in relatively 
rich communities from 2003 to 2004 and was then extended to less developed regions from 2004 to 
2006. The significant difference is mainly related to seemingly unimportant factors, and the communities 
that introduced the insurance early and those that took it later are generally similar with each other. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that insured and uninsured communities may have some unobserved 
differences that may bias the results.   
[Tables 2.2 and 2.3 about here] 
2.4.3 INSURANCE DESIGN OF THE NRCMS IN 2006 
Since the NRCMS package varies across counties, insurance design may affect the household demand for 
the NRCMS as well. Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show the variation of insurance design in treated 
communities across eastern, middle and western provinces in 2006. The figures provide information 
about whether the insurance benefits differ geographically, in terms of deductibles, reimbursement rates 
and spending caps and whether we need to account for regional heterogeneity in the analysis that 
follows. Only the reimbursement data for inpatient care is used here since the coverage for outpatient 
care is very limited. The data quality is low because many people are unclear of the detailed 
reimbursement rules. The NRCMS offers various benefit packages for different types of health services 
and health care delivered by different levels of health facilities. The rules are perhaps too complicated for 
people to work out how much they can actually benefit from the insurance.  
Figure 2.1 plots the histograms of the NRCMS premium separately for eastern, middle and western 
regions. The premium is largely charged within the national range (10-15 RMB per person per year), 
suggesting that county governments set very similar premium levels. Almost all western communities set 
                                                                    
10 There are 145 rural communities in 2006 survey, but 46 communities are dropped because they introduced the urban social 
health insurance programs during 2004 and 2006. No rural counties introduced urban social health insurance programs.  
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the lowest limit at around 10 RMB, while some communities in eastern and middle regions set relatively 
higher premium at around 15 RMB.  
[Figure 2.1 about here] 
Figure 2.2 plots the histograms of reimbursement rates for inpatient care. There is some heterogeneity 
across communities, but the reimbursement rates mainly concentrate between 40 and 70%. The eastern 
and middle regions set relatively low reimbursement rates at around 40-60%, while the majority of the 
western communities set higher levels at around 60-70%. Possible reasons may be that 1) lower price 
levels in western regions lead to relatively more generous coverage of health services; 2) the central 
government subsidize more towards poor communities in western regions (You and Kobayashi, 2009).  
[Figure 2.2 about here] 
The variation of deductibles and spending caps for inpatient care is shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. There is 
some regional heterogeneity in the deductibles, with relatively lower levels in western provinces 
compared with eastern and middle ones. The levels of spending caps are quite similar across the three 
regions and concentrate largely within the range from 10,000 to 20,000 RMB.  
In general, there is some regional variation in the levels of reimbursement rates and deductibles, and the 
western region offers relatively more generous coverage with higher reimbursement rates and lower 
deductibles.  Therefore, the insurance package is not geographically homogeneous, which underlies the 
importance of subgroup analysis over regions when explaining the pattern of household demand for the 
NRCMS.  
[Figures 2.3 and 2.4 about here] 
2.4.4 HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR THE NRCMS IN 2006  
Following Nguyen and Knowles (2010), the demand for social health insurance can be expressed as 
follows:  
𝑆𝐻𝐼 = 𝐹(𝐼, 𝐸, 𝐻, 𝑃, 𝑃𝑚,𝑐 , 𝑄𝑚,𝑐 , 𝑃𝑚,𝑢𝑐, 𝑄𝑚,𝑢𝑐, 𝑍)  
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where SHI is a binary variable that is 1 if the individual is enrolled and 0 otherwise. The function F takes 
the form of a logit or probit function. I, E, H represent the individual’s income, education and health 
respectively. 𝑃 denotes the insurance premium. 𝑃𝑚,𝑐  and 𝑄𝑚,𝑐  are the price and quality of medical 
services covered by the insurance while 𝑃𝑚,𝑢𝑐  and  𝑄𝑚,𝑢𝑐 are the price and quality of medical services not 
covered by the insurance. Z is a vector of other exogenous variables that may affect demand.  
Since participation in the NRCMS is on a household basis, all household members are defined as insured 
if the household head is reported as enrolled11. The dependent variable is thus defined as a binary 
indicator of the NRCMS household membership. The CHNS asks each respondent whether he/she has 
Cooperative Medical Scheme, but makes no distinction between the old and new scheme. As the study 
sample is restricted to counties where the NRCMS has been implemented, it is reasonable to define the 
CMS enrolees in the NRCMS counties as NRCMS participants.  
The main independent variables are the ones related to the insurance design. Insurance premium can 
reflect the cost of obtaining the NRCMS while the price and quality of the medical services covered and 
uncovered by the insurance represents the expected benefits of obtaining the NRCMS12. People’s demand 
for health insurance depends mainly on whether the benefits they expect to gain from the insurance 
exceed the premium cost they pay. In the absence of data on the price and quality of medical care 
provided by various health facilities, facility choice is used as a proxy to control for the observed wide 
variation in terms of price and quality. Since the NRCMS offers a more generous reimbursement for 
health services delivered by low-level facilities, people who go to village clinics or town hospitals are 
faced with lower price than people who use county or city hospitals. However, low-level facilities also 
provide lower quality health services than high-level ones. Therefore, facility choice is expected to play 
an important role in modelling the demand for the NRCMS since it reflects the variation in both price and 
quality of medical services: compared with county or city hospitals, village clinics or town hospitals offer 
poorer quality health services at a cheaper price.  . 
The question on household preference towards different levels of health facilities is formulated as 
follows “If household members are sick or want to see a doctor, dentist, nurse or other health worker, 
                                                                    
11 The insurance dummy is defined based on the insurance status reported by household heads because some household members 
may be unaware of their insurance status given that only the household heads make the insurance decisions.  
12 The premium is not included as an independent variable for the following two reasons: 1) the premium variable has a high 
proportion of missing values, leading to a small estimation sample size. 2) Given that local governments cannot vary premium 
according to individual characteristics, there is not much variation in the premium levels (see Figure 2.2).  
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which clinics and hospitals can they use?”13 Respondents can choose from 15 types of health facilities, 
including village clinic, private clinic, work unit clinic, other clinic, town family planning service, town 
hospital, county maternal and child hospital, county hospital, city maternal and child hospital, city 
hospital, worker’s hospital, other hospital, drugstore and other. Each household can choose more than 
one categories. We construct five dummies for village clinic, private clinic, town hospital, county hospital, 
city hospital and other types of health facilities14, respectively. Village clinic, town hospital, county 
hospital and city hospital are all public health facilities while private clinic represents private health 
facilities.  We treat the private clinics variable as the reference category and use the other four dummies 
in the model. All the facility choice dummies are lagged by one survey period in the model because they 
may be influenced by the insurance enrolment.  
The analysis uses the following model to estimate the demand for the NRCMS:   
𝐼𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,      {
𝐼𝑖 = 1 if 𝐼𝑖
∗ > 0; 
𝐼𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                         (2.1) 
where 𝐼𝑖
∗ is a continuous and latent variable measuring the net benefits of the NRCMS, 𝐼𝑖  is the observed 
insurance coverage, 𝐶𝑖  denotes the vector of facility choice dummies, 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of household 
characteristics, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are vectors of coefficients, 𝜀𝑖 measures unobserved factors.  
Other independent variables (𝑋𝑖) can be broadly classified into eight groups: (1) demographic 
characteristics of the household head, i.e., gender, household size, marital status, ethnicity (Han and 
ethnic minority) and geographic dummies (eastern, middle and western areas); (2) age, i.e., age of the 
household head, proportion of children under 18 in the household and proportion of elderly family 
members over 55 in the household; (3) household income and wealth level; (4) education level, i.e., 
illiterate (reference group), primary school, junior high school, senior high school and above; (5) labour 
condition, i.e., working ratio (proportion of working people in the household) and farmer; (6) health 
condition of the household, i.e., self-assessed health status of the household head, presence of major 
diseases of household head (hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, stroke, bone fracture and asthma) and 
the ratio of household members with chronic diseases; (7) risk preference of the household head, i.e., 
                                                                    
13 The response to this question reflects both facility preference and accessibility. Facility choice is not purely driven by the 
preference, but also restricted by people’s ability to access these health facilities.  
14 The frequencies of utilization in different levels of health facilities are as follows: village clinic (4115), private clinic (1794), town 
hospital (3055), county hospital (2203), city hospital (2576), private clinic (1794), other facilities (1167).  
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overweight, abdominal obesity, smoking status and alcohol consumption and (8) health facility 
characteristics such as waiting time, treatment cost for a common cold, travel cost and drug availability. 
All the independent variables are lagged by one survey period to account for the endogenous relationship 
between the take-up of the health insurance and the covariates.  
The analysis begins with a simple model containing only health facility dummy variables and examines 
the relationship between facility choice and insurance coverage by adding explanatory variables to 
control for observed sources of heterogeneity across individuals. To lessen the chance that omitted 
variables are driving the observed correlation between insurance and facility choice, the model 
subsequently includes demographic characteristics, age, income, education levels, health status, risk 
preference and facility characteristics in the demand for the insurance. Finally, county fixed effects are 
also controlled for in the last model to account for the geographic heterogeneity.  
However, it is possible that the relationship between facility choice and insurance enrolment is 
endogenous if there exist unobserved factors that influence both people’s choice of health facilities and 
their decisions to purchase the insurance. For example, people with chronic diseases may be more likely 
to use low-level health facilities for frequent and routine treatments, and also tend to obtain greater 
value from the NRCMS. In principle, one can identify the causal effect of facility choice on insurance 
enrolment if there is a valid instrumental variable (IV) that is correlated with facility choice but not 
correlated with insurance enrolment given facility choice and other covariates. However, it is difficult to 
find a valid IV for the problem here15. Any variable that has an impact on facility choice may also have a 
potential influence on insurance enrolment conditional on facility choice. For example, the presence of 
different levels of health facilities in the community obviously offers more convenient access to these 
facilities for people living in the community, but the facility location may also influence people’s 
willingness to purchase the NRCMS. Therefore, the validity of IV is questionable.  
In the absence of appropriate IVs, this paper further examines whether facility choice and insurance 
enrolment share common covariates. To calculate how much the relationship between facility choice and 
insurance coverage is attributed to various characteristics, the analysis adopts a method used by Doiron 
                                                                    
15 The following variables has been used as the instruments for facility choice: the presence of village clinics in the community, the 
presence of town hospitals in the community, the presence of county hospitals in the community, the presence of city hospitals in 
the community, the presence of other facilities in the community, travel time to the nearest health facility and travel cost to the 
nearest health facility. However, they do not pass standard IV tests for weak instruments and they do not appear to satisfy the 
assumption of exclusion restrictions. Therefore, the IV estimation results are not shown here, but are available upon request.  
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et al. (2008) to investigate the correlation between self-reported health status (SAHS) and private health 
insurance coverage in Australia. Reduced form models for insurance and facility choice are estimated 
with all explanatory variables except for facility choice. We then compare components of the estimated 
latent variables for facility choice and insurance purchase. Specifically, the insurance choice is modelled 
using a binary logit regression as in Equation (2.1) but excluding the 𝐶𝑖  dummies:  
𝐼𝑖
∗ = 𝛿′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,       {
𝐼𝑖 = 1 if 𝐼𝑖
∗ > 0; 
𝐼𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                                        (2.2) 
and facility choice is defined as a binary variable that equals to one if the household uses low-level public 
health facilities (village clinics or town hospitals) and equals to zero if  the household uses high-level 
public health facilities (county or city hospitals). We again use a logit regression to model the facility 
choice:  
𝐹𝑖
∗ = 𝜋′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 ,       {
𝐹𝑖 = 1 if 𝐹𝑖
∗ > 0; 
𝐹𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                                        (2.3) 
However, the errors in Equation (2.2) and (2.3) are very likely to be correlated since facility choice may 
affect insurance enrolment. Therefore, a bivariate probit model is more appropriate to be used here to 
account for the correlation between the error terms in both models.  
2.5 RESULTS:  
2.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics of 2006 and 2009 samples by insurance status16. In 2006, 
households who use village clinics and town hospitals (low-level public health facilities) are more likely 
to enrol in the NRCMS compared with households who use county and city hospitals (high-level public 
health facilities). Insured households in 2006 are also more likely to have larger household size, belong to 
the minority ethnicity groups, live in eastern and middle provinces, have lower wealth levels and are 
supported by more working people. The heads of the insured households tend to be younger males who 
are married, literate and work as farmers. There is no evidence of adverse selection since heads in better 
health are more likely to purchase the insurance. However, moral hazard may play a role here given that 
                                                                    
16 Demand analysis in 2004 is not shown here because only 10 counties introduced the NRCMS. There is a too small sample size.  
 35 
the insured heads tend to be overweight and daily alcohol drinkers. The NRCMS may lower their costs in 
ill health states and make them take fewer precautions or invest less in preventive measures. Households 
with better access to health services (with shorter waiting times) are also more likely to be covered. 
Almost all the significant differences disappear in 2009, which may be due to the fact that the insurance 
by then covers the majority of the rural sample. Therefore, in the rest of the analysis, we only use data 
from 2004 to 2006 when the insurance was newly introduced in most rural areas and the enrolment 
rates are still not high.   
[Table 2.4 about here] 
2.5.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
To test the robustness of the results, Table 2.5 presents the marginal effects of facility preference on 
insurance enrolment by subsequently adding different sets of independent variables in the insurance 
logit in 200617. The explanatory variables can be divided into eight groups: (1) demographic 
characteristics of the head and the household; (2) age of the head and other household members; (3) 
household income and wealth level; (4) education level of the head; (5) occupation and labour condition; 
(6) health status of the head and other household members; (7) risk-related health behaviours of the 
head; (8) health facility characteristics. Finally, we also control for the county fixed effects in the last 
model. Each column of results represents a separate logit.  
Model 1 uses only the facility preference dummies including the choice of village clinics, town hospitals, 
county hospitals, city hospitals and other facilities. There is a significant relationship between facility 
choice and insurance coverage in 2006. Individuals who use village clinics or town hospitals (low-level 
public health facilities) are 12-15 percent more likely to be covered by the NRCMS, while people who use 
county or city hospitals (high-level public health facilities) are 8-12 percent less likely to be enrolled.  
In Model 2, a set of 6 demographic variables are added to the logit. These variables include information 
on gender, household size, ethnicity, marital status and geographical dummies. The pseudo R2 increases 
dramatically from 4.6% in Model 1 to 13.5% after the inclusion of these controls.  There is a decrease in 
the positive correlation between the choice of low-level public health facilities and insurance enrolment, 
                                                                    
17 More detailed results can be found in Table A 2.1 in Appendix. The demand for the NRCMS in 2009 is shown in Table A 2.2 in 
Appendix. None of the coefficients of facility choice is significant in 2009 because the enrolment rate is too high (95%).  
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however, the negative correlation between the choice of high-level public health facilities and the 
insurance becomes even stronger. Model 3 adds 3 age-related variables: age of the household head, 
proportion of people under 18 years old within the household and proportion of people above 55 years 
old within the household. The relationship between facility choice and insurance purchase is not much 
affected.   
Model 4 adds 2 variables representing household income and wealth level. They slightly reduce the 
relationship between the choice of low-level health facilities and the probability of getting insurance, 
while the relationship between city hospitals and insurance has been strengthened. With the addition of 
3 variables on education and 2 variables on occupation in Models 5 and 6, the correlation between 
facility choice and insurance enrolment remains almost the same.  
Models 7 and 8 include health variables (self-rated health status of household head, presence of chronic 
conditions of household head, proportion of people with chronic diseases within the household) and risk-
related health behaviours of household head (overweight, abdominal obesity, smoking and drinking), 
respectively.  The main relationship between facility choice and insurance is not very much affected.  
Most coefficients become smaller but still remain significant. Model 9 adds health facility characteristics, 
including travel cost to the nearest health facility, waiting time, drug availability and treatment cost of a 
common cold. These variables largely reduce the correlation between county hospitals and the insurance, 
leading to an insignificant result. However, the effects of town hospitals and city hospitals are both 
stronger.  
Finally, the last model controls for county fixed effects, which are defined by 21 county dummies18. These 
variables would be expected to explain the majority of the correlation between facility choice and 
insurance given that the insurance package differs geographically. In fact, including these variables 
largely reduces the relationship between the use of high-level health facilities and the insurance, but the 
effect of the low-level health facility use on insurance enrolment still remains significant. People who go 
to village clinics or town hospitals have an 8-14 percentage point higher probability of having insurance 
compared with those who use private clinics (the reference group).  
                                                                    
18 The sample size is largely reduced in the last model after controlling for the county fixed effects, however, the significance and 
magnitudes of the coefficients are similar when Model 1 to 9 are run based on the sample of Model 10 (Table A 2.3 in Appendix). It 
indicates that the results presented here are not driven by the change of the sample size.   
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In summary, there is a positive, strong and significant empirical relationship between the use of the low-
level public health facilities (village clinics and town hospitals) and insurance enrolment and a negative 
relationship between the use of high-level public health facilities (county and city hospitals) and the 
insurance. The latter effects are largely reduced after the inclusion of health facility characteristics and 
county fixed effects, suggesting that the significant relationship is mainly accounted for by these two 
factors. The significant relationship between the use of primary level care and insurance remains strong 
and consistent across all models.  
[Table 2.5 about here] 
The quantitative relationship between facility choice and insurance coverage is made clearer by looking 
at the probability of purchasing the insurance. Table 2.6 presents the average predicted probability of 
insurance with all explanatory variables at their sample means. The average predicted probabilities by 
facility choice are calculated by placing each observation in different categories of health providers. The 
predicted probabilities are computed based on the coefficients of the two extreme models in Table 2.5: 
Model 1 with only facility choice dummies and Model 10 with the maximum number of explanatory 
variables and county fixed effects. There is a drop of 20 percentage points between the probability of 
coverage for those who use village clinics and those who use city hospitals in Model 1. After the inclusion 
of all other control variables, the fall in probability of coverage becomes even larger at the level of 24 
percentage points. Therefore, people who use low-level public health facilities are more likely to 
purchase the insurance than people who use high-level public health facilities.   
[Table 2.6 about here] 
Table 2.7 presents additional results of selected variables based on Models 9 and 1019. The results 
indicate that households with larger sizes are more likely to purchase the insurance. The heads of the 
insured households also tend to belong to the minority ethnicity groups. Geographic residence is found to 
be an important determinant of insurance coverage, since households living in eastern and middle 
provinces are more likely to be covered, even if they are faced with higher premium and more limited 
reimbursement compared with western households. Wealth level decreases the likelihood of insurance 
coverage, which indicates that the NRCMS appears to be more attractive to poor households.  
                                                                    
19 The full set of results is available Table A 2.2 in the Appendix. Results of Model 9 are also presented here because the geographic 
dummies are omitted in Model 10.  
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[Table 2.7 about here] 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 further look at the heterogeneity across different income groups and regions. The 
significant relationship between the choice of low-level facilities and insurance enrolment is mainly 
driven by people from low income groups who live in western regions (the poorest regions)20. The 
NRCMS appears to be attractive among the poor rural households who prefer low-level facilities, while 
the rich households may forego insurance benefits and incur the full treatment fees instead of risking 
lower quality of care.  
[Tables 2.8 and 2.9 about here] 
In order to investigate the factors driving the correlation between facility choice and insurance 
enrolment, separate logit and bivariate probit models are run for both outcomes. The correlation 
coefficient between these two outcomes is 0.22 and significant at 1% level. Therefore, the bivariate 
probit model needs to be used to account for the correlation between the error terms. All the significant 
variables have the same sign for both outcomes, indicating a positive correlation between the probability 
of seeking care at low-level health facilities and the probability of purchasing the NRCMS. Female 
household head reduces both the use of low-level facilities and insurance coverage, while households of 
larger size are more likely to buy insurance and be treated at low-level facilities. There is a strong 
negative effect of asset index on both the likelihood of having insurance and using low-level facilities. It 
indicates the NRCMS appears to be more popular among poor households, perhaps because they prefer 
cheap services from low-level facilities. High-income households, on the other hand, may be less likely to 
be enrolled in the insurance because they distrust the low quality services at primary facilities.  
[Table 2.10 about here] 
In summary, we find a positive and significant relationship between the choice of low-level public health 
facilities and insurance coverage. The correlation is particularly strong among poor households living in 
western regions. In addition, households with larger size, belonging to the minority ethnicity groups, 
living in eastern and middle provinces or with a lower wealth level are also more likely to be enrolled in 
                                                                    
20 China has diverse socioeconomic conditions across eastern, middle and western provinces. The eastern provinces are high-
income regions while the western provinces are low-income regions. Eastern provinces include Liaoning, Jiangsu and Shandong; 
Middle provinces include Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; Western provinces include Guangxi and Guizhou.  
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the NRCMS. Further correlation analysis confirms the relationship between facility choice and insurance 
enrolment since all the significant variables (e.g. female household head, household size, asset index) 
drive both outcomes in the same direction.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The demand for the NRCMS is affected by some features specific to informal sectors in developing 
countries: the premium is heavily subsidized by governments; reimbursement is more generous for 
health care delivered by low-level health facilities in order to direct patients to seek primary care first; 
the quality of health services provided by low-level health facilities is perceived to be low. Therefore, we 
should expect that the demand function behaves in a way different from the demand for private health 
insurance in developed countries. This study finds a strong positive relationship between the NRCMS 
coverage and the use of low-level public health facilities: people who use village clinics or town hospitals 
are more likely to be covered compared to people who use county or city hospitals.  
The results may reflect the existing problems related to reimbursement, quality of primary care 
providers and the referral system across different levels of health facilities. Since low-level public health 
facilities have lower deductibles, higher reimbursement rates and lower reimbursement caps for 
inpatient care compared with high-level ones, the insurance appears to be more attractive among people 
who access town hospitals. Although village clinics only deliver outpatient care and the NRCMS appears 
to provide little or no coverage for this type of care, people who use village clinics are still more likely to 
enrol since they are expected to benefit from more choices and better quality health services in higher-
level facilities after the insurance.21 However, the negative relationship between the use of high-level 
health facilities and insurance enrolment may indicate that the perception of quality of care is an 
important factor affecting enrolment in the NRCMS. Those who perceive the quality of primary care to be 
poor are perhaps not willing to switch to village clinics and town hospitals and therefore less likely to 
enrol in the insurance. They would rather forego insurance benefits and incur full treatment fees given 
limited reimbursement rates at high-level facilities and poor quality of care at low-level ones. The 
findings are consistent with the existing literature that also finds that quality perception is related to 
insurance demand in the context of developing countries (Alkenbrack et al., 2013; Nguyen and Knowles, 
                                                                    
21 Given the poor quality of health care delivered by village clinics, people choose to use this type of facility mainly out of financial 
concern. With the help of insurance, they tend to go to higher-level facilities for better quality outpatient and inpatient services.  
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2010; Sepehri et al., 2009). This is particularly true in China since the infrastructure of primary health 
care facilities in rural areas has lagged behind the development of high-level hospitals in cities. Rather 
than risking low quality care, many patients tend to seek initial care at secondary or tertiary hospitals for 
minor ailments. The health care delivery therefore remains hospital-centred and fragmented, and 
primary health facilities have not been able to perform a gate-keeping function (Yip and Hsiao, 2014). 
The inequitable health care utilization is also related to the inefficient referral system with a high 
transaction cost involved in obtaining a referral. Although the health insurance benefits are in principle 
portable, provided that the insured obtain a letter of referral from the designated health facility, in 
practice the referral system is working poorly because of competition for profits between different levels 
of health facilities.  
Some caveats should be noted. The regression models do not control for the quality of care received by 
patients. The inclusion of the facility choice may act as a proxy for quality of care in that higher level 
public health facilities tend to provide a higher quality of care than lower level public health facilities. 
However, the estimated coefficients of the type of health facility may be subject to omitted variable bias if 
there exists any unobserved variable that affects both facility choice and insurance enrolment. We have 
not been able to find an appropriate instrumental variable given the data availability. Future study is 
worthwhile to explore the endogeneity issue of the facility choice variables. Secondly, the facility choice 
question reflects both the preference and availability of different levels of health facilities. Cautions 
should be given when we interpret the relationship between facility choice and insurance enrolment. 
Finally, if the NRCMS pilot scheme is not randomly allocated across communities or if the variation in the 
insurance design is related to insurance enrolment, the results found here may not be generalizable to 
other regions in rural China.  
China achieved a very high enrolment rate for the NRCMS over the last ten years. The take-up rate 
reached 98% in 2012, much higher than most other developing countries. One possible reason is the 
enforcement and strong regulatory capacity of the Chinese governments. The central government sets 
enrolment targets for each local government and leads them into a competition for high enrolment rates. 
Local government officials exert considerable efforts to show strong political commitment through 
intensive advertising campaigns and door-to-door appeals. Secondly, the high enrolment rate may also be 
attributed to more comprehensive benefit packages over time with a massive injection of government 
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subsidies. The coverage of the scheme has expanded from mainly catastrophic illnesses in earlier years to 
both outpatient and preventive care, and there is a large increase in reimbursement rates as well. By 
2012, the targeted reimbursement rates had already reached 75% for inpatient care expenses. Generous 
benefit packages attract more rural residents to become enrolled. Finally, the improvement in low-level 
health facilities may also play an important role in expanding insurance coverage. In recent years, 
Chinese government has directed much funding into strengthening the infrastructure and improving 
workforce productivity at primary health care level (Yip et al., 2012). Given the results of this study, 
demand for the NRCMS is highly sensitive to the quality of care covered by the insurance. Therefore, 
improving quality of insured services may help to expand coverage.  
To meet the challenge of covering the majority of the rural population in the long run, it is important to 
understand the mechanism underlying the NRMCS take-up decision and the factors that drive demand 
for social health insurance in rural areas, which could also be of interest to other governments facing 
similar problems. This study shows that the perception of quality of care may be an important factor 
affecting enrolment in the NRCMS. Therefore, to expand the insurance coverage in the long run, priorities 
should be given to the improvement of the infrastructure and workforce at primary care level. Low-level 
health facilities are expected to serve as gate-keepers and manage to provide basic health care to the 
rural poor. The referral system across different levels of health facilities should also be strengthened to 
delivery services more efficiently. The financing system of low- and high-level facilities should be 
integrated in order to increase coordination and integration of health care delivery between primary care 
and hospitals.  
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Table 2.1: Reimbursement rules of the NRCMS for inpatient spending by area and different levels of 
health facilities 
Area Healthcare provider level Reimbursement rule (median) 
  Deductible (RMB) Ceiling (RMB) Coinsurance (%) 
National Township health centre 200 10,000 45-65 
 County hospital 305 10,000 50-70 
 Higher level hospital 500 10,000 55-80 
East Township health centre 400 20,000 40-70 
 County hospital 500 20,000 50-75 
 Higher level hospital 900 20,000 52-80 
Central Township health centre 100 10,000 45-70 
 County hospital 300 10,000 50-70 
 Higher level hospital 551 10,000 50-75 
West Township health centre 100 5,000 50-55 
 County hospital 200 5,000 55-70 
 Higher level hospital 400 5,350 60-70 




Table 2.2: Insurance availability in the community in 2004 
 Uninsured Insured  Difference P-value 
Population density 3516.74 1345.86 2170.88 0.42 
Daily wage for ordinary male workers (RMB) 32.75 30.64 2.12 0.80 
Proportion of people working in non-agricultural work 0.56 0.74 -0.18 0.07* 
Distance to the nearest traditional market (km) 0.84 0.52 0.33 0.64 
Opening hours of the traditional markets (days/week) 6.03 5.33 0.70 0.41 
No. of supermarkets in the community 3.55 3.00 0.55 0.86 
No. of modern markets in the community 37.01 60.80 -23.79 0.23 
Type of the most commonly used road 2.51 2.90 -0.39 0.07* 
Distance to the nearest bus stop (km) 1.32 1.60 -0.28 0.74 
Distance to the nearest train stop (km) 43.31 21.00 22.31 0.26 
Proportion of households with treated water 0.63 0.77 -0.15 0.28 
Proportion of households without excreta present outside the home 0.68 0.83 -0.14 0.12 
Availability of daily newspaper in the community 0.48 0.60 -0.12 0.45 
Availability of postal service in the community 0.83 0.90 -0.07 0.57 
Availability of telephone in the community 0.84 0.90 -0.06 0.61 
Proportion of households with a computer, TV or cellphone 0.41 0.41 -0.00 0.99 
Number of days a week that electricity is available to the community 6.76 6.60 0.16 0.41 
Proportion of households with indoor tap water 0.46 0.59 -0.13 0.32 
Proportion of households with flush toilet  0.26 0.34 -0.08 0.51 
Proportion of households with gas/electricity cooker 0.25 0.10 0.15 0.09* 
Average education level among adults >21 years old 1.53 1.56 -0.03 0.86 
Variation in community education level 1.11 1.33 -0.22 0.16 
Variation in community income level 338545.10 279415.12 59129.98 0.68 
Presence of public health facilities in or near the community 0.97 1.00 -0.03 0.58 
Highest level of public health facilities in or near the community 2.41 2.30 0.11 0.71 
Number of health facilities in or near the community 2.07 1.60 0.47 0.22 
Presence of pharmacy in the community 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.69 
Provision of preschool for children under 3 0.24 0.20 0.04 0.78 
Availability of commercial health insurance 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.68 
Number of communities 130 10   
Notes: * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at 1% level.  
 
 
Table 2.3: Insurance availability in the community in 2006 
 Uninsured Insured  Difference P-value 
Population density 3002.79 726.97 2275.81 0.05* 
Daily wage for ordinary male workers (RMB) 43.84 41.47 2.37 0.34 
Proportion of people working in non-agricultural work 0.62 0.50 0.11 0.04** 
Distance to the nearest traditional market (km) 1.45 1.95 -0.50 0.50 
Opening hours of the traditional markets (days/week) 5.80 5.77 0.03 0.94 
No. of supermarkets in the community 2.02 1.08 0.94 0.20 
No. of modern markets in the community 45.13 21.55 23.59 0.01*** 
Type of the most commonly used road 2.58 2.61 -0.03 0.79 
Distance to the nearest bus stop (km) 2.40 2.98 -0.58 0.62 
Distance to the nearest train stop (km) 45.99 30.72 15.27 0.14 
Proportion of households with treated water 0.60 0.62 -0.02 0.79 
Proportion of households without excreta present outside the home 0.64 0.65 -0.01 0.83 
Availability of daily newspaper in the community 0.64 0.53 0.11 0.28 
Availability of postal service in the community 0.87 0.86 0.01 0.89 
Availability of telephone in the community 0.91 0.86 0.05 0.42 
Proportion of households with a computer, TV or cellphone 0.48 0.46 0.02 0.39 
Number of days a week that electricity is available to the community 6.61 6.76 -0.15 0.38 
Proportion of households with indoor tap water 0.47 0.38 0.09 0.26 
Proportion of households with flush toilet  0.33 0.17 0.16 0.01*** 
Proportion of households with gas/electricity cooker 0.31 0.36 -0.05 0.38 
Average education level among adults >21 years old 1.52 1.34 0.19 0.06* 
Variation in community education level 1.27 1.13 0.14 0.11 
Variation in community income level 412540.10 1191491.08 -778950.98 0.19 
Presence of public health facilities in or near the community 0.94 0.93 0.00 0.99 
Highest level of public health facilities in or near the community 2.19 2.04 0.15 0.46 
Number of health facilities in or near the community 1.77 1.78 -0.01 0.97 
Presence of pharmacy in the community 0.00 0.00 0.00 --- 
Provision of preschool for children under 3 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.06* 
Availability of commercial health insurance 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.20 
Number of communities 45 64   
Notes: * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at 1% level.  
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Figure 2.1: Histograms of annual premium by regions 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Histograms of reimbursement rates of inpatient care 









































Figure 2.3: Histograms of deductibles of inpatient care 
 







































Spending Caps for Inpatient Services (Yuan)
Graphs by region
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of household-level characteristics by insurance status in 2006 and 2009 

















Village clinics 0.42 0.59 -0.16 0.00*** 0.48 0.58 -0.10 0.14  
Town hospitals 0.29 0.40 -0.11 0.00*** 0.50 0.45 0.05 0.49  
County hospitals 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.00*** 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.50  
City hospitals 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00*** 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.03**  
Private clinics* 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.00*** 0.07 0.15 -0.08 0.11  
Other facilities 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.00*** 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.35  
Female household head 0.31 0.20 0.11 0.00*** 0.30 0.17 0.12 0.02*  
Household size 3.67 3.92 -0.24 0.00*** 3.80 4.30 -0.50 0.03**  
Minority ethnicity 0.11 0.16 -0.05 0.00** 0.04 0.12 -0.08 0.08  
Married 0.82 0.89 -0.07 0.00*** 0.89 0.90 -0.02 0.67  
East provinces 0.18 0.32 -0.15 0.00*** 0.07 0.22 -0.15 0.01***  
Middle provinces 0.30 0.44 -0.14 0.00*** 0.93 0.73 0.19 0.00***  
Western provinces* 0.52 0.24 0.29 0.00*** 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.11  
Age of household head 51.18 48.34 2.84 0.00*** 57.71 51.14 6.57 0.00***  
Proportion age<18 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.23 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.02**  
Proportion age>55 0.26 0.24 0.03 0.06* 0.41 0.28 0.14 0.00***  
Household income 9.33 9.42 -0.10 0.11 8.51 9.15 -0.64 0.02*  
Asset index 1.28 1.14 0.14 0.00*** 1.15 1.11 0.04 0.52  
Illiterate* 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.03** 0.46 0.37 0.09 0.18  
Primary school 0.36 0.36 -0.01 0.81 0.24 0.25 -0.01 0.83  
Junior high school 0.29 0.34 -0.06 0.01*** 0.24 0.29 -0.04 0.48  
Senior high school and 
above 
0.14 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.39  
Household head is a 
farmer 
0.35 0.43 -0.08 0.00*** 0.42 0.57 -0.15 0.03**  
Ratio of working people 
in household 
0.46 0.50 -0.04 0.01*** 0.30 0.41 -0.11 0.02**  
SAH excellent or good* 0.53 0.63 -0.10 0.00*** 0.62 0.60 0.02 0.81  
SAH fair or poor 0.47 0.37 0.10 0.00*** 0.38 0.40 -0.02 0.81  
Household head has 
chronic disease 
0.11 0.13 -0.03 0.09 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.59  
Household chronic 
disease ratio 
0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.77  
Household head is 
overweight 
0.53 0.61 -0.08 0.00*** 0.61 0.69 -0.08 0.22  
Household head is 
abdominal obesity 
0.48 0.58 -0.09 0.00*** 0.71 0.71 -0.00 0.96  
Household head is 
smoker 
0.57 0.58 -0.02 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.00 1.00  
Household head is daily 
drinker 
0.19 0.23 -0.04 0.05** 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.09*  
Travel cost to the 
nearest health facility 
0.23 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.27 -0.11 0.48  
Waiting time 7.14 4.56 2.58 0.00*** 8.46 5.31 3.15 0.02**  
Drug availability  0.99 0.98 0.00 0.40 1.00 0.99 0.01 0.58  
Treatment cost of a 
common cold  
22.21 20.25 1.95 0.10* 30.88 23.74 7.14 0.21  
N 677 1782   54 911    
Notes: * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at 1% level.   
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Table 2.5:  The demand for the NRCMS in 2006 based on logit regressions: marginal effects of facility choice on insurance enrolment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Village clinic 
0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.08** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Town hospital 
0.12*** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
County hospital 
-0.08** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.07* -0.05 -0.02 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
City hospital 
-0.12** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15** -0.17*** -0.09 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Other facilities 
-0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.14 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Log likelihood -1333.83 -1125.12 -1113.75 -1107.33 -1104.41 -993.72 -990.70 -884.58 -785.88 -698.00 
No. Parameters 6 12 15 17 20 22 25 29 33 54 
No. Observations 2398 2234 2227 2227 2227 1989 1985 1798 1606 1571 
Pseudo-R2 0.046 0.135 0.142 0.147 0.150 0.148 0.149 0.153 0.161 0.245 














































Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level. b The full results are showed in Table A 2.1 (appendix A). 
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Table 2.6: Average predicted probability of insurance coverage – Model 1 and Model 10 
 Model 1 Model 10 
 Estimates Standard error Estimates          Standard error 
Average predicted probability 0.73 0.10 0.72 0.24 
Average predicted probability by provider category 
Village clinic 0.79 0.06 0.76 0.21 
Town hospital 0.79 0.07 0.80 0.19 
County hospital 0.65 0.10 0.67 0.28 
City hospital 0.59 0.11 0.52 0.20 
Notes: The average predicted probability is computed using the model estimates with all explanatory variables at their observed 
values and averaged over the sample. The average predicted probabilities by facility choice are computed by placing each 
observation in the facility choice category to calculate the probabilities at each data point and then are averaged over the sample.  
 
 
Table 2.7: Coefficients of selected additional variables – Model 9 and Model 10 (logit marginal effects) 
Variable Model 9 Model 10 
Household size 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Minority ethnicity 0.12** 0.12** 





Middle provinces 0.28*** --- 
 (0.04) (---) 
Asset index -0.08** -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
N 1606 1571 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 
the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at the 1% 
level.  
b The coefficients of eastern and middle provinces are omitted in Model 10 because Model 10 has controlled 




Table 2.8:  The demand for the NRCMS in 2006 across income groups – Model 10 (logit marginal effects) 
 Richest 25% Middle 50% Poorest 25% 
Village clinic 
-0.00 0.10* 0.21* 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.11) 
Town hospital 
0.06 0.14* 0.46*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.15) 
County hospital 
0.07 -0.05 -0.06 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.16) 
City hospital 
-0.13 -0.03 -0.63 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.40) 
Other facilities 
0.03 -0.13 -0.28 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.36) 
N 208 855 382 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** 
indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table 2.9:  The demand for the NRCMS in 2006 across geographic regions – Model 10 (logit marginal 
effects) 
 Eastern provinces Middle provinces Western provinces 
Village clinic 
-0.03 0.08 0.18* 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.10) 
Town hospital 
0.05 0.04 0.26** 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.11) 
County hospital 
0.00 -0.09* 0.02 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) 
City hospital 
-0.02 -0.06 --- 
(0.07) (0.05) (---) 
Other facilities 
-0.21** --- -0.18 
(0.10) (---) (0.15) 
N 482 642 437 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** 
indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
Table 2.10:  Correlation analysis between facility choice and insurance enrolment (logit marginal effects) 
Variable Impact on facility choice Impact on insurance enrolment 
Logit regressions   
Female household head -0.19*** -0.11** 
 (0.06) (0.04) 
Household size 0.04** 0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Asset index -0.14*** -0.11*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Bivariate probit models   
Female household head -0.48*** -0.39*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Household size 0.11** 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Asset index -0.37*** -0.34*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Correlation 0.22***  
 (0.07)  
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 





SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE AND TREATMENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR 




Several low- and middle-income countries have introduced state-sponsored insurance programs for people 
working in informal sectors with the aim of enhancing access to healthcare and provide financial protection from 
the burden of illness (Acharya et al., 2012). In China, a new health insurance program, the New Rural Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (NRCMS), was introduced in 2003. The NRCMS is targeted at rural areas, where 80 percent of 
people were not covered by any kind of health insurance prior to the NRCMS (Lei and Lin, 2009). Despite the 
rapid economic growth during the last decade, Chinese economic development shows uneven progress between 
urban and rural areas, and rural people still tend to be poor compared with their urban counterparts. Before 2003, 
there was a widespread discontent related to insufficient access to health services and large out-of-pocket health 
payments among rural residents (Yip and Hsiao, 2009a). To address these problems, the government initiated the 
NRCMS and provided large subsidies for those who were enrolled. The expansion of the NRCMS was rapid: the 
insurance scheme covered 10% of rural counties in 2003; by the end of 2012, 2,566 counties and 800.5 million 
people were covered by the NRCMS, accounting for 98.3 percent of the total rural population (Ministry of Health, 
2012).  
In recent years, there has been widespread interest in evaluating the impacts of the NRCMS on health care 
utilization, however, existing studies show quite mixed results. Some studies have shown that the NRCMS 
increases outpatient and inpatient use of health services (Wagstaff et al., 2009a), while others have found little 
evidence that having insurance increases overall utilization (Babiarz et al., 2010; Babiarz et al., 2012; Lei and Lin, 
2009). Some of these studies also investigate the behavioural responses associated with the NRCMS and have 
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found that the insurance increases the likelihood of people seeking care at low-level facilities (Babiarz et al., 2010; 
Babiarz et al., 2012; Hou et al., 2014; Wagstaff et al., 2009a). 
This study aims to provide additional evidence regarding the impact of the NRCMS on the utilization of different 
types of medical care and different levels of health facilities at which care is sought. Establishing the impacts of 
health insurance is difficult because it is very rare that coverage is allocated randomly. In most cases, the insured 
and uninsured are likely to be different from each other in terms of observed and unobserved characteristics. 
Methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) may fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated 
with participation into the program. This study adopts a unified approach that first pre-processes data with 
propensity score matching (PSM) and then applies parametric difference-in-difference (DID) analysis on the pre-
processed dataset. The two-step procedure is doubly robust since we will get consistent causal estimates if either 
the matching or the parametric model is correct, but not necessarily both (Ho et al., 2007). The method helps to 
make estimates based on the subsequent parametric analysis less dependent on modelling choices and 
specifications. The approach is considered to be a useful and robust extension of the PSM with DID models 
employed in previous studies (Lei and Lin, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 2009a), which take a straightforward difference 
in means after PSM approach, without control variables. In addition, more independent variables are also 
controlled for here, compared with previous studies, including risk preferences and health facility characteristics. 
These variables are important confounders that may influence the effect of the NRCMS on health care utilization 
and may have driven some of the results found in previous literature. 
New evidence is presented here that while the NRCMS has not increased the overall utilization of formal medical 
care and preventive care, it increases the likelihood of people seeking medical care from village clinics and county 
hospitals while reducing the utilization of town hospitals. The insurance appears to change patients’ utilization 
patterns by directing them away from town hospitals to village clinics and county hospitals and help them to 
access health services more conveniently and of potentially better quality. However, the results are inconsistent 
from the insurance benefit package design, which provides more generous reimbursement for health care 
delivered by town hospitals compared with village clinics22 and county hospitals. Our results may indicate that 
insured patients are more concerned about the convenience and quality of health care compared with its price.   
                                                                    
22 Village clinics only provide outpatient care, which is usually not covered by the NRCMS.  
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The lack of effect of the NRCMS on overall utilization may be due to a relatively small program budget. The co-
payments of the scheme are high, with large deductibles, low ceilings and high coinsurance rates, so poor 
households may still face financial barriers when seeking health services. However, the substitution effects away 
from town hospitals to village clinics and county hospitals indicate that the insurance may help beneficiaries to 
access more convenient and better quality health care, but they may also be faced with more expensive medical 
interventions at county hospitals. Careful consideration is therefore needed to address the associated welfare 
implications.      
3.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
The collapse of China’s rural health system in the late 1970s led to unaffordable health care and major financial 
risks associated with large out-of-pocket health payments. To improve health care access for rural residents, the 
Chinese government established one of the largest social health insurance programs in the world: the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS). The program was first implemented in 2003 and initially covered 10 
percent of total rural counties in China (Sun et al., 2009). In the following years, it expanded rapidly from 310 out 
of the total of 2,861 rural counties in 2004, to 1,451 counties in 2006 (Cheng et al., 2015). By the end of 2008, the 
insurance program was introduced to nearly all rural counties across the country and covered over 90 percent of 
the total rural population. In 2010, 836 million people were enrolled in the NRCMS, accounting for 96 percent of 
the whole rural population. The eligibility requirement is that people should hold rural residential status, a 
residential registration designating a citizen as rural or non-rural. All eligible individuals are accepted into the 
scheme, irrespective of their health status. Households decide whether to participate every year, and the 
enrolment is at household level so that rich and healthy individuals cannot opt out.  
The insurance financing is partly through flat-rate household contributions and partly through subsidies from 
four levels of government: central, provincial, county and township. The minimum requirement of the annual 
premium in 2003 was 30 RMB (US$3.62) per person, with 10 RMB (US$1.21) from households supplemented by a 
subsidy of 10 RMB (US$1.21) from local governments and 10 RMB (US$1.21) from the central government23 
(Ministry of Health et al., 2003). The premium level has been gradually increased over time. Up to 2012, the total 
government subsidy had reached 240 RMB (US$38.03), and the individual contribution rose to 60 RMB (US$9.51) 
                                                                    
23 In 2003, the average annual disposable income of rural population was 2,622 RMB (US$316.67). The average medical expense per outpatient 
visit in public hospitals was 108.2 RMB (US$13.07), and the average medical expense per inpatient visit in public hospitals was 3, 910.7 RMB 
(US$472.31). The exchange rate was US$1 =8.28 RMB in 2003. 
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per person24. The premiums are not risk-rated at the individual level so that all insured individuals within the 
same county are offered the same premium.  During the period covered by this study (from 2004 to 2006), 
households could purchase the NRCMS at a premium level of 10 RMB (US$1.25) per person supplemented by 
government contribution of 40 RMB (US$5.02) per person25. The 50 RMB premium level represents around 40 
percent of average per capita outpatient expense and only 1 percent of average per capita inpatient expense in 
2006.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The benefit package of the NRCMS varies geographically because county administrators are empowered to define 
the benefits based on local needs and resources (Yip and Hsiao, 2008). The program in all counties covers 
inpatient care, but differs in the coverage of outpatient services. Approximately three quarters of the counties 
cover outpatient services through a household saving account or on a pooled basis. Among the rest, half of the 
counties cover only catastrophic illness, and half do not cover outpatient services at all (Wagstaff et al., 2009a). 
For those counties that cover outpatient services, the reimbursement is much less generous for outpatient care 
compared with inpatient care. Detailed reimbursement rules were not specified in national guidelines until 2007. 
According to “Advice on Developing Reimbursement Rules of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme” 
(Ministry of Health et al., 2007), deductibles of inpatient services should be set two to four times higher than the 
average outpatient expense per visit in the last year, and no more than 100 RMB (US$13.14) in central and 
western areas. Maximum reimbursement caps should amount to six times the annual average per capita income of 
farmers in 2009 (Ministry of Health, 2009). The reimbursement rate was targeted at 50 percent in 2009 (Ministry 
of Health, 2009), and increased to 70 percent in 2011 and 75 percent in 2012 (Ministry of Health et al., 2011; 
2012). However, even if the national guidelines specify the requirements, there still exist large differences in 
published and actual reimbursement levels because of insufficient funding (Barber and Yao, 2010). Liang and 
Langenbrunner (2013) estimated that the average reimbursement rate in many counties was less than 50 percent 
in 2011.  
Table 3.1 shows the reimbursement rules of the NRCMS for inpatient expenses by areas and facilities (You and 
Kobayashi, 2009). The deductibles vary by locality, with the majority of them from 200 RMB (US$25.09) to 500 
RMB (US$62.74). Besides the deductibles, patients still have to pay 40–80 percent of the covered inpatient 
                                                                    
24 In 2012, the average annual disposable income of rural population was 7,917 RMB (US$1254.68). The average medical expense per 
outpatient visit in public hospitals was 192.5 RMB (US$30.51), and the average medical expense per inpatient visit in public hospitals was 
6,980.4 RMB (US$1106.24). The exchange rate was US$1=6.31 RMB in 2012. 
25 In 2006, the average annual disposable income of rural population was 3,587 RMB (US$450.06). The average medical expense per outpatient 
visit in public hospitals was 128.7 RMB (US$16.15), and the average medical expense per inpatient visit in public hospitals was 4,668.9 RMB 
(US$585.81). The exchange rate was US$1 =7.97 RMB in 2006. 
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expenses. The benefit package also caps the benefit payment at 10,000–20,000 RMB (US$1,254.71-2,509.41). 
Reimbursement is less generous for health care delivered in higher-level facilities, and both deductibles and 
coinsurance rates increase gradually from township health centre to higher-level hospitals. The eastern areas 
have the highest deductible levels (from 400 (US$50.19) to 900 RMB (US$112.92)) while their ceilings (20,000 
RMB (US$2,509.41)) are also higher than central and western areas.  
[Table 3.1 about here] 
In parallel with the introduction of the NRCMS, the government has also set up some supporting policies, such as 
improving the quality and delivery of health care services and strengthening pharmaceutical governance (Bai and 
Wu, 2014). To transform the health care delivery system from public hospital-centred to integrated primary care-
based, great attention has been paid to strengthen the quality and funding for village clinics and town hospitals in 
rural areas and community health centres in urban areas (Yip and Hsiao, 2014). Government funding has been 
directed to improve the primary health care infrastructure and train general practitioners. Primary health 
providers are expected to play a central part in prevention, case detection and management, gatekeeping and 
referral (Yip and Hsiao, 2014).  
Rural China has a three-tiered health system. The bottom tier is village clinics, staffed by clinicians26 with little 
formal training and providing basic outpatient services, emergency first aid, immunisations and public health 
surveillance. Township health centres are the system’s middle tier. Staffed by formally trained doctors and nurses, 
these centres provide inpatient services and treat more complicated outpatient conditions. Town hospitals also 
play a pivotal role in referring services to higher-level hospitals and act as an intermediary between village clinics 
and county hospitals. The top tier is county, city and higher-level hospitals that provide relatively expensive and 
specialized inpatient and outpatient medical care. These hospitals are usually far from most villages, and so incur 
high transportation costs. Since the NRCMS mainly covers inpatient services, village clinics are usually not 
reimbursed because they only offer outpatient care. To restrain overall medical expenditure, the NRCMS 
encourages patients to seek care from low-level health facilities by providing more generous reimbursement for 
health services delivered by town hospitals compared with county and city hospitals. Therefore, the NRCMS is 
expected to lead to more patients using inpatient care in town hospitals.   
                                                                    
26 Most village clinicians have not received formal medical school education. They usually have three to six months of training after junior 
middle school.  
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3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Several studies have investigated the impact of the NRCMS on medical care utilization. A major empirical issue is 
the self-selection problem related to the voluntary nature of the insurance. The participants (the treatment group) 
and non-participants (the comparison group) are likely to be different in terms of individual characteristics that 
influence both their decision to participate in the program and their levels of outcomes. With non-experimental 
data, econometric methods need to account for selection bias. Lei and Lin (2009) evaluate the impact of the 
NRCMS on health care utilization using individual fixed effects, instrumental variable and propensity score 
matching (PSM) with difference-in-difference (DID) based on the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 
2000 to 2006. They find that the NRCMS significantly increases the utilization of preventive care. The result is 
driven mainly by the provision of a free general physical examination if the individual does not use any other 
services throughout the year. They find no significant effect of the NRCMS on the utilization of formal medical care. 
Wagstaff et al. (2009a) also use a PSM with DID method based on a dataset collected from program administrators, 
health facilities and households, which covers 15 counties in 12 provinces. Their results show that the NRCMS 
increases outpatient and inpatient utilization, and larger impacts appear to have occurred for village clinics and 
county hospitals. Liu and Tsegai (2011) use a PSM and bounding approach to account for the heterogeneous 
effects of the program on utilization across different regions and income groups. They find that the NRCMS 
increases outpatient utilization for rural residents, especially for poor people in western regions. Utilization 
increases more in village clinics and town hospitals, which corresponds to the policies of shifting demand to low-
level facilities to reduce medical expenditure. One concern is that PSM alone cannot completely overcome the 
endogeneity of insurance participation if unobserved confounding variables between the treatment and 
comparison groups still exist after balancing the treatment and comparison groups alongside observable 
dimensions. In this case, due to the selection of unobservables, the PSM estimates may be biased. Babiarz et al. 
(2010; 2012) employ DID on a two-wave dataset from 25 rural counties across five Chinese provinces27. They find 
that the NRCMS does not increase the likelihood that a sick person would seek medical care, but it may change the 
composition of health care use by increasing the utilization of low-intensity outpatient care at village clinics and 
inpatient care at township health centres.  
                                                                    
27 The five provinces are Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shanxi, Jilin and Hebei, which are different from the provinces sampled in this study.   
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Previous studies provide a mixed picture of the impact of the NRCMS on health care utilization, and they mainly 
use data that is either from the early years of implementation or are not nationally representative. A further issue 
is that these studies typically have a sparse control vector, which leads to a concern that their results may be 
consequently affected by omitted variable bias. This paper seeks to advance the literature by using a large and 
nationally representative panel dataset to measure the impact of the NRCMS on different types of medical care 
utilization and people’s treatment-seeking behaviour. The analysis employs a unified approach that first pre-
processes data using PSM and then applies DID analysis on the pre-processed data. The method is expected to 
produce more accurate and less model-dependent results compared with the results in previous studies.  
3.4 DATA 
This paper uses panel data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) conducted in 1989, 1991, 1993, 
1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 201128. CHNS is an international collaborative project between the Carolina 
Population Centre at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and 
Food Safety at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. The dataset covers nine of China’s 31 
provinces, accounting for nearly 44 percent of China’s total population. The provinces are mainly situated in 
central and eastern China and differ considerably in geography, economic development, public resources and 
health outcomes29. In each province, a multi-stage random cluster process is used to draw the sample. Counties 
are initially stratified by income (low, middle and high), and four in each province are randomly selected based on 
a weighted sampling approach. Villages and townships within the counties, and urban and suburban 
neighbourhoods within the cities, are also selected randomly. CHNS provides comprehensive information 
covering a wide range of individual, household and community characteristics.  
In this study, the sample includes only households living in rural China and not covered by any health insurance 
before 2006. A small number of households covered by other insurance programs except the NRCMS are 
excluded30. Waves 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 are used for logit, DID and DID combined with nearest 
neighbour (NN) matching models. In total, there are 39,316 individuals and 3,006 households from 29 counties 
(20,247 individuals and 1,707 households from 17 counties that introduced the NRCMS in 2006)31. According to 
                                                                    
28 The data can be obtained from http://www.cpc.unc.edu/ . 
29 The surveyed provinces are Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. The detailed 
geographical distribution of surveyed regions is presented in Appendix (Figure A 3.1).   
30 The detailed descriptions of the number of observations excluded from the sample are given in Appendix (Table A 3.1).  
31 8 counties are excluded from the sample because they have pre-existing social insurance programs that may confound the effect of the 
NRCMS on health care utilization.  
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the dataset, the coverage rates of the NRCMS in 2006 are 41.6 percent across all counties and 64.5 percent in 
participating counties.  
The dependent variables used in this study include health care utilization (formal medical care, preventive care32, 
folk doctor and inpatient care)33 and treatment-seeking behaviour based on utilization of different levels of health 
facilities (village clinics, town hospitals, county hospitals, city hospitals and private clinics). Households’ 
preferences towards different types of health facilities are based on the question “If household members are sick 
or want to see a doctor, dentist, nurse or other health worker, which clinics and hospitals can they use?” 
Respondents can choose from 15 types of health facilities, including village clinics, town hospitals, county 
hospitals, city hospitals, private clinics and so on. The facility choice is represented by stated preference instead of 
actual utilization as the data on actual utilization is limited to people who report feeling sick or were injured in the 
past four weeks, and it provides no information for the rest of the population. On the contrary, the stated 
household preference has a large sample size and indicates the health facility choice of all households no matter 
whether they used health services recently or not.  
The key independent variable is enrolment in the NRCMS. It is based on the survey question: “what type of 
medical insurance do you have?”. The question from 1991 to 2006 only provides information on the choice of 
cooperative medical insurance (CMS), but does not distinguish between the old CMS from the current NRCMS. The 
solution here is to identify whether the county has introduced the NRCMS and define an individual who reports 
enrolment in the CMS and is living in a county that had offered the NRCMS as insured  (Lei and Lin, 2009)34. We 
use the NRCMS enrolment at household level, which equals one if the household head reports to be enrolled. The 
reason for using this variable is that some household members may be unaware of their insurance status if only 
the household head makes the decision of enrolment. In DID estimation, treatment group is defined as people 
enrolled in the NRCMS in 2006, and the comparison group includes people who lived in non-NRCMS counties and 
did not have the option of joining the NRCMS in 2006. The reason for comparing participants with non-exposed 
                                                                    
32 Preventive care includes general physical examination, blood test, blood pressure screening, tumour screening, vision or hearing exam, 
prenatal exam, postnatal exam, gynaecological exam and so on.  
33 The survey questions are based on the use of health care in the last four weeks. Since insured respondents decide whether to enroll in the 
NRCMS at the beginning of the year, they should have already been covered by the insurance during the period the survey covered. However, 
this may not be the case for the use of folk doctors since the survey asked about utilization in the last year. Therefore, the utilization data may 
be from pre-treatment period before the insured were covered by the NRCMS.  
34 Lei and Lin (2009) use the implementation dates of CMS reported by community health workers and define those programmes introduced 
after 2003 as the NRCMS. In this study, we did not follow this method because there is inconsistency of the introduction years reported by 
health workers in the same community but in different waves. Instead, we use the question: “Does this village/neighbourhood have this type of 
medical insurance?” We define the community as NRCMS community in a particular wave (after 2003) if the health workers reported “yes” for 
the CMS in any wave after 2003 and “no” in the previous wave. The reason to use this question is that health workers may be unclear about the 
introduction year of the NRCMS in their communities, but they should know whether the insurance is available at the moment. Therefore, the 
question used in our study should have less reporting bias. A county is defined as an NRCMS county in a particular wave if at least one 
community within that county is known to have adopted the NRCMS in that wave.  
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people is that non-participants who live in the NRCMS counties may suffer from adverse selection problems and 
make enrolment decisions based on unobserved variables that change over time (Wagstaff et al., 2009a). 
Other independent variables consist of individual-, household- and community-level characteristics, including age, 
gender, household size, marital status, ethnicity, geographic dummies (eastern, middle or western provinces), 
household income, asset index, education level, occupation, presence of major illness (hypertension, diabetes, 
heart diseases, apoplexy and bone fracture), health risk variables (overweight, smoking and daily drinking) and 
community health facility characteristics (presence of public health facility in the community, travel time to the 
nearest health facility, travel cost to the nearest health facility, waiting time and treatment cost of a common cold). 
Both the NN matching and DID analysis use the same set of covariates.  
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables by insurance status in 2006. 
The uninsured people are those who live in non-NRCMS counties and hence do not have the option to enrol. In 
general, the insured are less likely to use folk doctors, town hospitals, city hospitals and private clinics, while more 
likely to use village clinics. In terms of the individual-level characteristics, the insured tend to be married, working 
people, are more likely to be a farmer and have chronic diseases. There is some variation in household-level 
characteristics as well. Insured households are more likely to be led by a younger and male household head, have 
a smaller household size, live in eastern provinces, earn higher income but own less household assets. People who 
are enrolled also have better access to health care services with shorter travelling time and waiting time, however, 
they are faced with higher treatment costs.  
[Table 3.2 about here] 
3.5 METHODOLOGY 
3.5.1 LOGIT ESTIMATION  
As an initial step, logit estimation is used to provide results for the purpose of comparison. The effect of 
participating in the NRCMS on medical care utilization is estimated as:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) (3.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the measure of utilization in year t for household/individual i. The function 𝐹 takes the form of a logit 
function. 𝐷𝑖𝑡  is an indicator of whether a household is enrolled in the NRCMS or not; 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a set of individual-, 
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household- and community-level characteristics including age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, geographic 
dummies, education level, occupation, household income, asset index, chronic diseases, health risk preference and 
community health facility characteristics. 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the error term of mean zero and assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the regressors 𝑋𝑖𝑡 .  
In most applications, the goal of policy evaluation is to estimate the average effect for a particular population. This 
leads to several areas of interest for averages of all or a subset of observations in the dataset. The average policy 
effect among the whole population is represented by the average treatment effect (ATE):  
 𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡) (3.2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0 are the with-treatment and no-treatment outcomes for a given individual. A more prominent 
parameter of interest in the literature is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which only calculates 
the policy effect on those individuals who actually participate in the program. ATT is defined as the difference 
between the with-treatment outcomes of the insured people and the outcomes of the same group of people if they 
were not covered:   
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) (3.3) 
ATT is usually easier to retrieve, and it only focuses on the policy effect among the individuals whom the program 
was intended.  Therefore, evaluation literature tends to report ATT in most cases, and this paper will also 
calculate the ATT of the NRCMS.  
Since the mean counterfactual outcomes of the insured people (E(Yit
0|X = Xit, Dit = 1)) is not observed, logit 
estimation uses the mean outcome of the uninsured people (E(Yit
0|X = Xit, Dit = 0)) for substitution. However, 
these two may be different if the insured and uninsured people differ in key aspects that are not observed by 
researchers. As the NRCMS is offered on a voluntary basis, those who are covered may be more likely to be sick or 
utilize health services and therefore tend to benefit more from the NRCMS compared with those who are not 
covered. Therefore, simply comparing the mean outcomes of the insured and uninsured people may give a biased 
result. This is a common challenge arising in program evaluation if the treatment assignment is not random. Logit 
estimation cannot account for self-selection bias, and more advanced econometric methods are required to 
address potential bias from unobserved characteristics.  
3.5.2 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE MODELS AND INTENTION-TO-TREAT ANALYSIS 
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I start by presenting the standard linear DID model for a continuous and uncensored outcome that is defined as 
follows:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (3.4) 




0 = 𝛼1 + 𝑔(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡
0  (3.5) 
If longitudinal data are available, the additional time dimension can be used to estimate the treatment effect under 
less restrictive assumptions. Suppose a survey has been conducted at time t2 after the treated group has acquired 
insurance coverage, and the same individuals have been surveyed at time t1 before they were covered. The 
difference in mean outcomes between the treated and untreated at time 𝑡2 is first taken: 
 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡2] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡2] =  𝐴𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑖𝑡) +
(𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡2) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡2))  
(3.6) 
Then the difference in mean outcomes between the two groups at time t1 is also taken, when neither the treated 
nor the untreated has received the treatment. We get 
 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡1] =
 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡1) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡1)  
(3.7) 
Subtracting Equation (3.7) from Equation (3.6) gives the DID estimator, which is the change in the difference 
between the treated and untreated groups over time: 
 𝐷𝐼𝐷 = {𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡2] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡2]} −
{𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡1]} = 𝐴𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑖𝑡) +
{(𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡2) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡2)) −
(𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑡1) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑡1))}  
(3.8) 
Linear DID model rely on the parallel trend assumption that the treated and untreated groups have the same 
trend in unobserved characteristics over time, so that the last two round brackets in Eq. (3.8) are equal to one 
another. Therefore, DID reduces to ATT(𝑋𝑖𝑡). The DID estimators enable the untreated individuals to act as the 
“counterfactual” for the treated ones and gives an estimate of the outcomes of the treatment group at time 𝑡2 if 
they were not covered by the insurance. However, DID approach would only provide an unbiased estimate of the 
treatment effect if any differences in unobservables between treatment and control groups are not time-varying.  
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The following econometric model can be constructed to obtain the DID estimator of the effect of the NRCMS on 
linear outcomes:    
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.9) 
where 𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑡  equals one for time after the insurance introduction (2006) and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖  is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if individual/household was enrolled in the NRCMS in 2006, 0 if the 
individual/household lives in non-NRCMS counties (counties that did not introduce the NRCMS in 2006). There 
are two types of untreated people: non-participants (people who live in NRCMS counties and choose not to enrol) 
and non-exposed (people who live in non-NRCMS counties and do not have the option of enrolment). We only use 
the non-exposed people as our comparison group since the non-participants may select themselves into the 
program based on unobservables that change over time. They may deliberately choose not to enrol because they 
are confident of their health status and will not need any health services in the near future. Therefore, the DID 
identification assumption would be violated. The selection bias may be less if we compare the outcomes of 
participants with the non-exposed people (Wagstaff et al., 2009a). However, it should also be noted that there may 
still remain a residual risk of selection bias that cannot be eliminated even if we compare those who enrol with all 
of those in a county in which the NRCMS is not offered. The coefficient on the interaction term 𝛽3 is the DID 
estimator, indicating the relative impact of the NRCMS on utilization outcomes for an individual/household living 
in the treated counties in 2006 compared to the one living non-treated counties in 2006.  
Since the outcome variables used in this study are dummy variables,  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑆𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) (3.10) 
where F is the conditional distribution function of the logistic distribution. The treatment effect becomes the 
incremental effect of the coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽3, which can be obtained by calculating the marginal 
effect averaged over the treatment group in the post-treatment period.  
When estimating the treatment effect of enrolling in the NRCMS, the DID model compares treated households with 
untreated ones and requires that the household-level unobservables are parallel across time. To reduce the 
endogeneity problem related to household characteristics (rich and more health-conscious households may be 
more likely to take up the insurance), intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis is employed to estimate the treatment 
effect of offering the NRCMS in a county. The method uses all households in NRCMS counties as the treatment 
group and all households in non-NRCMS counties as the comparison group regardless of their actual enrolment 
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status. Therefore, ITT analysis compares the outcomes of all households in NRCMS counties with those living in 
non-NRCMS counties and relies on a weaker assumption that the unobserved county-level (rather than 
household-level) characteristics of treatment and comparison groups should show parallel trends prior the 
insurance.  
3.5.3 PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING TO PRE-PROCESS DATA  
The main purpose of matching is to choose a comparison group from the untreated individuals such that their 
outcomes act as the correct counterfactuals for the treated group had they not received the treatment (Blundell 
and Dias, 2002).  PSM is based on two assumptions: (a) treatment assignment is independent of the potential 
outcomes conditional on the observed baseline covariates and (b) every subject has a nonzero probability to 
receive either treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The assumption (a) indicates that the selection only 
occurs on observables so that all the differences in outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups are 
attributed to their observed characteristics. The assumption (b) guarantees that all treated individuals have a 
counterpart in the untreated group given the observables.  
Since conditioning on all relevant covariates would lead to a dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) suggest using a balancing score. One commonly used balancing score is the propensity score, the 
probability of receiving the treatment conditional on observed baseline covariates. According to Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983; 1984), the assumption (a) remains valid if controlling for the propensity score instead of covariates. 
Therefore, if potential outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on covariates, they are also 
independent of treatment conditional on a balancing score (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). We use a probit model 
to estimate the propensity score and include individual-, household- and community-level characteristics that 
influence both participation decision and outcome variables. All the covariates are measured before insurance 
coverage is available. The estimation results and histograms of the propensity score are shown in Appendix (Table 
A 3.1 and Figure A 3.1). The distribution of people in the comparison group is skewed to the left, while the 
distribution of people in the treatment group is skewed (to a lesser extent) to the right. The region of common 
support is ample and relatively few individuals will be dropped because they lie off the common support.  
We apply propensity score matching (PSM) to pre-process the data before employing DID models in order to 
improve balance in the observed characteristics between the treated and comparison groups. PSM helps to 
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minimize selection bias associated with non-experimental data by selecting individuals from non-participants 
who are similar to the participants in observed pre-treatment characteristics (Axelson et al., 2009). Pre-
processing data with matching before parametric analysis helps to reduce bias and inefficiency and produce less 
model-dependent causal inferences (Ho et al., 2007). The combination of PSM with DID has been explored by 
Heckman et al. (1997; 1998) and Abadie (2005), who proposed a regression-adjusted semi-parametric 
conditional DID matching estimator. The estimator is constructed using a two-step strategy: (i) estimate the 
propensity score and compute the weights for the untreated sample; (ii) impose the weights on untreated 
individuals to obtain the ATT. The main objective is to avoid comparing the incomparable and restrict the 
application of nonexperimental methods to regions of common support (Heckman et al., 1997). In this paper, we 
use NN matching without replacement35 to adjust the data by constructing a match for each treated individual 
using the closest comparison unit in terms of the propensity score36. This type of matching has the advantage that 
the calculations are simple and quick to run when the sample size is large. To achieve close balancing, we impose a 
tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance with a caliper of 0.0137.  
3.6 RESULTS 
3.6.1 INITIAL ESTIMATES 
Table 3.3 shows the estimates of the effects of the NRCMS on utilization of formal medical care, preventive care, 
folk doctors and inpatient care38 based on logit models since all these outcomes are dummy variables. For each 
dependent variable, estimation results are first shown based on models with only demographic characteristics, 
and then additional covariates that may be correlated with the insurance status are added in the models. The only 
significant effect occurs for preventive care, and the probability of using preventive care is 1.4% higher for the 
insured compared to the uninsured with only demographic characteristics, while the magnitude of the coefficient 
is largely reduced after controlling for other covariates but still remains to be significant at the 1% level. 
                                                                    
35 Since the propensity score distribution is very similar across the treatment and comparison groups (Figure A 3.2), NN without replacement 
can achieve good matching quality. In addition, NN without replacement will make use of more uninsured people from the comparison group 
to construct the counterfactual outcome and thereby reduces the variance of the estimates.  
36 We use NN matching instead of kernel matching or Mahalanobis distance matching because NN can achieve balance with the maximum 
amount of covariates. Since omitting important variables can seriously increase bias in estimates, the outcomes will be more likely to be 
independent of treatment under the NN matching.   
37 The sensitivity of results to three other choices of caliper (0.005, 0.0025, 0.00125) is shown in Appendix (Table A 3.2). We also try NN 
without replacement in both ascending and descending order (Table A 3.3). The estimates remain similar across different choices of caliper 
and order in which observations get matched.  
38 The sample size of  inpatient care use is particularly small compared to other dependent variables since the survey question is only 
answered by people who reported feeling sick or were injured during the last 4 weeks.  
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Tables 3.4 and 3.5 take a further look at the utilization of different levels of health facilities based on both actual 
utilization and stated household preference. In Table 3.4, the probability of using village clinics is 12% to 17% 
higher among the insured people compared to the uninsured ones. The same significant effect is also found in 
Table 3.5 using stated preference data. Insured households are around 13% to 20% more likely to use village 
clinics, and the effect is significant at 1% level. Meanwhile, the likelihood of using town, county and city hospitals 
is around 11%, 19% and 2.5% lower among the insured, respectively. The estimates in Table 3.4 are quite similar 
to the ones in Table 3.5 with the same signs and similar magnitudes of the coefficients. However, the results based 
on stated household preference (Table 3.5) are more precise given the larger sample size and lower variance. 
Therefore, in the following sections only results based on stated household preference are presented.  
[Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 about here] 
The results from logit estimation provide suggestive evidence that the NRCMS is related to an increase in the use 
of preventive care and village clinics and a decrease in the use of county and city hospitals. However, the results 
here may not be reliable if the treated and comparison groups differ prior to treatment in ways that matter for the 
outcomes under study. Since the NRCMS is offered on a voluntary basis, it is very likely that the participants and 
non-participants may be different in terms of unobserved individual characteristics that influence both their 
decision to participate in the program and their levels of outcomes. For instance, the insured people may 
deliberately select themselves into the NRCMS because they expect to use many health services and benefit more 
from the insurance. Therefore, simply employing logit models conditional on observables may provide a 
misleading estimate of the effect of the program due to omitted variable bias.  
3.6.2 IMPACT ESTIMATES  
To reduce the self-selection bias related with observational data, DID and NN matching are used to control for the 
observed and unobserved characteristics between the insured and uninsured subjects. Table 3.6 shows the 
treatment effects of the NRCMS based on six waves of data (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006). We first 
show the results based on DID estimation only and then employ NN matching before DID to make the selected 
non-treated group as similar as possible to the treated group in terms of their observed characteristics. For both 
models, the NRCMS appears to have negative impact on the use of folk doctors, with the insured 2% to 3% less 
likely to use health services provided by folk doctors. Both the use of village clinics and county hospitals appear to 
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be around 10% higher for the insured compared to the uninsured, although the coefficient for county hospitals is 
only significant at 10% level under the DID combined with NN matching model. The insured households also 
appear to be around 16% to 20% less likely to use town hospitals.  
 [Table 3.6 about here] 
To investigate whether the significant results are driven by the change of the sample or the addition of covariates, 
a series of logit regressions are estimated for all significant outcome variables (e.g. folk doctors, village clinics, 
town hospitals and county hospitals). The estimation starts with the model with only demographic characteristics 
and subsequently adds different groups of independent variables such as income, education status, occupation, 
chronic disease, health risk preference and community health facility characteristics (from Model 1 to Model 7).  
The treatment effects of the NRCMS on the use of town hospitals and county hospitals are significant and robust 
across all models. However, there is only a statistically significant effect of the NRCMS on the use of folk doctors 
and village clinics in the last model. It is possible that the significance is driven by the change of the size or 
composition of the sample since Model 7 has the least number of observations compared with previous models. 
Therefore, Models 1-6 are re-run based on the sample of Model 7 for the use of folk doctors and village clinics 
(Appendix).  The significance of folk doctors seems to be related to the change of the sample in the last model, 
while the significance of village clinics is merely due to the addition of facility characteristics 39. Since facility 
characteristics are important covariates that may confound the effect of the NRCMS on health care utilization and 
needs to be controlled for in the complete model, the significant treatment effect on the use of village clinics 
should also be regarded as robust.  
[Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 about here] 
Similar results are also observed when we combine ITT analysis with DID models (Table 3.11). The NRCMS is 
found to decrease the likelihood of using folk doctors and town hospitals by 3% and 12-15%, respectively, and 
increase both the probabilities of using village clinics and county hospitals by more than 10%. All the estimates 
are significant at the 1% level. The robustness check still shows that the significance for village clinics, town 
                                                                    
39 Table A 3.4 (Appendix) shows that all the treatment effects become significant when we use the sample based on Model 7, indicating that the 
significance of folk doctors is mainly driven by the change of the sample size or composition. Table A 3.5 shows that the significance of village 
clinics still appears in the last model and should be related with the addition of facility characteristics.  
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hospitals and county hospitals are consistent across various specifications with different groups of independent 
variables40.  
 [Table 3.11 about here] 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 present the DID estimates for different subgroups. In Table 3.12, the impact of the NRCMS is 
estimated for different income groups. The results suggest that the decrease in the use of folk doctors is mainly 
driven by low- and middle-income households, suggesting that the poor are less likely to use informal health 
services with insurance coverage. The rich have seen a significant increase in the use of village clinics and a 
decrease in the use of town hospitals. It suggests that the NRCMS seems to be more favourable to the rich in 
obtaining more convenient access to health services from village clinics. Table 3.13 presents the heterogeneous 
impact of the NRCMS across regions since the insurance program differs geographically41. Larger impacts of the 
NRCMS are observed for eastern and western provinces. The insured from the eastern provinces are significantly 
less likely to use folk doctors, village clinics and town hospitals while significantly more likely to use county 
hospitals and private clinics. On the other hand, people from western provinces have seen significant increase in 
the use of village clinics, county hospitals and city hospitals while significant decrease in the use of town hospitals 
and private clinics.  
[Tables 3.12 and 3.13 about here] 
In conclusion, although the NRCMS appears to have no effect on the use of formal medical care, preventive care 
and inpatient care, it seems to be associated with a change in type of health facility used when ill.  The insured are 
less likely to use town hospitals, but more likely to use village clinics and county hospitals42. The shift from town 
hospitals to village clinics and county hospitals is inconsistent from the design of the insurance benefit package. 
The NRCMS provides little coverage for outpatient care delivered by village clinics, and the rate of reimbursement 
is generally lower in county hospitals than in town hospitals. However, similar results have been found in 
                                                                    
40 Tables A 3.6-A 3.9 (Appendix) show that the significance for the use of town and county hospitals is consistent across different models with 
various independent variables, while the significance for the use of folk doctors and village clinics only appears in the last model. Similar as 
before, Table A 3.10 (Appendix) suggests that the significance for the use of folk doctors is driven by the reduction of the sample size, and 
Table A 3.11 (Appendix) suggests that the significance for the use of village clinics may be due to the addition of facility characteristics. 
Therefore, the treatment effects on the use of village clinics, town hospitals and county hospitals should be robust.  
41 The eastern provinces are the richest compared with the other two areas while the western provinces are the poorest. Eastern provinces 
include Liaoning and Shandong provinces. Middle provinces include Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei and Hunan provinces. Western provinces 
include Guangxi and Guizhou provinces.  
42 Further robustness checks are shown in Tables A 3.3 and A 3.12 (Appendix). Table A 3.3 presents the results based on different calipers and 
matching orders for nearest neighbour matching. The significance on the use of village clinics disappears in all four models. In Table A 3.12, we 
adjust the standard errors by clustering at the community level. The standard errors become much larger, leading to smaller t-statistics and 
less significant results. The significant effects on the use of village clinics and county hospitals all disappear. However, there may be problems 
with too few clusters since the number of clusters here is only 28. According to , the number of clusters is considered to be too small if it ranges 
from less than 20 to less than 50 clusters for balanced clusters and even more for unbalanced clusters.  
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previous studies as well (Babiarz et al., 2010; Wagstaff et al., 2009a). The results suggest that the NRCMS not only 
leads to more use of primary care, but also helps patients to receive more specialized and better quality medical 
care provided by high-level health facilities. The decrease in the use of town hospitals given relatively more 
generous reimbursement rates may indicate that insured patients are more concerned about the accessibility and 
quality of health care compared to its price.  
3.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study has evaluated the impact of the NRCMS on health care utilization and people’s treatment-seeking 
behaviour. The programme is found to have little impact on the utilization of formal medical care and preventive 
care. The results are generally in line with previous studies that suggest limited effectiveness of the NRCMS on 
overall medical care use in rural China (Babiarz et al., 2010; Babiarz et al., 2012). In addition, this study further 
looks at the change in treatment-seeking behaviour in terms of different types of health care facilities contacted. 
The NRCMS is found to redistribute utilization across different levels of health facilities through its substitution 
effects: from town hospitals towards village clinics and county hospitals. The effects are robust across all three 
causal models. The increase in village clinics and county hospitals is consistent with previous work by Wagstaff et 
al. (2009a), however, this study is the first to find the reduction of town hospitals utilization and the substitution 
effect across different levels of health facilities.  
The limited effects of the NRCMS on overall utilization of formal medical care and preventive care suggest that the 
insurance may still leave patients with a significant financial burden, which may be attributed to limited coverage 
benefits with large deductibles, low ceilings and high coinsurance rates under the scheme. Therefore, adequate 
financial resources may have to be put in place to support the insurance programme effectively. However, it has 
also been found that many rural counties keep a large surplus of the NRCMS funds in order to prevent the 
outbreak of large disease shocks that would affect the entire population in the county (Mao, 2005). County 
administrators are afraid that it would lead to the bankruptcy of the NRCMS financial system, and therefore set 
high co-payment rates to save money. To address this problem, policy makers are advised to enlarge the NRCMS 
risk pooling level gradually from local-level to provincial-level and even the national-level, which will help to 
establish a broader financing pool but will also lead to a high administrative cost.  
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The substitution effect across different levels of health facilities may be an indication that the NRCMS alleviates 
financial barriers to accessing village clinics and higher levels of care and thus responds to an unmet need. The 
insured may have received health care more conveniently since village clinics are usually the easiest to be 
accessed for most rural residents in China. However, it may increase patient flow and shift uncompensated 
responsibilities to village clinics. The increase in the use of county hospitals indicates that insured people may be 
able to use better quality of care, since county hospitals are generally better-equipped and staffed than town 
hospitals. However, the opportunity cost of accessing care at higher-level health facilities may also be large, and 
the potential barriers are particularly high for the rural poor. Therefore, policy makers should perhaps pay more 
attention to upgrade town hospitals and build a functioning referral system to ensure that patients can be treated 
at the most appropriate and cost-effective level of care. More funding and training at primary health care level 
may be needed to strengthen the infrastructure of village clinics in rural areas.  
One caveat should be noted here. Since the utilization of different levels of health facilities is based on the type of 
care the respondent declares that the household could use, there may be some deviation between actual 
utilization and the response to this question. In fact, the correlation between the actual utilization of different 
levels of health facilities and what respondents claim to use is around 20-30% among people who reported to be 
sick in the last four weeks. Therefore, attention should be paid to interpret our findings here since the change in 
the stated utilization pattern may not reflect any change in actual behaviour.  
Future research should focus on how the type of health care that patients receive changes as a result of the 
insurance. As patients become more inclined to seek care from county hospitals, it is worthwhile to see whether 
they would receive more costly tests, drugs and medical interventions that the patients would not have chosen if 
they are not covered by the insurance. Future studies can also examine the magnitude of the health gains 
associated with the change in the utilization pattern and how far welfare can be improved after expanding 
insurance coverage. In addition, the cost-effectiveness of the insurance depends on the size of deductibles and 
ceiling, the coinsurance rate and the range and type of services covered may also be of interest. As the NRCMS 
continues to expand and evolve, it is worthwhile to explore the variations of benefit designs in different regions 
and compare the effectiveness of different benefit packages. Such research would be particularly meaningful if 
they can give appropriate deductibles and co-payment rates to maximize population health under financial 
constraint.  
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Table 3.1: Reimbursement rules of the NRCMS for inpatient spending by area 
Area Healthcare provider level Reimbursement rule (median) 
  Deductible (RMB) Ceiling (RMB) Coinsurance (%) 
National Township health centre 200 10,000 45-65 
 County hospital 305 10,000 50-70 
 Higher level hospital 500 10,000 55-80 
East Township health centre 400 20,000 40-70 
 County hospital 500 20,000 50-75 
 Higher level hospital 900 20,000 52-80 
Central Township health centre 100 10,000 45-70 
 County hospital 300 10,000 50-70 
 Higher level hospital 551 10,000 50-75 
West Township health centre 100 5,000 50-55 
 County hospital 200 5,000 55-70 
 Higher level hospital 400 5,350 60-70 
Sources: The New Cooperative Medical Scheme in China (You and Kobayashi, 2009)
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 Uninsured Insured Difference p-value 
Dependent variables     
Formal medical care 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.83 
Preventive care 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02* 
Folk doctor utilization 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00*** 
Inpatient care 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.67 
Village clinics (actual utilization) 0.25 0.46 -0.21 0.00*** 
Town hospitals (actual utilization) 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.05 
County hospitals (actual utilization) 0.14 0.14 -0.00 0.99 
City hospitals (actual utilization) 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.00** 
Private clinics (actual utilization) 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.12 
Village clinics (household preference) 0.35 0.56 -0.21 0.00*** 
Town hospitals (household preference) 0.38 0.31 0.07 0.00*** 
County hospitals (household preference) 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.81 
City hospitals (household preference) 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.00*** 
Private clinics (household preference) 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.00*** 
     
Independent variables     
Individual-level characteristics     
Age 44.03 43.31 0.72 0.21 
Female 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.80 
Marital status 0.83 0.87 -0.04 0.00** 
Illiterate 0.33 0.30 0.03 0.05* 
Primary 0.21 0.27 -0.06 0.00*** 
Junior high school 0.32 0.33 -0.01 0.52 
Senior high school and above 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.00*** 
Working 0.59 0.68 -0.09 0.00*** 
Farmer 0.38 0.52 -0.14 0.00*** 
Chronic diseases 0.08 0.11 -0.03 0.00** 
Overweight 0.37 0.40 -0.03 0.07 
Smoker 0.24 0.27 -0.02 0.08 
Daily alcohol drinker 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.12 
Household-level characteristics     
Age of household head 52.48 49.30 3.18 0.00*** 
Fraction age <18 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.02* 
Fraction age >55 0.28 0.25 0.03 0.00** 
Female household head 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.00** 
Household size 4.36 3.93 0.44 0.00*** 
Minority ethnicity 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.02* 
Household head married 0.87 0.89 -0.02 0.02* 
Eastern provinces 0.11 0.30 -0.20 0.00*** 
Middle provinces 0.60 0.49 0.11 0.00*** 
Western provinces 0.30 0.21 0.09 0.00*** 
Household income 9.25 9.43 -0.19 0.00*** 
Asset index 1.43 1.25 0.17 0.00*** 
Household head illiterate 0.32 0.22 0.10 0.00*** 
Household head completed primary school 0.24 0.27 -0.02 0.09 
Household head completed junior high school 0.31 0.36 -0.05 0.00*** 
Household head completed senior high school or above 0.12 0.15 -0.02 0.03* 
Household head is a farmer 0.41 0.57 -0.16 0.00*** 
Working ratio 0.40 0.46 -0.06 0.00*** 
Household head has chronic disease 0.10 0.11 -0.01 0.12 
Chronic disease ratio 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.00*** 
Household head is overweight 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.76 
Household head is smoker 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.94 
Household head is daily drinker 0.15 0.18 -0.03 0.01** 
Travel time to the nearest health facility 13.17 10.18 2.99 0.00*** 
Travel cost to the nearest health facility 0.36 0.50 -0.14 0.10 
Waiting time 7.93 3.76 4.17 0.00*** 
Treatment cost of a common cold 24.81 33.73 -8.92 0.00*** 
Presence of public health facilities in the community 0.68 0.81 -0.13 0.00*** 
N 2670 1883   
 Notes: * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. 
*** indicates statistical significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.3: Impact of the NRCMS on formal medical care, preventive care, folk doctors and inpatient care from 1991 to 2006 (logit marginal effects) 
















NRCMS -0.006* -0.003 0.014*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.018 0.019 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female 0.004** -0.001 0.003*** 0.003** 0.005* 0.002 0.001 -0.014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.015) 
Household size -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.002* 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Minority ethnicity -0.005 -0.003 -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.010* -0.003 0.037** 0.022 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) 
Married 0.000 0.002 -0.007*** -0.002* 0.000 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) 
Eastern provinces -0.007** -0.007** -0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.029* 0.021 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.018) 
Middle provinces -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.000 0.001 -0.016*** -0.003 0.030** 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) 
Household income   0.001  0.001***  0.001  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.007) 
Asset index  -0.002  0.002  -0.005  -0.008 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
Primary school   0.005**  -0.002  -0.017***  -0.011 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.015) 
Junior high school  0.000  -0.003  -0.018***  -0.011 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.020) 
Senior high school or above  -0.001  0.001  -0.020**  -0.054* 
 (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.032) 
Working  -0.003  -0.001  -0.005  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.019) 
Farmer  -0.004  -0.003**  0.005  -0.035* 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.019) 
Chronic diseases  0.012***  0.005***  -0.005  0.036** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.014) 
Overweight  0.001  0.002**  -0.002  -0.033** 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.014) 
Smoker  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.033* 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.018) 
Daily alcohol drinker  -0.015***  -0.000  -0.006  -0.007 
 (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.031) 
Travel time to nearest health facility  -0.000  0.000**  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility  0.000**  -0.000  0.001*  0.011*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Waiting time  0.000***  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Treatment cost of a common cold  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
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 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the 
community 
 0.003  0.000  0.000  -0.016 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.015) 
N 9114 6085 36275 19617 12069 7829 2463 1546 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level.  
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NRCMS 0.123*** 0.174*** -0.044 -0.047 -0.020 -0.041 -0.056*** -0.030 -0.032 -0.050 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.032) (0.042) (0.026) (0.034) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.036) 
Age -0.000 0.002** -0.001 -0.000 0.001* -0.001 0.001* 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.018 0.009 -0.018 -0.017 0.050*** 0.029 -0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.017) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.025) 
Household size 0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.010 -0.014* 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) 
Minority ethnicity -0.065 -0.086* 0.068 0.074* 0.049 0.084** -0.086*** -0.070*** 0.023 0.000 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.043) (0.043) (0.035) (0.036) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037) (0.035) 
Married 0.001 -0.024 0.018 0.037 -0.008 -0.005 0.015 0.034** -0.027 -0.039 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) (0.022) (0.028) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) 
Eastern provinces 0.142*** 0.153*** 0.033 0.022 -0.034 -0.064* -0.025 -0.013 -0.096*** -0.059* 
 (0.045) (0.050) (0.040) (0.045) (0.031) (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.036) (0.036) 
Middle provinces 0.056 0.099** 0.075** 0.066 -0.054* -0.038 -0.007 -0.007 -0.061* -0.092*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041) (0.029) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.033) 
Household income   -0.015  -0.003  0.011  -0.004  0.022** 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Asset index  -0.126***  -0.027  0.097***  0.012  -0.003 
  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.020) 
Primary school   0.045  -0.016  0.008  -0.017  0.020 
 (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.015)  (0.028) 
Junior high school  0.037  -0.038  -0.001  -0.003  0.007 
 (0.042)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.031) 
Senior high school or above  0.011  -0.075  -0.046  0.022  0.050 
 (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.021)  (0.044) 
Working  0.103**  -0.010  0.007  -0.047***  -0.047 
  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.030) 
Farmer  -0.000  0.033  -0.078***  -0.006  0.074** 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.029) 
Chronic diseases  -0.066*  0.020  0.029  0.011  -0.049 
 (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.035) 
Overweight  0.021  -0.025  -0.021  0.019  -0.001 
  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.023) 
Smoker  -0.019  0.019  -0.039  0.035**  0.023 
  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.016)  (0.026) 
Daily alcohol drinker  0.091*  -0.044  -0.019  -0.010  -0.008 
 (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.042)  (0.023)  (0.041) 
Travel time to nearest health facility  -0.002  0.000  0.001**  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility  -0.035*  0.004  0.009  0.002  -0.023* 
  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
Waiting time  -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  0.000*  0.000 
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 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the 
community 
 0.131***  0.043  0.035  -0.040***  -0.120*** 
 (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.015)  (0.024) 
N 2510 1509 2510 1509 2510 1509 2510 1509 2510 1509 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.5: Impact of the NRCMS on stated household preference of village clinics, town hospitals, county hospitals, city hospitals and private clinics from 1991 to 2006 





















NRCMS 0.127*** 0.204*** -0.120*** -0.108*** -0.183*** -0.191*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.016 -0.030* 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fraction age <18  0.045 -0.066* 0.165*** 0.113*** -0.051* 0.010 -0.042*** -0.016 -0.037* -0.044* 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.026) (0.033) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.023) 
Fraction age >55 -0.007 -0.047 0.007 -0.037 0.003 0.034 -0.018* -0.007 -0.022 -0.027 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.021) (0.027) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) 
Female household head -0.110*** -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.016 0.100*** 0.075*** 0.005 -0.008 -0.014 -0.034*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) 
Household size 0.015*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.012** 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.002 -0.007*** -0.007** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.155*** -0.161*** -0.074*** -0.086*** 0.043** 0.084*** -0.085*** -0.056*** 0.061*** 0.044*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Household head married -0.007 -0.040* 0.019 0.013 -0.021 0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.015 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) 
Eastern provinces 0.182*** 0.092*** 0.235*** 0.266*** 0.098*** 0.125*** -0.061*** -0.042*** -0.143*** -0.132*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
Middle provinces 0.082*** 0.094*** 0.139*** 0.147*** -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.045*** -0.030*** -0.071*** -0.094*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) 
Household income   -0.010**  0.011**  0.009**  -0.001  0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Asset index  -0.174***  -0.077***  0.080***  0.017***  0.007 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Household head completed primary school   0.029  -0.082***  -0.002  0.022***  -0.009 
 (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.006)  (0.012) 
Household head completed junior high school  0.021  -0.084***  -0.004  0.010  0.013 
 (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.013) 
Household head completed senior high school or above  0.018  -0.071**  0.046**  0.016**  -0.013 
 (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.007)  (0.017) 
Working ratio  0.076***  -0.006  0.004  -0.001  -0.044*** 
 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.007)  (0.015) 
Household head is a farmer  0.077***  0.142***  -0.120***  -0.022***  -0.024** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.010) 
Household head has chronic disease  -0.022  -0.050  -0.002  -0.007  0.027 
  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.009)  (0.019) 
Chronic disease ratio   -0.053  -0.015  0.029  0.026*  -0.026 
  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.052)  (0.015)  (0.035) 
Household head is overweight  0.040***  -0.069***  -0.001  0.004  0.019** 
  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Household head is smoker  -0.033**  -0.013  0.033***  -0.007*  0.008 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Household head is daily drinker  0.020  0.035**  -0.038**  0.003  -0.017* 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
Travel time to nearest health facility  -0.008***  0.002**  0.002***  0.000*  0.000 
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  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Travel time to nearest health facility  -0.036***  -0.015**  0.004  0.004*  -0.003 
  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
Waiting time   -0.003***  -0.001  0.002***  0.000***  -0.003*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold  -0.003***  -0.000  -0.001**  0.000***  -0.001*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community  0.257***  0.128***  0.010  -0.024***  -0.086*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
N 42079 23445 42079 23445 42079 23445 42079 23445 42079 23445 




Table 3.6: Impact of the NRCMS on medical care utilization and stated preference of different levels of health facilities using DID and NN matching with DID (logit 
marginal effects) 
 Formal care Preventive care Folk doctor use Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospitals County hospitals City hospitals Private clinics 
Difference-in-difference estimation           
NRCMS treatment effect -0.001 0.001 -0.020** 0.043 0.117*** -0.160*** 0.097*** 0.009 -0.000 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.009) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.009) (0.023) 
NRCMS treatment group 0.003 0.000 -0.009 0.008 0.154*** -0.020 -0.110*** -0.021*** -0.084*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.005) (0.013) 
After policy period 2006 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.012 -0.063** -0.028 -0.119*** -0.009 -0.048*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.007) (0.014) 
N 3952 9480 4740 714 14793 14793 14793 14793 14793 
Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching 
NRCMS Treatment effect 0.005 0.004* -0.029** 0.000 0.113** -0.195*** 0.102* --- 0.002 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (---) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053) (---) (0.033) 
Treatment group 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.192*** 0.022 -0.090*** --- -0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (---) (0.016) 
Policy period -0.006 -0.003 0.014 --- -0.060 0.019 -0.139*** --- -0.060*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.012) (---) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039) (---) (0.020) 
N 1635 4394 2268 109 7984 7984 7984 --- 7984 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level. Control variables for DID models that are used in the model but not reported include: age, gender, household size, ethnicity, marital status, household income, asset index, education levels, 
occupation, chronic disease, community health facility characteristics and geographical dummies. b Since the question ‘Any formal medical care in last four weeks’ is only asked in survey waves 2004 and 
2006, samples used for formal care are only from these two waves. c The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. d --- means that the 




Table 3.7: Impact of the NRCMS on use of folk doctors using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit marginal effects) 
Folk doctors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
NRCMS -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
2006 0.024** 0.024** 0.022** 0.022** 0.023** 0.022* 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Time trends 0.009* 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.010** 0.009** 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Household size 0.003** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Minority ethnicity -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Married 0.019** 0.015* 0.015* 0.016** 0.016** 0.014* 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Eastern provinces 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Middle provinces -0.019** -0.019** -0.018** -0.019** -0.020** -0.018** 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household income   0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Asset index  -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Primary school    -0.014* -0.014* -0.015* -0.015* -0.014** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Junior high school   -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.001 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Senior high school or above   -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 0.003 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) 
Working    -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.005 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Farmer    0.006 0.006 0.006 0.001 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Chronic diseases     0.005 0.007 0.005 
     (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Overweight      -0.002 -0.004 
      (0.006) (0.005) 
Smoker      0.003 -0.000 
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      (0.008) (0.006) 
Daily alcohol drinker      -0.013 -0.004 
      (0.013) (0.009) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.000** 
       (0.000) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.010* 
       (0.005) 
Waiting time       -0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.000 
       (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       -0.001 
       (0.007) 
N 2793 2793 2792 2786 2774 2584 2268 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 




Table 3.8: Impact of the NRCMS on stated household preference of village clinics using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit marginal 
effects) 
Village clinics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.014 -0.014 0.113** 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) 
NRCMS 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.154*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 0.192*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
2006 -0.044 -0.045 -0.051 -0.051 -0.045 -0.039 -0.060 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.041) 
Time trends 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Age of household head 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  -0.094* -0.113** -0.114** -0.057 -0.058 -0.048 -0.050 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) 
Fraction age >55 -0.039 -0.065 -0.071 -0.046 -0.043 -0.032 -0.028 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) 
Female household head -0.069** -0.039 -0.047 -0.030 -0.038 -0.041 -0.012 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) 
Household size 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.021** 0.020** 0.017** 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.215*** -0.223*** -0.225*** -0.221*** -0.217*** -0.222*** -0.238*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Household head married -0.050 -0.045 -0.035 -0.048 -0.058 -0.066* -0.048 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) 
Eastern provinces 0.108** 0.091** 0.090** 0.105** 0.093** 0.051 -0.084* 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.047) 
Middle provinces 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.082** 0.065* 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) 
Household income   -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Asset index  -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.163*** -0.173*** -0.171*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) 
Household head completed primary school    -0.049 -0.043 -0.035 -0.038 -0.061* 
   (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) 
Household head completed junior high school   -0.038 -0.031 -0.026 -0.022 -0.007 
   (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   -0.047 -0.042 -0.032 -0.028 -0.024 
   (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) 
Working ratio    0.150*** 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.150*** 
    (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) 
Household head is a farmer    0.049* 0.048* 0.060** 0.056* 
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    (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.005 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.050) (0.051) (0.058) 
Chronic disease ratio      -0.032 -0.078 -0.058 
     (0.113) (0.114) (0.117) 
Household head is overweight      0.095*** 0.117*** 
      (0.024) (0.027) 
Household head is smoker      -0.013 -0.028 
      (0.023) (0.026) 
Household head is daily drinker      -0.002 0.006 
      (0.029) (0.032) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       -0.008*** 
       (0.002) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.039* 
       (0.024) 
Waiting time        -0.000 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.006*** 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.243*** 
       (0.029) 
N 13135 13135 13117 10177 9897 9791 7984 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 




Table 3.9: Impact of the NRCMS on stated household preference of town hospitals using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit 
marginal effects) 
Town hospitals Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.107** -0.109** -0.107** -0.113*** -0.104** -0.107** -0.195*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.049) 
NRCMS 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.013 0.008 -0.002 0.022 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
2006 0.049 0.048 0.040 0.030 0.021 0.014 0.019 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) 
Time trends -0.028*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.015** -0.014** -0.011* -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age of household head 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  0.150** 0.144** 0.142** 0.137** 0.139** 0.130** 0.187*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) 
Fraction age >55 -0.044 -0.052 -0.054 -0.066 -0.051 -0.062 -0.056 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) 
Female household head -0.040 -0.023 -0.031 -0.017 -0.012 -0.038 -0.014 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) 
Household size -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.027 -0.030 -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027 -0.006 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Household head married -0.017 -0.015 -0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.015 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) 
Eastern provinces 0.294*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.306*** 0.315*** 0.373*** 0.346*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.052) 
Middle provinces 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.226*** 0.253*** 0.251*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Household income   0.009 0.009 0.010 0.012* 0.010 0.018** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Asset index  -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.056** -0.051** -0.044* -0.034 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Household head completed primary school    -0.051 -0.065* -0.066* -0.059* -0.061* 
   (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
Household head completed junior high school   -0.052 -0.057 -0.063* -0.063* -0.069* 
   (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   0.016 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.015 
   (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) 
Working ratio    -0.011 -0.017 -0.003 -0.011 
    (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) 
Household head is a farmer    0.135*** 0.138*** 0.127*** 0.138*** 
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    (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.032 -0.038 -0.030 
     (0.053) (0.055) (0.058) 
Chronic disease ratio      -0.127 -0.106 -0.120 
     (0.099) (0.100) (0.111) 
Household head is overweight      -0.113*** -0.099*** 
      (0.024) (0.025) 
Household head is smoker      -0.067*** -0.040 
      (0.023) (0.025) 
Household head is daily drinker      0.015 0.002 
      (0.027) (0.029) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.003** 
       (0.001) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.025** 
       (0.012) 
Waiting time        0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       0.000 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.072** 
       (0.029) 
N 13135 13135 13117 10177 9897 9791 7984 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table 3.10: Impact of the NRCMS on stated household preference of county hospitals using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit 
marginal effects) 
County hospitals Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.114** 0.117*** 0.113** 0.121*** 0.102* 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.053) 
NRCMS -0.112*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.090*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
2006 -0.177*** -0.174*** -0.172*** -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.139*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.039) 
Time trends -0.006 -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age of household head -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  -0.154*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.164*** -0.157*** -0.154*** -0.168*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.058) 
Fraction age >55 -0.008 0.019 0.016 0.029 0.022 0.028 0.047 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046) 
Female household head 0.079*** 0.056** 0.059** 0.036 0.036 0.057** 0.073*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) 
Household size 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Minority ethnicity  0.060** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.098*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Household head married 0.010 0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.016 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
Eastern provinces 0.226*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.249*** 0.243*** 0.239*** 0.233*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) 
Middle provinces -0.057** -0.044* -0.044* -0.039 -0.043 -0.044* -0.072** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Household income   0.017** 0.016** 0.017** 0.019** 0.018** 0.025** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Asset index  0.123*** 0.121*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Household head completed primary school    0.013 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.026 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) 
Household head completed junior high school   0.029 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.039 
   (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   0.023 0.018 0.022 0.028 0.055 
   (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) 
Working ratio    -0.005 -0.009 -0.016 0.004 
    (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) 
Household head is a farmer    -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.071*** 
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    (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.058 -0.059 -0.055 
     (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) 
Chronic disease ratio      0.161* 0.174* 0.163* 
     (0.094) (0.094) (0.096) 
Household head is overweight      0.004 0.008 
      (0.018) (0.020) 
Household head is smoker      0.069*** 0.068*** 
      (0.019) (0.022) 
Household head is daily drinker      -0.013 -0.019 
      (0.022) (0.025) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.002** 
       (0.001) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       0.007 
       (0.008) 
Waiting time        0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       0.000 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.047** 
       (0.024) 
N 13135 13135 13117 10177 9897 9791 7984 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table 3.11: ITT analysis of the impact of the NRCMS on medical care utilization and stated preference of different levels of health facilities using DID and NN 
matching with DID (logit marginal effects) 
 Formal care Preventive care Folk doctor use Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospitals County hospitals City hospitals Private clinics 
Difference-in-difference estimation           
NRCMS treatment effect -0.000 -0.001 -0.026*** 0.041 0.103*** -0.152*** 0.132*** 0.004 -0.012 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.010) (0.019) 
NRCMS treatment group 0.002 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 0.120*** -0.005 -0.067*** -0.019*** -0.075*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.005) (0.011) 
After policy period 2006 -0.005 0.001 0.021*** 0.007 -0.054* 0.004 -0.152*** -0.014* -0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.008) (0.014) 
N 5564 16713 6882 1258 19992 19992 19992 19992 19992 
Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching 
NRCMS Treatment effect 0.003 0.003 -0.026** --- 0.125*** -0.121*** 0.113** -0.000 -0.069** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (---) (0.048) (0.042) (0.046) (0.012) (0.031) 
Treatment group 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 0.147*** 0.029 -0.079*** -0.017*** -0.089*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.006) (0.014) 
Policy period -0.006 -0.002 0.018** --- -0.040 -0.005 -0.112*** -0.007 -0.038** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (---) (0.038) (0.032) (0.037) (0.009) (0.018) 
N 2795 6940 3517 247 10063 10063 10063 10063 10063 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level. Control variables for DID models that are used in the model but not reported include: age, gender, household size, ethnicity, marital status, household income, asset index, education levels, 
occupation, chronic disease, community health facility characteristics and geographical dummies. b Since the question ‘Any formal medical care in last four weeks’ is only asked in survey waves 2004 and 
2006, samples used for formal care are only from these two waves. c The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. d --- means that the 






Table 3.12: Income subgroup analysis of the impact of the NRCMS on medical care utilization and stated 
preference of different levels of health facilities using DID (logit marginal effects) 
 Richest 25% Middle 50% Poorest 25% 
Formal medical care 0.002 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Preventive care -0.004 0.003 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) 
Folk doctors 0.013 -0.027** -0.041** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.017) 
Inpatient care 0.000 -0.000 0.019 
 (---) (0.043) (0.023) 
Village clinics 0.232** 0.126** 0.049 
 (0.102) (0.051) (0.067) 
Town hospitals -0.165* -0.165*** -0.111* 
 (0.094) (0.050) (0.064) 
County hospitals -0.011 0.144*** 0.054 
 (0.091) (0.046) (0.054) 
City hospitals 0.046 -0.012 0.015 
 (0.034) (0.014) (0.010) 
Private clinics -0.037 -0.027 -0.021 
 (0.067) (0.031) (0.042) 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates 
statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% level.  
 
 
Table 3.13: Regional subgroup analysis of the impact of the NRCMS on medical care utilization and stated 
preference of different levels of health facilities using DID (logit marginal effects) 
 Eastern provinces Middle provinces Western provinces 
Formal medical care 0.016 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
Preventive care 0.010 0.007* 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
Folk doctors -0.048** -0.018 -0.014 
 (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) 
Inpatient care -0.024 0.057 0.027 
 (0.060) (0.042) (0.034) 
Village clinics -3.581*** 0.001 0.342*** 
 (0.118) (0.050) (0.081) 
Town hospitals -1.097*** 0.091** -0.162** 
 (0.245) (0.046) (0.065) 
County hospitals 3.263*** 0.063 0.157** 
 (0.154) (0.040) (0.070) 
City hospitals 0.053 -0.005 0.077*** 
 (0.035) (0.012) (0.022) 
Private clinics 0.706*** 0.019 -0.227*** 
 (0.084) (0.025) (0.072) 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates 





INCOME-RELATED INEQUITY IN ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM A LONGITUDINAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
FROM 2000 TO 2009 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Policy makers are concerned not just with average health outcomes but also with their distribution. China 
launched a nationwide health care reform in 2003 and committed to achieving affordable and equitable 
basic health care for all by 2020. Equitable access has been officially declared by the State Council to be 
the primary aim of the rural health care reform (Yang, 2013). Following the market-liberalizing reforms 
in 1978, both demand-side subsidies to social health insurance programs, and supply-side subsidies to 
health facilities disproportionately serve the better-off (Wagstaff et al., 2009b). Health insurance 
coverage decreased dramatically in the 1990s, especially in rural areas where communes collapsed along 
with their associated health insurance schemes.  In addition, government spending on health is also 
unequally distributed across provinces given the important role of local governments in the finance of 
health care systems and inequalities in fiscal capacity. The health care financing relied heavily on out-of-
pocket health payments, and the wealthy generally have better access to health care compared to the 
poor. Consequently, the health and health care utilization in China are decidedly pro-rich by international 
standards, and there is a widening gap in health status and utilization between urban and rural residents 
and between the poor and rich population groups (Gao et al., 2002; Liu et al., 1999; Wagstaff, 2009; Zhang 
and Kanbur, 2005).  
This chapter investigates income-related inequity in access to different types of health services and 
different levels of health facilities in rural China. The analysis focuses on horizontal inequity – people in 
equal need ought to be treated equally – and compares the actual distribution of medical care use by 
income with the distribution of need. It then tests for the extent of any observed differentials in use 
across income groups that cannot be accounted for by need differences. The analysis allows us to address 
two major issues concerning rural China’s current health care system. First, it helps us to find out 
whether equity in the use of health care has improved in recent years, especially after the expansion of 
social health insurance in rural areas. Second, to what extent do the non-need factors drive the income-
related inequity in health care utilization after controlling for the need differences. The empirical findings 
in this study will feed back into the policy making process and provide useful insights for other 
developing countries in moving towards an efficient and equitable health care system.  
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Recent studies that examine income-related inequity in health care utilization in rural China have found a 
pro-rich inequity in the use of outpatient and inpatient care (Chen et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2012; Xie, 
2011; Zhang et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2011), preventive care (Yang, 2013), maternal health services (Li et 
al., 2015; Shen et al., 2014) and treatment of major chronic conditions (Elwell-Sutton et al., 2013; Xie et al., 
2014). This paper extends and develops the existing literature in a number of aspects. First, while 
previous studies only focus on aggregate health care utilization, such as formal medical care, preventive 
care and folk doctors, this study also shows results for the choice of different levels of health facilities, 
including village clinics, town hospitals, county hospitals and private clinics. Since various health 
providers indicate different quality levels of health services, the findings on facility choice could indicate 
whether the poor have the same access of good quality health care as the rich. Secondly, results on 
income-related inequity are presented across four waves of data, which last for nearly ten years and 
cover the period before and after the health care reforms. Since previous studies mainly limit their 
analysis to a given point of time (Li et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2012; Xie et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015), it is 
worth extending the time period to obtain a more robust picture on how the equity of health care 
utilization changes over time. Thirdly, the dataset used in this analysis covers nine of China’s 31 provinces 
and provides a much broader picture on health care inequity compared with previous studies, which 
mainly focus on one or two provinces (Chen et al., 2015; Elwell-Sutton et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; Shen et 
al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on the health care 
reform in China since 2003. Sections 3 and 4 describe the model and introduce the dataset. Results are 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes with the implications of the findings for the ongoing efforts to 
achieve a more equitable health care system in China as well as many other developing countries.  
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
During the late 1970s, China began transforming itself from a closed centralized planned economy to a 
market economy. These economic reforms brought dramatic changes to China’s health care system and 
turned it into a market-oriented health system within a few years. China’s health care system switched 
from one that provided preventive and affordable basic health care to all people to one in which many 
people could not afford basic care and many families are driven into poverty because of large medical 
expenses (Yip and Hsiao, 2008). The economic liberalization policy in health care sectors caused many 
problems, including unaffordable access to health services, high rates of financial catastrophe due to large 
out-of-pocket payments, widened disparities in health and health care utilization and rapidly rising health 
care costs (Wagstaff et al., 2009b). Among all these problems, the inequity issue in health and health care 
utilization raised great interest among both academics and policy makers. Some recent studies found a 
widening gap in health status and utilization from 1978 onwards between urban and rural residents (Liu 
et al., 1999; Shen et al., 1996; Zhang and Kanbur, 2005) and across people with different income levels 
(Wagstaff, 2009).  Wagstaff et al. (2009) also found that the substantial pro-rich inequalities in child 
malnutrition in China is high by international standards in the early 2000s.  
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In 2002, the Chinese government publicly acknowledged the limitations of the health care system and 
began to implement a series of reforms aimed at addressing various challenges within the system 
(Central Committee of the Communist Party and State Council, 2002). President Hu stated that the goal of 
the reform is to ensure that every citizen has equal access to affordable basic health care by 2012 (Yip et 
al., 2009). The ambitious health care reform plan involves the expansion of health insurance coverage to 
achieve universal coverage, establishment of a national essential medicines system, improvement of the 
primary health care at grass-roots level, expansion of the coverage of basic public health services and 
reform of public hospitals (Yip et al., 2012). The government decided to re-instate its role in health care 
system for the purposes of equity and provision of public goods. In rural areas, a heavily subsidized 
voluntary health insurance program known as the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS)43 
was introduced, together with a health expenses safety-net program known as Medical Assistance (MA)44. 
On the supply side, large-scale investments were promised to rehabilitate and equip rural health facilities, 
with a particular focus on investment in infrastructure and provider training at primary health care level 
(Wagstaff et al., 2009b). Low-level health facilities, such as village clinics and town hospitals, are expected 
to serve a gate-keeping function in the long run.  
The NRCMS was introduced to improve access to health care and provide financial protection to rural 
residents regardless of demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The key feature of the NRCMS 
includes being government-led, offering voluntary enrolment, being critical disease-oriented, and being 
based at the county level (Dong, 2009). The governments provide significant demand subsidies for rural 
populations to enrol in the NRCMS. The scheme was initiated in 2003 and piloted in hundreds of counties 
in four provinces. The insurance expanded gradually in the following years and became widespread in all 
rural counties by 2008. The program is organized and supported by four levels of government: central, 
provincial, county and township. Local governments have the power to implement the plan at their own 
discretion. The premium is subsidized by both local and central governments, with central government 
helping local governments in poor regions. The premium contribution from rural residents is relatively 
limited45. The program is operated at the county level, and county authorities have been given 
considerable discretion in the design of the benefit packages in terms of risk covered, reimbursement 
rules for inpatient and outpatient expenses and so on (Wagstaff et al., 2009a). Therefore, the benefit 
packages vary geographically, but most packages include the coverage for hospitalization and outpatient 
expenses incurred in the treatment of critical diseases, aiming to alleviate poverty resulting from 
catastrophic diseases. Deductibles, ceilings and reimbursement rates differ across different levels of 
health facilities, with favourable policies provided for low-level facilities, such as village clinics and town 
hospitals. The government tried to direct funds toward primary health care to mitigate the current 
                                                                    
43 NRCMS program is aimed to provide health insurance to more than 800 million rural citizens (around 66 percent of total 
population) in China. 
44 MA program is aimed to provide financial assistance with health care payments for poorest in both rural and urban areas, 
especially those covered by the Wu Bao, Te Kun and Di Bao social assistance programs. 
45 When the program was initiated in 2003, the central government contributed 10 yuan per person per year, and local governments 
matched that contribution with no less than 10 yuan and rural residents contributed 10 yuan per person per year. The premium 
level keeps increasing over time. In 2008, the central and local governments’ contribution increased to 40 yuan per person per year, 
and individual contribution increased to 20 yuan per person per year.  
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pressure at city and higher-level hospitals. The insurance coverage and government subsidies have 
become more generous as more funding goes into the program over time.  
On the supply side, the government has tried to reduce the cost of health care by encouraging patients to 
seek care in low-level health facilities. However, gatekeeping is virtually non-existent in China, where 
patients traditionally have been free to self-refer to any providers. In addition, patients have a distrust of 
the quality of care provided by village clinics and town hospitals, and therefore a large share of outpatient 
and inpatient visits occur at secondary and tertiary hospitals (Eggleston, 2012). In 2005, the government 
announced its intention to strengthen the primary health care facilities by investing in infrastructure and 
training of general practitioners. Recent reforms in rural areas include upgrading primary health facilities, 
encouraging medical students to work for low-level facilities in the central and western parts of the 
country, and provision of general practitioner training for doctors and health care professionals at town 
hospitals and village clinics. Providers of primary health care are expected to provide high-quality 
preventive, primary and home care, and at the same time to serve as gate-keepers, managing referrals to 
specialist care and hospitals. However, the effort to build up a reliable network of non-hospital-based 
primary care providers is a difficult and long-term process.  
Despite the fact that the NRCMS covered more than 98% of total rural population by the end of 2012, 
problems such as inadequate financial protection associated with high co-payments still persist, 
especially for the rural poor. Since the NRCMS mainly covers hospitalization and critical diseases, the 
enrolled still have to pay for most outpatient fees by themselves (Dong, 2009). In addition, the insurance 
offers the same benefit packages to all the participants regardless of the fact that the poor usually have 
greater health needs and spend a larger fraction of their income on health care utilization (Yang, 2013). 
On the supply side, primary health care facilities have not been able to play a gate-keeping role. Health 
care delivery remains hospital-centred since most visits and admissions continue to take place at 
secondary and tertiary hospitals. This creates a barrier for the poor to access health care since hospitals 
are usually seated far away from most poor households and services are charged at a higher price. The 
major challenge in strengthening primary health care is a shortage of human resources since retention of 
qualified health professionals in rural areas has been difficult, especially in poor regions (Yip et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the effect of the health care reform on reducing inequity in health and health care is expected 
to be limited. 
4.3 DATA 
The dataset used in this study is the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), collected collaboratively 
by the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National 
Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. 46 The 
survey followed a large sample of individuals and households in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2009 and 2011. The CHNS covers nine of China’s 31 provinces47, which spread across eastern, 
                                                                    
46 The China Health and Nutrition Survey is available at: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china.  
47 The nine provinces are: Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou.  
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central and western regions and vary substantially in economics and health-related indicators. All 
counties within the surveyed provinces were stratified by income, and four of them were randomly 
selected from each province based on a weighted sampling scheme. Villages and townships within the 
counties were then selected randomly. The survey questions cover demographic, social and economic 
factors as well as public health risk factors and health outcomes at individual, household and community 
levels (Popkin et al., 2010).  
In this study, three recent waves of the CHNS data (2000, 2004 and 2006) are used to measure the 
income-related inequity among residents living in rural areas.48 The analysis is restricted to those rural 
communities without urban social insurance programs since the urban schemes are designed differently 
from the rural ones and may confound the contribution of the rural social health insurance to total 
inequity.  The analysis includes a sample of 27,492 observations from four waves.49  
4.3.1 HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION 
The income-related inequity is computed for the utilization of different types of health services (formal 
medical care, preventive care, folk doctors and inpatient care) and utilization of different levels of health 
facilities (village clinics, town hospitals, county hospitals and private clinics). Measurement of utilization 
of formal medical care is based on the question “Did you seek care from a formal medical provider during 
the past 4 weeks?” A similar question referring to a 4 weeks reference period is used for preventive care: 
“During the past 4 weeks, did you receive any preventive health service, such as health examination, eye 
examination, blood test, blood pressure screening, tumour screening?” However, the utilization of folk 
doctors has a 12-month recall period. The relevant survey question is that “Did you visit a folk doctor last 
year?” 50 
The utilization of inpatient care and different levels of health facilities is restricted to people who 
reported to be sick in the last 4 weeks, and therefore has a much smaller sample size. The survey first 
asks “During the past 4 weeks, have you been sick or injured? Have you suffered from a chronic or acute 
disease?” and if so “Where did you see a doctor?” and “Was it an outpatient or inpatient visit?” 
Respondents can choose from 15 types of health facilities in the question on facility choice, which 
includes both public and private health facilities. Four main categories are selected for health facility 
choice: village clinic, town hospitals, county hospitals and private clinic. All the utilization variables are 
defined as 0/1 dummies. 
4.3.2 INCOME 
                                                                    
48 These four waves cover the period both before and after the health care reforms. The 2011 wave is not used here because the data 
is still incomplete. I also exclude 2009 here since it does not have questions about self-assessed health status. In addition, waves 
before 2000 are not used since they only covered eight provinces. One province was dropped (Liaoning) and one new province was 
added (Heilongjiang) in 1997 survey. Both the old and new provinces were surveyed since 2000. 
49 Detailed information on the number of observations excluded from the analysis is shown in Table A 4.1 (Appendix). There are 
8,293 observations in 2000, 6,854 observations in 2004, 6,369 observations in 2006 and 5,976 observations in 2009. The follow-up 
rate is not very high. Only 2,965 individuals appear in 4 waves; 2,130 individuals appear in 3 waves; 2,371 individuals appear in 2 
waves and 4,500 individuals appear in 1 wave.  
50 Folk doctors are informal medical providers who do not have the licence to practice medicine.  
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Per capita income data is used as the measure of living standards. The CHNS income measure is net 
monetary income received by the household members during the reference year and is inflated to 2011 
(the last wave of the survey). It includes income from farming, fishing, gardening, livestock and small 
commercial household business. As the analysis uses health care utilization at individual level as outcome 
variables, per capita income is computed by dividing the household income by the number of people in 
the household.   
However, previous studies suggest that household income data has limitations in both accuracy and 
measurement, particularly in the developing countries context. For instance, households may have 
temporary fluctuations in income levels but still maintain consumption through savings or insurance 
(Grosh and Glewwe, 2000; O'Donnell et al., 2008). However, household income data may be the only 
appropriate indicator to be used in this study since China has the highest saving rate in the world, and 
expenditure or consumption may be distorted by the propensity to save (Sun et al., 2010; Yang, 2013). 
Therefore, individuals are ranked by income levels here.  
4.3.3 NEED FACTORS 
Health need is defined as the health care utilization that an individual is expected to receive given his or 
her age, gender and health status. Age is captured by six dummy variables, namely 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 
45-54, 55-64, 65 and above. 12 variables are created by interacting age with gender, and the reference 
group is males who are aged between 18 and 24. Health status is measured by self-reported health status, 
the number of major diseases51 and illness during the last four weeks preceding the survey52. Instead of 
using a dummy variable to indicate the presence of major diseases, the analysis controls for the number 
of disease types since poor people are more likely to suffer from more than one conditions (O'Donnell and 
Propper, 1991; Van Doorslaer et al., 1992). In addition, the symptoms and severity of illness during the 
past four weeks are also included here since the health utilization variables on inpatient care and 
different levels of health facilities are only responded by people who report illness during the last month.  
4.3.4 NON-NEED FACTORS 
The information on insurance coverage includes the enrolment in rural social health insurance, free 
medical insurance and commercial health insurance. The rural social health insurance variable is based 
on household level, which equals one if household head reports to be enrolled. The reason to use the 
household level enrolment is that some household members may be unaware of their enrolment status if 
only the head makes the decision for the whole household. The relevant survey question is: “what type of 
medical insurance do you have?”, and respondents can choose from nine types of insurance programs, 
                                                                    
51 Major diseases include hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, stroke and bone fracture. 
52 The 2009 wave is not used here since self-assessed health status (SAH) is missing in the 2009 CHNS survey. 
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including rural cooperative medical scheme, free medical insurance53 and commercial health insurance54. 
We define all insurance variables as a 0/1 dummies.   
Other non-need/socioeconomic factors include: log of household income, asset index, household size, 
ethnicity of household head (Han and ethnic minority), marital status, education levels (illiterate, primary 
school, junior high school, senior high school and above), employment status and geographic dummies 
(eastern, middle and western provinces).  
4.4 METHODOLOGY 
Our aim is to measure and explain income-related inequity in health care utilization. A common approach 
adopted in health economics literature is to focus on horizontal inequity, defined as unequal treatment 
for people with equal need (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van de Poel et al., 2012; Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer, 2000). It proceeds by comparing the actual observed distribution of medical care use by 
income with the distribution of need. To measure horizontal inequity in health care utilization, we use the 
Concentration Indices (CI) to compare the actual observed distribution of medical care use by income 
with the distribution of health need (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer, 2000). The method involves four steps: (1) estimating a model of determinants of health care 
utilization using a set of need (age, gender and health status) and non-need/socioeconomic variables; (2) 
predicting need-standardized health utilization for each outcome variable; (3) calculating the CI for actual 
health care use and for need-standardized health care use; (4) decomposing the contribution of both need 
and non-need/socioeconomic factors to total inequity.  
4.4.1 INDIRECT STANDARDIZATION FOR UTILIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 
Since health care utilization differs across population groups not only by socio-economic characteristics, 
but by health needs as well, such as age, gender and health status. The inequality in health care utilization 
must be standardized for differences in need before it can be interpreted as inequity. After 
standardization, any residual inequality in utilization by income is regarded as horizontal inequity (HI), 
which represents the avoidable inequity in health care use. HI is expressed by a difference of actual 
inequality and need-standardized health care utilization.  
There are two ways of standardizing need differences: the direct and indirect methods. In this study, we 
use indirect standardization because of the following two advantages: i) it is computationally more 
straightforward; ii) it can be easily applied to individual level data (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000). The 
indirect method takes the difference between the actual distribution of health care use and the need-
expected use. The latter is obtained by standardizing the need variables and setting all the non-need 
                                                                    
53 Free medical insurance is provided for workers working at governmental institutions and their family members. The burden of 
medical expenses mainly falls on public finance, and individuals pay for a certain proportion of expenses for drugs and 
hospitalization.  
54 Very few rural residents are covered by other insurance types, such as health insurance for women and children, expanded 
program of immunization insurance for children and other insurance programs. In addition, the analysis excludes communities 
where urban social health insurance programs are available. 
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variables at their sample means. Although the measures of health care use are dummy variables, we use 
linear estimators since results from non-linear models depend on the arbitrary choice of reference values.  
We begin with estimating a linear model of health utilization:  




+ 𝜀𝑖 (4.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖  is utilization of different types of health services (eg. formal medical care, preventive care, folk 
doctors and inpatient care) or utilization of different levels of health facilities (eg. village clinics, town 
hospitals, county hospitals and private clinics); i denotes the individual; and 𝑥𝑗  are a set of need variables 
associated with health demands that need to be standardized and the 𝑧𝑘  are non-need variables for which 
we do not want to standardize but to control for in order to estimate partial correlations between the 
need variables and the outcome variables. Probit parameter estimates (?̂?, 𝛽?̂?, 𝛾?̂?), individual values of the 
need variables (𝑥𝑗𝑖) and sample means of the non-need variables (𝑧?̅?) are then used to predict the need-
expected health care use ?̂?𝑖
𝑋: 
 ?̂?𝑖





Estimates of need-standardized utilization, 𝑦?̂?
𝐼𝑆 is then given by the difference between actual and need-
expected health care use, plus the mean of actual utilization:55  
 𝑦?̂?
𝐼𝑆 = 𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖
𝑋 + 𝑦?̅? (4.3) 
The value of 𝑦?̂?
𝐼𝑆 can be interpreted as the distribution of health care utilization that would be expected to 
be observed, irrespective of differences in the distribution of the need factors across income.  
4.4.2 MEASURING INCOME-RELATED INEQUITY IN HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION 
The degree of horizontal inequality in health care use can be measured using the well-established method 
based on the Concentration Curve (CC) and the Concentration Index  (CI) (O'Donnell et al., 2008). The CC 
(Figure 4.1) plots the cumulative distribution of health care utilization against the cumulative distribution 
of the population ranked by income. If everyone uses exactly the same amount of health care irrespective 
of his or her income levels, the concentration curve will be a 45-degree line (the line of equality). If the 
health care use concentrates among the rich (poor) people, the curve will lie below (above) the line of 
equality.  
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
The CI is used to quantify the degree of socioeconomic inequality in health care utilization (d’Uva et al., 
2009; Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van Doorslaer et al., 2004; Van Doorslaer et al., 2006). The CI is defined 
as twice the area between the CC and the line of equality. CI is zero if the distribution is equal. The index 
takes a negative value when the curve lies above the line of equality, indicating disproportionate 
                                                                    
55 The reason to add the mean of the need-expected utilization is to ensure that the mean of standardized utilization equals that of 
actual utilization (O’Donnell et al. 2008).  
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concentration of the health care utilization among the poor, and a positive value when it lies below the 
line of equality.  
Formally, the CI is defined as:  
 




The CI can be computed by using the “convenient covariance” or “convenient regression”. The former one 
is defined as the covariance between the health care utilization and the fractional rank in the living 





𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑟) (4.5) 
where y is health care use and 𝜇 is its mean. r is the rank of household income.  
Given the relationship between covariance and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, an equivalent 
estimate can be obtained using “convenient regression”, which regresses a transformation of the health 





) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (4.6) 








𝑤𝑖 , where 𝑤𝑖  is the sampling weight 
and N is the sample size56), and 𝜎𝑟
2 is the variance of the fractional rank. The OLS estimate of 𝛽 is an 
estimate of the Concentration Index equivalent to that obtained from Equation (4.5). In this paper, we use 
“convenient regression” without transforming the left-hand-side variable but equivalently transforming 
the rank coefficient. The method helps us to derive the standard error of the CI that takes sampling 
variability into account. From the regression 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (4.7) 
   







However, the degree of inequality in the use of health care will indicate inequity only if the need for 
health care does not vary with income. If this is not the case, we need to compare it with the degree of 
inequality in health need. The index of horizontal inequity (HI) is computed by using the CI of inequality 
in need-standardized utilization (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). Robust standard errors clustered at 
community level are used to account for serial correlation.  
                                                                    
56 The observations are sorted in ascending order of living standard, and the sample weight 𝑤𝑖 is sum to 1. However, CHNS dataset 
doesn’t have sampling weight, so we set weight equal to one for all the observations used in this study.  
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Several recent studies suggest some limitations of the use of CI. Wagstaff (2005) shows that if the 
outcome variables are binary, the minimum and maximum values of the CI depend on the mean of the 
outcomes. The bounds are much wider for populations with a low mean than for populations with a high 
mean. This would complicate the comparison of the values of the CI for populations with different mean 
levels in health care utilization. Since all the health care utilization variables used in this study are binary, 
we use Erreygers’ Index (EI) to ensure that the range of the inequality indices are always between -1 and 






where 𝑎𝑦 and 𝑏𝑦 denote the lower and upper bound of health care utilization 𝑦𝑖 , 𝜇 is the population mean 
of 𝑦𝑖 , and 𝐶𝐼 represents the standard CI specified in Eq. (4.8). In general, the difference between CI and EI 
is that CI measures relative inequality in the distribution of a variable according to income, while EI 
measures absolute inequality. In this study, both indices are used to test the sensitivity of our results.  
4.4.3 EXPLAINING INCOME-RELATED INEQUITY THROUGH DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
To explain the potential sources of horizontal inequity in health care utilization, we can decompose the 
inequity indices into the contribution of various determinants to income-related inequality. Based on OLS 
regressions, it is computed as the product of the elasticity of health utilization with respect to the factor 
and the degree of income-related inequality in that factor (Wagstaff et al., 2003).  
Although the binary nature of the outcome variables requires a non-linear estimation, decomposition 
analysis can be applied to non-linear models only by using approximation techniques, which are difficult 
to implement and interpret (Van Doorslaer et al., 2004). In addition, previous studies have shown that 
equity measurements calculated by OLS regressions do not differ much from the non-linear estimation 
(Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004). Therefore, OLS regression is used for 
decomposition analysis. 𝑦𝑖  is assumed to be a linear and additively separable function of need (𝑥𝑗𝑖) and 
non-need (𝑧𝑘𝑖) variables as follows:  
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑗
𝑥𝑗𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝑘
𝑧𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  (4.10) 
The CI for health care utilization can be written as a weighted sum of the concentration indices of the 
explanatory variables for the use of health services, where the weights represent the sensitivity of health 
care utilization with respect to each explanatory variable (Wagstaff et al., 2003).   
 𝐶𝐼 = ∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝑗
𝑥?̅?/𝜇)𝐶𝑗 + ∑ (𝛾𝑘
𝑘
𝑧?̅?/𝜇)𝐶𝑘 + 𝐺𝐶𝑢/𝜇 (4.11) 
where 𝑥?̅?  and 𝑧?̅?  are the means of 𝑥𝑗𝑖  and 𝑧𝑘𝑖 , 𝐶𝑗  and 𝐶𝑘 are the concentration indices for 𝑥𝑗𝑖  and 𝑧𝑘𝑖 , and 
𝐺𝐶𝑢 is the generalized Concentration Index for the error term 𝑢𝑖 . The weights for 𝑥𝑗𝑖  and 𝑧𝑘𝑖  are the 
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elasticity of 𝑦𝑖  with respect to 𝑥𝑗𝑖  (𝛽𝑗𝑥?̅?/𝜇) and 𝑧𝑘𝑖  (𝛾𝑘𝑧?̅?/𝜇), respectively. The first term denotes the partial 
contribution of need variables, and the second term represents the contribution of the non-need variables. 
The last term in Equation (4.11) is the residual part, which reflects the income-related inequality in health 
care utilization that is left unexplained by the model.  
The decomposition can be extended to EI by multiplying the CI by 4 and 𝜇:  
 
𝐸𝐼 = 4 ∗ [∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝑗
𝑥?̅?)𝐶𝑗 + ∑ (𝛾𝑘
𝑘
𝑧?̅?)𝐶𝑘 + 𝐺𝐶𝑢] (4.12) 
The estimated inequality in health care utilization is a weighted sum of the inequality of each explanatory 
variable, with the weights equal to the elasticity of the variable (Van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2004). 
Therefore, total inequality can be partitioned into ‘potentially avoidable’ and ‘unavoidable’ inequality. The 
unavoidable part of the inequality is the inequality in utilization outcomes due to need factors (age, 
gender and health status), while the potentially avoidable inequality is the one driven by non-need factors. 
Most of the need variables are expected to contribute to pro-poor inequality with positive use elasticity 
combined with negative concentration indices, while non-need variables usually contribute to pro-rich 
inequality with positive elasticity and positive concentration indices (Van Doorslaer et al., 2004). In 
addition, the decomposition method also allows us to identify the importance of each factor in 
contributing to the income-related inequality of health care utilization. 
4.5 RESULTS 
The first part of the results shows the trends of average levels of actual health care utilization across 
years, and then presents the distribution of the actual and need-standardized utilization by income 
quantiles. Concentration Indices (CI) and Erreygers’ Indices (EI) of actual and need-standardized 
utilization are calculated for different types of health services and different levels of health facilities. 
Finally, decomposition analysis is conducted to provide details on the explanatory factors driving the 
inequities in health care utilization.  
4.5.1 DIFFERENCES IN HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION ACROSS YEARS 
Figure 4.2 shows the variation in the average levels of health care utilization from 2000 to 2009. On 
average, around 1.3% of the adult population used formal medical care and about 2% used preventive 
care during the last four weeks. The use of folk doctors refers to a longer recall period that lasts for one 
year, this may be why the average proportion is higher (3.9%). The fraction of using inpatient care is the 
highest at around 7.0%, but it has a much smaller sample size given that the question is only answered by 
people who report to be sick in the last four weeks. From 2000 to 2009, there is a slight decrease in the 
use of formal medical care while a steady increase in the use of preventive care. Both the utilization of 
folk doctors and inpatient care decreases from 2000 to 2004, but increases gradually in the following 
years. 
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In terms of the utilization of different levels of health facilities57, village clinics are the most common 
source of treatment (on average 33%), and visits to town and county hospitals (both average around 20%) 
rank as the second. Around 16% of the respondents use private clinics. From 2000 to 2009, the 
probability of seeking care in village clinics increases from 29.8% to 38.7%, while the probability of using 
private clinics decreases from 17.9% to 13.7%. The likelihood of using town and county hospitals remain 
stable across years. The increase in the use of village clinics may be closely related to the investment in 
infrastructure and staff training at primary health facilities along with the health care reform, making 
village clinics more accessible and offer better quality health services. The decrease in the use of private 
clinics may indicate that insurance reduces financial burden of patients to access better public health 
services since the private health care is usually considered to be cheap but of inferior quality. However, 
these differences should be interpreted carefully since they may reflect differences in the need for health 
care across years. It is therefore more appropriate to use the need-standardized utilization of health 
services and facilities for further analysis.  
[Figure 4.2 about here] 
4.5.2 QUANTILE DISTRIBUTIONS OF HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION 
Table 4.1 presents unstandardized and need-standardized quantile distributions of the utilization of 
different types of health services and different levels of health facilities. The ratio between the top and 
bottom income quantiles is calculated in the last column. Need is proxied by a vector of 12 age-sex 
dummies, number of major diseases, one dummy for the presence of illness during the last four weeks, 
and number of symptoms and severity related to illness. Standardized utilization is obtained by adding 
the difference between the actual and need-expected health care use per quantile to the mean of the 
need-expected use. Expected use was estimated based on probit models that standardize only need 
factors and set all the non-need factors at their sample means.  
The use of formal medical care shows a pro-rich inequality in 2004 and a pro-poor inequality in 2006. 
The magnitudes of the inequality appear to be similar before and after need standardization. The top 
income group is around 40 per cent more likely to use the formal medical care than the bottom group in 
2004, while becomes 20%-35% less likely in 2006.  
The use of preventive care is clearly in favour of the high income groups in most years, indicating that the 
rich appear to receive a higher amount of preventive care than the poor. The largest top-to-bottom 
quantile ratio appears in 2004, where the top income group reports twice the use of preventive care 
compared with the bottom group.   
The picture is quite different for visits to folk doctors: the top-to-bottom quantile ratio is substantially 
below one across all waves. The pro-poor inequality increases over years, and the largest difference 
between the top and bottom quantiles is observed in 2006, with the bottom group 60% more likely to 
                                                                    
57 Similar as the use of inpatient care, the utilization question about health facilities is only answered by people who report to be 
sick during the last four weeks.  
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seek care from folk doctors than the top group. The pro-poor distribution pattern may be due to the lower 
price levels of health services provided by folk doctors compared with those offered by formal medical 
facilities.  However, the quality of care is also perceived to be low for most folk doctors58. Poorer people 
may take the risk of obtaining inferior or even inappropriate treatment from informal medical providers 
in order to pay a cheap price.   
There is some variation in the top-to-bottom ratio for the use of inpatient services across years, which is 
largely due to the small sample size since very few individuals report using inpatient services during the 
last four weeks. After standardization, the distributions are generally in favour of the higher income 
groups. The only exceptions are the top quantile in 2004, where the utilization among the top group 
appears to be the lowest. The extremely small probability of using inpatient care of the top quantiles 
should be related to the bias due to small sample size59. The gradients based on other quantiles in 2004 
still show a pro-rich trend. In general, the rich are still getting a higher share of inpatient services than 
expected on the basis of their need characteristics. 
In terms of the utilization of different levels of health facilities, it is worth noting from Table 4.1 that 
across all years, people in the poorest quantile are more likely to use village clinics and town hospitals, 
but less likely to use county hospitals. Almost all the top-versus-bottom ratios for village clinics and town 
hospitals are below one, while all the ratios are above one for the utilization of county hospitals. The gap 
between the top and bottom income quantiles stays similar for the use of town hospitals across years, but 
for the use of village clinics and county hospitals, the gap reduces gradually over time. Until 2006, people 
in the richest quantile are 45% and 12% less likely to seek care from village clinics and town hospitals, 
respectively, while nearly 30% more likely to use county hospitals than those in the poorest quantile. 
Therefore, the rich tend to receive better quality health services than the poor given that county hospitals 
are usually better equipped and staffed than village clinics and town hospitals.  
While the top-versus-bottom ratios are useful in providing insights into the differences in the 
distributions of health care utilization, the information is incomplete in the sense that they do not depend 
on the distribution of the middle three quantiles. In the next section, we examine whether the general 
patterns observed correspond to the results when we use more appropriate inequity measures.  
[Table 4.1 about here] 
4.5.3 INDICES FOR TOTAL INEQUALITY AND HORIZONTAL INEQUITY 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the concentration indices (CI) and Erreygers’ indices (EI) for utilization of each 
type of health care and each level of health facilities by year. Both indices are calculated for actual and 
need-standardized health care utilization60. Any inequality remaining in need-standardized use is 
interpreted as horizontal inequity (HI), and the magnitude of the indices shows the degree to which there 
                                                                    
58 Folk doctors refer to those private providers who do not have licence to practice medicine and have only limited medical training.  
59 In 2004, only 46 individuals report to use inpatient services, and 5 of them are from the top quantile group.  
60 The graphs of concentration curves for the use of different types of health services and different levels of health facilities can be 
found in Figure A4.1 – 4.8 (Appendix).  
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is inequality related to income. Positive (negative) values indicate inequality favouring the rich (poor), 
and a zero or non-significant value indicates that the use is distributed equally across income groups. The 
scatter diagrams of horizontal inequity based on CI and EI along with 95% confidence intervals are 
shown in Figure 4.3.  
The probability of using formal medical care shows little evidence of inequality both before and after 
need standardization. All the CI and EI indices are generally small and insignificant, which indicates that 
the likelihood of using formal medical care is distributed fairly equally across income groups. The picture 
is somewhat different for the use of preventive care. The CI and EI indices are positive and mostly 
significant, suggesting that higher income groups are more intensive users of preventive care than lower 
income groups.  However, the pro-rich trend disappears in 2006 and there is no significant difference of 
utilization across income groups. We also find substantial pro-poor inequality in the likelihood of 
contacting folk doctors based on both actual and need-standardized health care utilization. While not all 
indices are significant, the pro-poor inequality becomes larger over time and lower income groups are 
about 15-30% more likely to seek medical care from folk doctors in 2006. With respect to the use of 
inpatient care, both CI and EI indices appear to be insignificant and close to zero in 2000 and 2004. The 
exception is in 2006 that the indices are significantly positive, indicating the distribution of the use of 
inpatient care reveals significant pro-rich trend.  
The second parts of Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the CI and EI indices of the utilization in different levels of 
health facilities, which confirms the trend we observe in Table 4.1. The indices suggest that the use of 
village clinics is much more frequent among lower-income groups, while the use of county hospitals is 
more frequent among higher-income groups. We observe a large and significant degree of pro-poor 
inequity in the use of village clinics in 2004 and 2006, while a significant degree of pro-rich inequity in 
the use of county hospitals in 2000 and 2004. Possible reasons behind the pro-rich inequity of accessing 
county hospitals may be that: i) the treatment costs at county hospitals are generally high; ii) county 
hospitals are usually situated far away from most villages, which leads to a high transport costs; iii) 
county hospitals often have longer waiting times. Therefore, poorer people are usually only able to use 
village clinics given the lower price and easy access, even if their quality of care is perceived to be lower.  
After standardizing for age, sex, major diseases and illness during the last four weeks, both CI and EI 
indices have the same sign and significance level and similar magnitudes as the unstandardized ones. In 
addition, we use EI indices to account for the binary nature of the outcome variables, but the resulting 
indices do not differ much from the CI indices. In conclusion, there is pro-rich inequity (significantly 
positive CI and EI indices for need standardized health care utilization) for the use of preventive care and 
county hospitals, while pro-poor inequity (significantly negative CI and EI indices for need standardized 
health care utilization) for the use of folk doctors and village clinics. It means that higher income groups 
are more likely to seek preventive care and receive better quality health services compared with the 
lower income groups.  
[Tables 4.2 and 4.3 about here] 
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[Figures 4.3-4.8 about here] 
4.5.4 DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
Having compared the differences in income-related inequities across years and types of health services, it 
is useful to investigate the potential sources of any inequities using decomposition methods. Tables 4.4-
4.6 present the results of decomposition analysis for the EI indices based on OLS regressions, depicting 
the contribution of both need and non-need/socioeconomic factors to total inequity. All the results are 
also presented in graphs (Figure 4.9-4.11). The inequality is decomposed into the contribution of three 
main sources: i) need factors, including age, gender and health status; ii) non-need factors, including 
household income, education, employment status, insurance, region and other demographics (ethnicity 
and marital status); iii) residual term. One disadvantage of aggregating the contributions of several 
variables is that positive and negative contributions may cancel out in the aggregate so that a small 
contribution may hide larger contributions (Van Doorslaer et al., 2004). Therefore, these three main 
sources are further divided into more detailed categories: i) age and gender interactions; ii) health status; 
iii) income; iv) education; v) employment status; vi) health insurance coverage; vii) region; viii) other 
demographics; ix) residual. The following sections go through each of the contributor.  
4.5.4.1 Contribution of need factors 
The partial contribution of need factors is, with very few exceptions, negative for nearly all types of care 
(except for the use of private clinics). It indicates that unequal need distributions account for the pro-poor 
inequality and lead to less positive or more negative inequity indices. The largest contribution is observed 
for the use of formal medical care, mainly driven by the very strong pro-poor distribution of health status. 
However, the extent of the pro-poor distribution of formal medical care itself is not sufficient to match the 
pro-poor distribution of need. The same is true for the use of preventive care and county hospitals.  On 
the other hand, the actual distribution of folk doctors, village clinics and town hospitals is more pro-poor 
than required on the basis of needs. It indicates that other socio-economic factors may also play an 
important role in contributing to the horizontal inequity. Therefore, in the following parts, we decompose 
the EI indices further into other contributing factors.  
4.5.4.2 Contribution of income 
In most years, the unequal distribution of income contributes to a more pro-rich distribution of the use of 
preventive care, county hospitals and private clinics and a more pro-poor distribution of the use of folk 
doctors, village clinics and town hospitals. It means that the contribution of income is to reduce the use of 
low quality health services provided by informal doctors and low-level health facilities, while increasing 
the utilization of better quality health services provided by high-level hospitals. The size of the 
contribution is quite large, mostly between 30% and 80%. The main difference between income-related 
inequity in health care utilization (CI and EI indices for need-standardized health care use) and the 
marginal contribution of income is that the former is obtained by controlling only need factors while the 
latter is obtained by controlling all other variables except income (Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004). 
Any discrepancy between the inequity indices and the income contribution to inequity must be due to the 
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contributions of the other non-need variables included. For example, the EI indices for the need-
standardized use of preventive care is large and significant while the partial income contribution is 
relatively small and accounts for less than half of the total inequity. Apparently, the pro-rich inequity is 
generated through other non-need factors like regional differences. However, the opposite phenomenon 
occurs for the use of county hospitals in 2000 and 2004: horizontal inequity is to a large extent (nearly 
100%) driven by the unequal distribution of income, and the contribution of other non-need factors 
appears to be negligible. For most types of health care use, the income contribution is smaller than the HI, 
indicating the importance of other socio-economic factors except income.  
4.5.4.3 Contribution of education and employment status 
Education and employment status are two other important socio-economic characteristics that may affect 
the utilization of health care. Differences in medical care use by education level mostly mirror the 
utilization patterns by income. We also find that more highly educated people are less likely to seek care 
from folk doctors, village clinics and town hospitals. The contribution of education to pro-rich inequity is 
particularly large for the use of folk doctors and town hospitals, which suggests that demand-side 
barriers to health service access may not be fully explained by the lack of income but also related to taste 
differences in treatment-seeking behaviour in the use of health services.  
In theory, labour force participation is not directly related to health care use, therefore, being employed 
seems to exert very little influence on the degree to which utilization patterns vary by income, with a few 
exceptions in the use of formal medical care, village clinics and town hospitals. The contribution of 
employment status appears to be the opposite of the contribution of income and education to horizontal 
inequity: it contributes to the pro-poor direction for the use of formal medical care, inpatient care and 
county hospitals, while contributes to the pro-rich direction for the use of village clinics and town 
hospitals.  This could be for two reasons. First, employed people may have higher time costs in terms of 
accessing health services. Second, those people who are not in the work force may be less healthy and in 
greater need of care. This might explain why employment status acts in the opposite direction from 
income and education.   
4.5.4.4 Contribution of health insurance coverage 
Inequalities in the degree of health insurance coverage may also exert an influence on patterns of health 
care use by income. We include three insurance dummies: one for cooperative medical insurance, one for 
commercial health insurance and one for the free medical care insurance. It is worth emphasizing that all 
rural residents are eligible for cooperative medical insurance irrespective of their income or health status, 
and this insurance scheme entitles them to basic outpatient and inpatient care subject to a certain amount 
of co-payments. However, free medical care only targets at people working at governmental institutions, 
while commercial health insurance usually covers certain hospital services and luxury treatments and 
targets at the rich population.  
The three insurance dummies have the expected opposite effects: commercial health insurance and free 
medical care increase the pro-rich distribution of most types of health care use, while cooperative 
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medical scheme decreases it. On average, the cooperative medical scheme does not fully compensate the 
positive effect of commercial health insurance and free medical care, and therefore, the total contribution 
of insurance coverage is mostly pro-rich. The only exception is for the use of private clinics, which are not 
covered by any type of health insurance and mainly provide low-quality health services at a cheap price. 
The pro-rich contribution of health insurance is particularly large for the use of preventive care, inpatient 
care, town hospitals and county hospitals. The reason for this turns out to be that the health insurance 
coverage may help patients to obtain better quality health services.  
4.5.4.5 Contribution of regional disparities 
Regional disparities in health care utilization are related to health policy making and often mirror the 
income and socio-economic differences (Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004). The nine surveyed provinces 
are broadly divided into three regions: eastern, middle and western provinces61. Income differences 
appear to be large across these three regions: the eastern provinces have the highest income levels, while 
the west has the lowest. Income heterogeneity may lead to differences in health care need and access to 
medical facilities. People living in the eastern region mainly use insurance to protect themselves against 
catastrophic medical expenses incurred as a result of hospitalization, while people living in the western 
region may still have difficulties to access basic health services, and a relatively small amount of medical 
expense can lead to financial hardship and push them below the poverty line. In addition, the eastern 
region is well supplied with medical services, while the western region has a much more limited 
availability of good quality health services.  
For most types of care, regional variation contributes a great deal to total income-related inequity. It is 
not surprising that its contribution to income-related use differentials matches the income-related 
inequity patterns. There are pro-rich regional contributions for the use of formal medical care, preventive 
care, village clinics and county hospitals and pro-poor regional contributions for the use of folk doctors, 
inpatient care, town hospitals and private clinics. The regional differences can be interpreted by income 
differences that capture the regional variations. They reflect that people living in eastern and middle 
provinces tend to be wealthier and have better access to good quality health services than people living in 
western provinces. However, the decomposition by region appears to be of particular interest for the use 
of inpatient care and village clinics. The contribution of region is negative for inpatient care use while 
positive for village clinic use, which are opposite to the direction of income-related inequity. Possible 
reasons may be that primary health facilities in eastern and middle provinces are more accessible and of 
better quality than the western region since the west is still faced with a serious shortage of health 
resources, which may lead to the dysfunction of village clinics (Liu and Tsegai, 2011). Given limited access 
to primary health facilities, poor people living in western provinces can only give up outpatient services 
at primary health facilities and seek inpatient care from high-level hospitals when their illness becomes 
serious. Hence, the use differences across regions acts differently from income-related use inequalities.  
                                                                    
61 Easter provinces include: Liaoning, Jiangsu and Shandong; Middle provinces include Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; 
Western provinces include Guangxi and Guizhou. The reference group is the western provinces.  
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The picture is much clearer if the decomposition analysis is presented using bar charts (Figures 4.9-4.11). 
If the health care utilization is equitably distributed across income, the sum of the bars would be equal to 
the need bar (Van Doorslaer et al., 2004). Any discrepancies between the actual and need-expected 
distribution would lead to other bars, which are driven by factors such as income, other socio-economic 
variables or variables not included in the equation. Income accounts for most of the significant pro-rich 
inequality in the use of preventive care and county hospitals and the significant pro-poor inequality in the 
use of folk doctor and village clinics. The contribution of insurance and region is generally positive but 
rather modest compared with income. All other variables show relatively small contributions. Therefore, 
the substantial horizontal inequity in the use of health care is mainly a consequence of the unequal 
distribution of income.  
[Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 about here] 
[Figures 4.9-4.11 about here] 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This paper provides new evidence on the degree to which the utilization of different types of health care 
services and different levels of health facilities are unequally distributed by income. While it builds on 
previous work (Yang, 2013), it also offers a number of advances, both in terms of new data analysed and 
in terms of new methods used. First, it exploits new data on the use of different levels of health facilities. 
The inequity in seeking care from different health providers may help us to find out whether people from 
various socio-economic groups consume similar quality levels of health care. Secondly, it extends the data 
to four waves, covering almost a decade, encompassing the period both before and after the introduction 
of health care reforms. Finally, it employs new methods for indirect standardization with nonlinear 
models. Since measures of health care use are typically 0/1 dummy, and ordinary least squares 
regression would not guarantee that the predicted values from the standardizing regression lie within the 
range of (0,1), it would be more appropriate to model the determinants of the use/non-use probability 
using probit models. While such non-linear models have been deployed previously in the European 
context (Van Doorslaer et al., 2002; Van Doorslaer et al., 2004), they have not been used to standardize 
differences in health utilization  for equity studies in China.  
Both simple quantile distribution and inequality indices (the CI and EI) are estimated using regression 
models to assess the extent to which people in equal need for health care have unequal rates of medical 
care utilization. The results provide a number of new insights. First, there appears to be relatively little 
reason for concern about the access to formal medical care. The small and insignificant HI indices suggest 
that there is little or no horizontal inequity in the case of formal medical care use. Secondly, the 
distributional pattern is quite different for the use of preventive care. In all years except 2006, the use of 
preventive care is more concentrated among higher income groups. With respect to folk doctor use, it is 
clear that the distribution tends to favour the lower income groups. Finally, in terms of the utilization of 
different levels of health facilities, the poor individuals appear to use village clinics (low-level health 
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providers) more than the rich, while the rich are more likely to use county hospitals (high-level health 
providers) and receive better quality health care. Both the CI and EI indices show similar results, that 
higher income people do have better chances of receiving more preventive care and obtaining better 
quality health services from higher level hospitals. Decomposition analysis provides further information 
that the pro-rich inequity is mainly driven by the unequal distribution of income. Other socio-economic 
characteristics play a relatively modest role in affecting the income-related inequity in health care 
utilization.  
The findings in this paper suggest the existence of pro-rich inequity in the use of preventive care and 
county hospitals and pro-poor inequity in the use of folk doctors and village clinics. Rich people are 
significantly more likely to obtain better health services than the poor. The decomposition analysis 
further helps to track down the sources of inequity for each type of medical care use. It reveals that 
income itself is the most important factor leading to income-related patterns of use. Among other socio-
economic factors, regional disparities and health insurance coverage are the ones that raise greater 
interest to health policy makers. Differences in health care utilization between richer and poorer regions 
do make some contribution to income-related inequity in the use of different levels of health facilities. 
There are pro-rich contributions of regional differences in terms of the use of village clinics and county 
hospitals and pro-poor contributions for the use of town hospitals and private clinics. The results reflect 
that eastern regions are better supplied with more convenient and better quality health facilities. The 
decomposition analysis on health insurance coverage reveals that cooperative medical insurance reduces 
the pro-rich inequity in health care use; however, the effect is very limited and cannot fully compensate 
the opposite effects of commercial health insurance and free medical care. Unfortunately, neither regional 
disparities nor health insurance coverage shows a large and universal contribution to income-related 
inequity.  
The paper suggests that inequities in the use of health care still exist in China’s health care system. Based 
on the empirical findings of this paper, recent health care reforms have had limited impacts on improving 
equitable access to health services. The poor are still less likely to use preventive care and tend to obtain 
poor quality health services from low-level health facilities. A possible policy solution is to link co-
payments to household income so that to offer better financial protection to the poor. More attention 
needs to be paid to poor people in rural areas, potentially by offering additional benefits in the social 
insurance program. A well-designed and regulated health insurance would be helpful in providing more 
comprehensive coverage for low income participants to help them access more preventive care and 
better quality health services.   
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Figure 4.1: Concentration curve of health care use (pro-rich case) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Actual utilization of different types of health services and different levels of health facilities 
across years 
(a)                                                                                       (b) 
 
Notes: (a) Average level of actual utilization of formal medical care, preventive care, folk doctors and inpatient care across years 
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Table 4.1: Quantile distributions of actual and need-standardized utilization of different types of health 
services and different levels of health facilities 
 Poorest 2nd Poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest Q5/Q1 
Formal medical care 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.021 1.373 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.021 0.020 1.411 
Formal medical care 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.653 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.014 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.011 0.814 
       
Preventive care 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.021 1.373 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.021 0.020 1.411 
Preventive care 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.018 0.013 0.021 0.025 0.043 2.370 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.017 0.014 0.019 0.028 0.043 2.508 
Preventive care 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.025 0.022 0.024 0.031 0.026 1.039 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.025 0.023 0.026 0.031 0.025 1.004 
       
Folk doctors 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.060 0.030 0.042 0.029 0.038 0.626 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.058 0.035 0.046 0.031 0.040 0.686 
Folk doctors 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.026 0.035 0.036 0.026 0.014 0.558 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.024 0.035 0.037 0.026 0.014 0.584 
Folk doctors 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.058 0.056 0.046 0.049 0.022 0.377 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.056 0.057 0.045 0.047 0.022 0.399 
       
Inpatient care 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.071 0.112 0.045 0.086 0.145 2.029 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.033 0.121 0.059 0.078 0.135 4.055 
Inpatient care 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.051 0.046 0.076 0.071 0.029 0.582 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.054 0.051 0.079 0.079 0.037 0.676 
Inpatient care 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.031 0.063 0.061 0.059 0.104 3.343 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.034 0.063 0.058 0.057 0.057 1.646 
       
Village clinics 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.262 0.348 0.330 0.271 0.268 1.022 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.274 0.299 0.279 0.259 0.183 0.667 
Village clinics 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.416 0.314 0.246 0.248 0.284 0.683 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.432 0.333 0.272 0.249 0.285 0.660 
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Village clinics 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.395 0.377 0.368 0.298 0.208 0.526 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.409 0.402 0.366 0.297 0.225 0.551 
       
Town hospitals 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.310 0.124 0.148 0.229 0.169 0.546 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.298 0.182 0.195 0.247 0.217 0.728 
Town hospitals 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.180 0.234 0.175 0.235 0.154 0.856 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.174 0.219 0.186 0.240 0.162 0.929 
Town hospitals 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.232 0.160 0.153 0.179 0.192 0.827 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.228 0.162 0.166 0.176 0.201 0.882 
       
County hospitals 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.107 0.202 0.193 0.200 0.366 3.418 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.085 0.200 0.172 0.199 0.354 4.165 
County hospitals 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.157 0.137 0.269 0.196 0.337 2.144 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.146 0.131 0.253 0.195 0.333 2.282 
County hospitals 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.162 0.206 0.160 0.232 0.215 1.328 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.167 0.204 0.161 0.226 0.215 1.286 
       
Private clinics 2000       
Actual Utilization 0.202 0.225 0.182 0.229 0.056 0.278 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.213 0.216 0.205 0.253 0.097 0.456 
Private clinics 2004       
Actual Utilization 0.157 0.211 0.146 0.209 0.095 0.602 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.158 0.209 0.139 0.202 0.077 0.485 
Private clinics 2006       
Actual Utilization 0.119 0.131 0.139 0.179 0.254 2.135 
Need-standardized Utilization 0.118 0.126 0.141 0.184 0.243 2.058 




Table 4.2: Concentration indices for total inequality and horizontal inequity for utilization of different 
types of health services and different levels of health facilities across years 
 2000 2004 2006 
 Actual Standardized Actual Standardized Actual Standardized 
Formal medical care --- --- 0.050 0.076 -0.026 0.015 
 --- --- (0.054) (0.052) (0.087) (0.091) 
Preventive care 0.337*** 0.216** 0.223*** 0.228*** 0.037 0.016 
 (0.072) (0.086) (0.057) (0.055) (0.063) (0.058) 
Folk doctors -0.140 -0.122 -0.104** -0.090* -0.159*** -0.151*** 
 (0.140) (0.148) (0.047) (0.049) (0.042) (0.043) 
Inpatient care 0.092 0.108 -0.046 -0.023 0.217*** 0.223*** 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.079) (0.078) (0.065) (0.068) 
Village clinics -0.029 -0.088 -0.084** -0.088** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (0.050) (0.061) (0.042) (0.039) (0.033) (0.034) 
Town hospitals -0.060 -0.030 -0.018 -0.018 -0.025 -0.016 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) 
County hospitals 0.164*** 0.187*** 0.149*** 0.171*** 0.065 0.054 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.053) (0.055) (0.041) (0.043) 
Private clinics -0.111 -0.049 -0.062 -0.086* 0.144*** 0.141*** 
 (0.081) (0.078) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at community level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** 
indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
Table 4.3: Erreygers indices for total inequality and horizontal inequity for utilization of different types of 
health services and different levels of health facilities across years 
 2000 2004 2006 
 Actual Standardized Actual Standardized Actual Standardized 
Formal medical care   0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Preventive care 0.009*** 0.007** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.004 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Folk doctors -0.021 -0.018 -0.011** -0.010** -0.029*** -0.027*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
Inpatient care 0.032 0.035 -0.010 -0.006 0.057*** 0.060*** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) 
Village clinics -0.031 -0.084 -0.102** -0.111** -0.154*** -0.160*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.051) (0.049) (0.043) (0.046) 
Town hospitals -0.051 -0.027 -0.014 -0.013 -0.021 -0.014 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) 
County hospitals 0.138** 0.142** 0.129*** 0.142*** 0.052* 0.043 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.049) (0.049) (0.033) (0.034) 
Private clinics -0.075 -0.035 -0.040 -0.052* 0.092*** 0.088** 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at community level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** 










































Table 4.4: Decomposition of EI indices for the utilization of different types of health care and different levels of health facilities in 2000 
 Formal medical care Preventive care Folk doctors Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospital County hospital Private clinics 
 Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage 
Need factors                 
Age-sex   -0.000 -0.9% -0.000 -0.2% -0.001 -1.7% -0.006 -17.8% -0.001 -1.6% 0.002 1.3% 0.008 11.2% 
Health status   -0.000 -3.7% 0.001 3.8% -0.002 -6.3% 0.000 1.5% 0.002 4.4% -0.001 -0.5% -0.000 -0.1% 
Subtotal   -0.000 -4.7% 0.001 3.6% -0.003 -8.1% -0.005 -16.2% 0.001 2.9% 0.001 0.8% 0.008 11.1% 
Non-need factors 
Income   0.003 33.8% 0.009 44.5% -0.015 -48.3% -0.161 -517.2% -0.031 -61.1% 0.200 145.0% 0.022 29.2% 
Education   -0.000 -2.1% -0.006 -28.8% -0.003 -9.4% 0.024 77.3% -0.013 -26.5% -0.029 -21.1% -0.007 -10.0% 
Employment   -0.000 -0.7% 0.000 0.0% 0.002 6.1% 0.006 17.8% 0.001 2.6% -0.001 -0.8% 0.000 0.7% 
Insurance   -0.001 -13.4% -0.006 -29.4% 0.010 31.5% 0.018 56.9% 0.013 26.7% -0.008 -6.1% -0.022 -29.8% 
Region   0.002 17.0% 0.000 2.4% -0.014 -43.5% 0.035 112.8% -0.024 -47.5% 0.013 9.5% 0.001 1.5% 
Other   -0.000 -0.5% 0.005 25.2% -0.002 -6.2% -0.006 -20.6% 0.003 6.8% -0.003 -2.3% 0.005 6.5% 
Subtotal   0.003 34.1% 0.002 9.2% -0.022 -69.8% -0.085 -273.1% -0.050 -98.9% 0.171 124.2% -0.002 -3.2% 
Residual   0.007 70.5% -0.023 -112.8% 0.056 177.8% 0.059 189.3% -0.002 -4.0% -0.034 -25.0% -0.080 -107.9% 
Total   0.009 100% -0.021 -100% 0.032 100% -0.031 -100% -0.051 -100% 0.138 100% -0.075 -100% 
 
Table 4.5: Decomposition of EI indices for the utilization of different types of health care and different levels of health facilities in 2004 
 Formal medical care Preventive care Folk doctors Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospital County hospital Private clinics 
 Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage 
Need factors                 
Age-sex -0.001 -19.2% -0.001 -4.6% 0.001 5.9% -0.001 -13.9% -0.005 -5.0% 0.002 -14.7% -0.000 -0.3% 0.000 1.3% 
Health status -0.003 -80.0% 0.000 0.2% -0.004 -31.7% 0.001 5.6% 0.004 3.6% -0.003 -24.0% -0.011 -8.4% 0.010 24.6% 
Subtotal -0.004 -99.2% -0.001 -4.4% -0.003 -25.8% -0.001 -8.3% -0.001 -1.4% -0.001 -9.3% -0.011 -8.8% 0.010 25.8% 
Non-need factors 
Income 0.001 25.0% 0.008 35.5% -0.009 -82.2% -0.012 -129.1% -0.070 -68.9% -0.011 -82.4% 0.105 81.6% -0.041 -102.7% 
Education 0.000 7.5% 0.001 6.9% -0.002 -14.0% -0.002 -15.9% -0.007 -7.1% -0.008 -56.9% 0.005 3.6% 0.006 14.9% 
Employment -0.001 -19.2% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.9% -0.003 -35.6% 0.016 15.9% 0.001 8.8% -0.009 -7.4% -0.002 -4.3% 
Insurance 0.000 3.6% 0.005 23.4% 0.001 11.5% 0.004 45.3% 0.000 0.4% 0.004 28.4% 0.013 10.4% -0.010 -24.4% 
Region -0.001 -29.2% 0.003 16.0% -0.002 -15.0% -0.004 -40.3% -0.001 -1.1% 0.001 6.4% 0.006 5.0% -0.004 -10.4% 
Other 0.001 29.7% 0.001 2.7% 0.000 0.6% 0.002 25.2% 0.004 4.3% -0.005 -34.8% -0.003 -2.3% -0.003 -7.6% 
Subtotal 0.001 17.4% 0.018 84.7% -0.011 -98.3% -0.014 -150.4% -0.058 -56.5% -0.018 -130.6% 0.117 90.9% -0.053 -134.5% 
Residual 0.007 181.8% 0.004 19.8% 0.003 24.1% 0.006 58.6% -0.043 -42.1% 0.005 39.9% 0.023 17.8% 0.003 8.6% 




Table 4.6: Decomposition of EI indices for the utilization of different types of health care and different levels of health facilities in 2006 
 Formal medical care Preventive care Folk doctors Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospital County hospital Private clinics 
 Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage Absolute  Percentage 
Need factors                 
Age-sex -0.001 -60.6% -0.000 -11.1% 0.002 6.9% -0.005 -8.3% -0.008 -5.0% 0.003 12.2% 0.004 6.7% 0.006 7.1% 
Health status -0.003 -208.7% -0.000 -2.9% -0.004 -13.2% -0.006 -10.6% 0.019 12.2% -0.001 -2.5% -0.015 -29.0% -0.001 -1.5% 
Subtotal -0.004 -269.3% -0.001 -13.9% -0.002 -6.3% -0.011 -18.9% 0.011 7.2% 0.002 9.7% -0.012 -22.3% 0.005 5.5% 
Non-need factors 
Income -0.003 -177.2% 0.001 15.4% -0.015 -53.0% 0.011 19.5% -0.147 -95.6% 0.032 151.6% -0.016 -30.2% 0.090 98.0% 
Education -0.000 -17.0% -0.002 -43.2% -0.005 -19.2% 0.002 4.3% -0.001 -0.5% -0.014 -67.6% 0.009 17.5% -0.009 -9.7% 
Employment -0.000 -27.9% -0.000 -6.9% -0.002 -6.9% -0.005 -9.3% 0.010 6.2% 0.009 41.8% -0.010 -18.6% 0.000 0.3% 
Insurance 0.000 3.1% 0.005 126.3% -0.004 -14.8% 0.009 16.3% 0.008 5.0% -0.001 -5.6% 0.013 24.9% -0.010 -10.8% 
Region -0.000 -3.3% -0.003 -66.8% 0.006 21.1% 0.002 3.8% 0.015 9.6% -0.005 -24.0% -0.005 -9.6% 0.000 0.0% 
Other 0.000 1.1% 0.001 17.2% 0.002 6.0% -0.000 -0.4% 0.002 1.4% 0.000 1.7% -0.003 -6.1% -0.002 -2.1% 
Subtotal -0.003 -221.3% 0.002 42.0% -0.019 -66.8% 0.020 34.2% -0.113 -73.7% 0.021 97.9% -0.011 -22.0% 0.069 75.7% 
Residual 0.006 390.7% 0.003 71.9% -0.007 -26.9% 0.048 84.6% -0.051 -33.5% -0.044 -207.6% 0.075 144.3% 0.017 18.7% 























5.1 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
This thesis contributes significant new knowledge to the research on the evaluation of health care 
reforms in developing countries by conducting quantitative analysis based on a large panel dataset in the 
context of rural China. The study time covers the period before the introduction of a major reform to 
health care, the pilot phase and the period following the expansion of the reforms across the whole 
country.  
The analysis comprises three main components. It has examined the demand for the rural social health 
insurance program – the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS); the impact of the NRCMS on 
health care utilization and treatment-seeking behaviour; and the potential for income-related inequity in 
the use of health care across time. This last chapter synthesizes findings from the empirical chapters and 
embeds them within the institutional background of rural China. Policy implications include options 
around designing more comprehensive insurance packages and improving the quality of care delivered 
by low-level health facilities. The limitations of this study are also discussed, and recommendations are 
suggested in the final section.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the relationship between the demand for the NRCMS and people’s facility choice. 
People who use village clinics or town hospitals (low-level health facilities) are found to be more likely to 
be insured while people who use county or city hospitals (high-level health facilities) are less likely to be 
covered. These results reflect the issues, such as various reimbursement rates across facilities, poor 
quality of primary level care and an inefficient referral system. Since the insurance requires patients to 
seek care from low-level health facilities and provides relatively limited reimbursement for health 
services delivered by high-level facilities, people who use high-level hospitals cannot benefit a great deal 
from the NRCMS. This is particularly true if the quality of health services delivered by primary health 
centres is perceived to be low, and referral from low-level to high-level facilities involves complicated 
paperwork and procedures. People who use high-level facilities may give up insurance benefits and incur 
full treatment fees in order to seek care at better hospitals.  
Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of the NRCMS on the utilization of different types of health services and 
different levels of health facilities. Although the introduction of the NRCMS is not clearly related to the 
overall use of medical care, it has directed patients away from town hospitals towards village clinics and 
county hospitals. The increase in the use of village clinics corresponds to this policy aim by directing 
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patients to low-level facilities in order to improve efficiency of health care delivery systems and reduce 
overall medical costs. Implications related to the increase in the use of county hospitals, however, depend 
on whether the increase is regarded as necessary or not. If the increase in the use of county hospitals is 
considered to be necessary, it indicates that the insurance may help patients to obtain better quality and 
more specialized health care. If the increase is unnecessary, insured patients may be faced with more 
expensive drugs and health interventions. There is no information in the available data about how the 
type of health care that patients receive changes as a result of the insurance. Therefore, future research 
could usefully investigate the issue of whether the extra utilization at county hospitals the NRCMS has 
encouraged is medically necessary or not.  
Chapter 4 presents new results on income-related inequity in the use of different types of health services 
and different levels of health facilities. The rich are found to be more likely to use preventive care and 
county hospitals and less likely to use village clinics and folk doctors. The results indicate that there is 
pro-rich inequity in the quality of health services received by patients since county hospitals usually 
provide more specialized and high quality health services than village clinics and folk doctors. Income 
appears to be the most important contributor of total inequity. Recent health reforms have had limited 
impacts on improving the equitable access to health services since the significance and magnitude of 
inequity indices remain similar over time. In the most recent wave, 2009, the poor are still less likely to 
use preventive care and obtain health services from county hospitals.  
5.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Drawing from the empirical results presented in this thesis, a number of policy recommendations can be 
made here. First, the NRCMS needs more comprehensive benefit packages for inpatient and outpatient 
care. Although government claimed that the reimbursement rates are around 40-70% for outpatient care 
and 45-75% for inpatient care (Ministry of Health, 2008)62, the actual reimbursement rates are reported 
to be less than 50% (Liang and Langenbrunner, 2013). The large differences in published and actual 
reimbursement rates are mainly attributed to insufficient funding (Barber and Yao, 2010). Under the 
current design of the NRCMS, the government subsidies, benefit packages and reimbursement schemes 
are relatively limited. According to Barber and Yao (2010), the inpatient reimbursement rate should have 
increased to around 70-80% in order to reduce the incidence of catastrophic expenditure. Therefore, 
more comprehensive benefit packages, lower deductibles and co-payments and higher ceilings for the 
NRCMS could help to better improve health care access and provide financial protection for rural 
residents.  
Secondly, primary health care still needs to be strengthened given that most visits and admissions 
continue to take place at secondary and tertiary hospitals. Higher reimbursement rates for primary level 
care under the NRCMS create some incentives for patients to access health services at low-level facilities, 
                                                                    
62 According to (Barber and Yao, 2010), the reimbursement for inpatient care depends on the level of health facilities that care is 
sought. The claimed reimbursement rates by the government are no less than 75% for village clinics/town hospitals, 55%for 
county/district hospitals and 45% for city/province hospitals. The objective is to improve efficient use of medical care and to avoid 
patients seeking unnecessary care at secondary and tertiary hospitals.  
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however, the poor quality of care remains one of the most important barriers to prevent people from 
seeking primary care. In recent years, large scale investments have been made to improve safety, quality 
and efficiency of village clinics and town hospitals (Yip and Hsiao, 2014). Promoting utilization of primary 
health care requires shifting qualified human resources and technology to primary level and increasing 
quality of care, particularly for the management of chronic conditions that require more qualified staff 
and stronger referral systems (Barber and Yao, 2010). Once the primary level care is strengthened, it 
would be feasible for village clinics and town hospitals to function as a gatekeeping system and offer basic 
outpatient consultations. To achieve a more cost-effective and high-quality health care delivery system, 
primary health care is expected to play a central part in prevention, case detection and management, 
gatekeeping, referral and care coordination within the system (Yip and Hsiao, 2014). 
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDY 
Several limitations should be noted. First, facility choice variables are based on stated preference rather 
than actual utilization. There may be some differences between people’s willingness to use the facilities 
and their ability to pay. The CHNS dataset has information on actual utilization of different types of health 
facilities, however, these questions are only answered by those people who are sick in the last four weeks. 
Therefore, regression analysis based on actual utilization may lead to large standard errors given the 
small sample size. The task of examining the impact of the NRCMS on actual utilization pattern is left to 
future research with more comprehensive data.  
Second, the analysis is limited by the time scope of the survey. In order to apply difference-in-difference 
methods, chapter 2 only applies data until 2006, when some rural counties were still not covered by the 
NRCMS. It will be interesting for future work to consider the long-run effects of the NRCMS on various 
outcomes, such as health care utilization, medical expenditure and health outcomes. As the NRCMS 
continues to expand and evolve, more research is needed to understand the effects of recent changes of 
the health care reforms on rural China’s health system.  
Third, the dataset provides no information about the quality of care received by patients. Facility choice 
may act as a proxy for quality of care since high-level hospitals tend to provide a higher quality of care 
than low-level facilities. However, these variables may not be sufficient to fully explain the variation in 
quality levels. Future research might investigate how the type of health care that patients receive changes 
as a result of the insurance. It may be worth investigating the potential existence of moral hazard or 
supply-induced demand, especially concerning whether patients have received more costly tests, drugs 
and medical interventions that they would not have chosen if they are not covered by the insurance.  
Fourth, the analysis sheds only limited light on how the impact of the NRCMS varies with insurance 
design and implementation characteristics. The insurance participation is only defined as a dummy, 
however, the demand and impact of the NRCMS may also depend on deductibles, reimbursement rates 
and reimbursement caps due to the wide variation in design and implementation features across regions. 
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Future research can further compare the demand and effectiveness of the NRCMS across different benefit 
packages in various regions.  
Finally, the findings here may not be generalizable for China as a whole. This is partly because of non-
random program placement and partly because the sampled provinces may not be representative of the 
whole country. Estimation methods such as matching and difference-in-difference can help to remove 
some bias, but unobserved heterogeneity may still remain.  
This thesis has found limited impact of the health care reforms in China on improving access to health 
services and reducing income-related inequity in the use of health care. The results indicate that various 
challenges still remain in reforming the health care system. More policies aimed at improving efficiency 
and quality should be adopted to better pursue universal health coverage.   
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Table A 2.1: Number of observations 




CHNS 2004~2006  23,862 
Restrict to observations living in rural areas 7,945 15,917 
Exclude if counties not covered by the NRCMS 5,762 10,155 
Exclude if counties covered by urban social health insurance programs 939 9,216 
Exclude if counties covered by other social health insurance before the NRCMS 718 8,498 
Exclude if households missing in one wave 2,604 5,894 
Exclude if households are insured before 2006 455 5,439 





Table A 2.2: The demand for the NRCMS in 2006 (logit marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Village clinics 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Town hospitals 0.12*** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
County hospitals -0.08** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.07* -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
City hospitals -0.12** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15** -0.17*** -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Other facilities -0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.14 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Female household head  -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.08** -0.08** -0.14*** -0.10** -0.06 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household size  0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Minority ethnicity  0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12** 0.12** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Married  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
East provinces  0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.30*** --- 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (---) 
Middle provinces  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.28*** --- 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (---) 
Age of household head   -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fraction age<18   -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 
   (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Fraction age>55   0.13** 0.12** 0.12* 0.11* 0.11* 0.13** 0.09 0.07 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household income    0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index    -0.06** -0.05* -0.06** -0.06** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07* 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Primary school     -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Junior high school     -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 
     (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Senior high school and above     -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household head is a farmer      -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 
      (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ratio of working people in household      0.10* 0.10* 0.12** 0.12* 0.10 
 129 
      (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
SAH fair or poor       -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06* 
       (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head has chronic disease       0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 
       (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household chronic disease ratio       0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.07 
       (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Household head is overweight        0.05 0.04 0.01 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head is abdominal obesity        0.03 0.03 0.03 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head is smoker        -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
        (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head is daily drinker        -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Travel cost to the nearest health facility         0.01 0.01 
         (0.01) (0.01) 
Waiting time         -0.00 -0.00 
         (0.00) (0.00) 
Drug availability          -0.18 -0.10 
         (0.13) (0.14) 
Treatment cost of a common cold          -0.00 --- 
         (0.00) (---) 
County dummies No No No No No No No No No Yes 
N 2398 2234 2227 2227 2227 1989 1985 1798 1606 1571 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level.   
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Table A 2.3: The demand for the NRCMS in 2009 (logit marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Village clinics 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (---) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Town hospitals -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01* -0.03* -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.02) (---) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
County hospitals 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03*** -0.04 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (---) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
City hospitals -0.04 -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 -0.03* -0.03 -0.02** -0.04 -0.04* -0.01 
 (0.03) (---) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Other facilities --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (---) (---) (---) (---) (---) (---) (---) (---) (---) (---) 
Female household head  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03* -0.00 
  (---) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Household size  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (---) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Minority ethnicity  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 --- --- --- 
  (---) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (---) (---) (---) 
Married  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03* -0.00 
  (---) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
East provinces  -0.34 -0.26*** -0.25** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.14** 0.10*** 0.03 --- 
  (---) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (---) 
Middle provinces  -0.39 -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.20*** --- --- --- 
  (---) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (---) (---) (---) 
Age of household head   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fraction age<18   0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.00 
   (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.01) 
Fraction age>55   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Household income    0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset index    -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Primary school     -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Junior high school     -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Senior high school and above     0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Household head is a farmer      -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
      (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ratio of working people in household      0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
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      (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) 
SAH fair or poor       0.01* 0.02* 0.01 0.00 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Household head has chronic disease       0.01 0.02 --- --- 
       (0.03) (0.06) (---) (---) 
Household chronic disease ratio       0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.00 
       (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00) 
Household head is overweight        0.02 0.00 -0.00 
        (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Household head is abdominal obesity        -0.00 0.00 0.00 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Household head is smoker        -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Household head is daily drinker        0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
        (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Travel cost to the nearest health facility         0.02* 0.00 
         (0.01) (0.00) 
Waiting time         -0.00 -0.00 
         (0.00) (0.00) 
Drug availability          --- --- 
         (---) (---) 
Treatment cost of a common cold          -0.00 -0.00 
         (0.00) (0.00) 
County dummies No No No No No No No No No Yes 
N 924 850 848 848 848 769 764 603 454 454 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level.   
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Table A 2.4: Robustness check based on the sample of Model 10: the demand for the NRCMS in 2006 (logit marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Village clinics 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** 0.09** 0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Town hospitals 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
County hospitals -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
City hospitals -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.09 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Other facilities -0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.14 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Female household head  -0.10*** -0.10** -0.09** -0.10** -0.09** -0.08* -0.10** -0.10** -0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household size  0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Minority ethnicity  0.12** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Married  0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
East provinces  0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.29*** --- 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (---) 
Middle provinces  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.30*** --- 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (---) 
Age of household head   -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Fraction age<18   -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Fraction age>55   0.12* 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household income    0.02** 0.03** 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Asset index    -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07* 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Primary school     -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 
     (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Junior high school     -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.04 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Senior high school and above     -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
     (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household head is a farmer      -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ratio of working people in household      0.12* 0.13** 0.13* 0.13* 0.10 
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      (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
SAH fair or poor       -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06* 
       (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head has chronic disease       0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
       (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Household chronic disease ratio       0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 
       (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Household head is overweight        0.04 0.04 0.01 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head is abdominal obesity        0.03 0.03 0.03 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head is smoker        -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household head is daily drinker        -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
        (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Travel cost to the nearest health facility         0.01 0.01 
         (0.01) (0.01) 
Waiting time         -0.00 -0.00 
         (0.00) (0.00) 
Drug availability          -0.18 -0.10 
         (0.13) (0.14) 
Treatment cost of a common cold          -0.00* -0.00 
         (0.00) (0.00) 
County dummies No No No No No No No No No Yes 
N 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level.   
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Table A 3.1: Number of observations 
Data Number of observations Number remaining 
CHNS 1991~2006  81,815 
Restrict to observations living in rural areas 37,867 43,948 
Exclude if covered by any other health insurance except NRCMS 12,258 31,690 
Exclude if insurance status is one or missing before 2006 2874 28,816 
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Table A 3.2: Estimation results of the propensity score 
  
Age of household head -0.007** 
 (0.003) 
Fraction age <18  0.707*** 
 (0.187) 
Fraction age >55 -0.343*** 
 (0.118) 
Female household head -0.152* 
 (0.085) 
Household size -0.029 
 (0.020) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.169** 
 (0.069) 
Household head married -0.000 
 (0.091) 
Eastern provinces 1.039*** 
 (0.089) 
Middle provinces 0.107 
 (0.074) 
Household income  0.099*** 
 (0.019) 
Asset index -0.365*** 
 (0.052) 
Household head completed primary school  0.152* 
 (0.082) 
Household head completed junior high school 0.032 
 (0.088) 
Household head completed senior high school or above 0.047 
 (0.110) 
Working ratio 0.661*** 
 (0.106) 
Household head is a farmer -0.433*** 
 (0.061) 
Household head has chronic disease -0.183* 
 (0.104) 
Chronic disease ratio  1.049*** 
 (0.222) 
Household head is overweight -0.389*** 
 (0.059) 
Household head is smoker -0.048 
 (0.058) 
Household head is daily drinker 0.216*** 
 (0.064) 
Travel time to nearest health facility -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility -0.004 
 (0.018) 
Waiting time  -0.016*** 
 (0.003) 
Treatment cost of a common cold 0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community -0.347*** 
 (0.068) 
N 2764 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in 
brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** 
indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates 
statistical significant at the 1% level.   
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Figure A 3.2: Propensity score histograms 
 
  




Table A 3.3: Sensitivity of results of choice of caliper and order for NN matching with DID (logit marginal effects) 
 Formal care Preventive care Folk doctor use Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospitals County hospitals City hospitals Private clinics 
 Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching (caliper 0.005) 
NRCMS treatment effect 0.001 0.004* -0.033** --- 0.075 -0.170*** 0.124** -0.018 -0.004 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.013) (---) (0.056) (0.050) (0.054) (0.012) (0.033) 
NRCMS treatment group 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 --- 0.222*** 0.015 -0.097*** -0.017*** -0.106*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (---) (0.031) (0.029) (0.023) (0.006) (0.016) 
After policy period 2006 -0.004 -0.003* 0.015 --- -0.054 0.022 -0.149*** 0.009 -0.061*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (---) (0.042) (0.036) (0.041) (0.007) (0.019) 
N 1767 4286 2211 --- 7848 7848 7848 7848 7848 
 Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching (caliper 0.0025) 
NRCMS Treatment effect 0.000 0.002 -0.026** 0.000 0.103* -0.175*** 0.105* --- 0.007 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.013) (---) (0.058) (0.052) (0.057) (---) (0.034) 
Treatment group 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.018 0.193*** 0.030 -0.099*** --- -0.109*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.014) (0.032) (0.030) (0.022) (---) (0.017) 
Policy period -0.004 -0.002* 0.017 0.000 -0.052 0.033 -0.154*** --- -0.063*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.013) (---) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (---) (0.020) 
N 1601 3943 2040 115 7425 7425 7425 --- 7425 
 Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching (caliper 0.00125) 
NRCMS treatment effect -0.000 0.001 -0.027** --- 0.088 -0.189*** 0.155*** -0.021* 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.013) (---) (0.059) (0.055) (0.058) (0.012) (0.035) 
NRCMS treatment group 0.003 0.000 -0.003 --- 0.176*** 0.031 -0.108*** -0.015** -0.107*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (---) (0.034) (0.032) (0.025) (0.006) (0.018) 
After policy period 2006 -0.001 -0.001 0.015 --- -0.060 0.040 -0.157*** 0.012 -0.073*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.011) (---) (0.045) (0.040) (0.045) (0.007) (0.021) 
N 1344 3368 1739 --- 6601 6601 6601 6601 6601 
          
 Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching (descending order) 
NRCMS treatment effect -0.002 0.002 -0.021** --- 0.076 -0.150*** 0.166*** -0.010 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (---) (0.055) (0.048) (0.053) (0.011) (0.033) 
NRCMS treatment group 0.002 0.000 -0.004 --- 0.197*** 0.005 -0.104*** -0.016*** -0.102*** 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.007) (---) (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.005) (0.016) 
After policy period 2006 0.001 -0.002 0.014 --- -0.004 -0.002 -0.183*** -0.005 -0.074*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (---) (0.041) (0.035) (0.042) (0.007) (0.019) 
N 1843 4562 2364 --- 8225 8225 8225 8225 8225 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level. Control variables for DID models that are used in the model but not reported include: age, gender, household size, ethnicity, marital status, household income, asset index, education levels, 
occupation, chronic disease, community health facility characteristics and geographical dummies. b Since the question ‘Any formal medical care in last four weeks’ is only asked in survey waves 2004 and 
2006, samples used for formal care are only from these two waves. c The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching without replacement.  
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Table A 3.4: Robustness check of the impact of the NRCMS on use of folk doctors using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 based on 
sample of Model 7 (logit marginal effects) 
Folk doctors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.034** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** -0.029** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
NRCMS -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
2006 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.014 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Time trends 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Household size 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Minority ethnicity 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Married 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Eastern provinces 0.020** 0.016* 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Middle provinces 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household income   0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Asset index  -0.012** -0.011** -0.012** -0.012** -0.012** -0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Primary school    -0.017** -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.014** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Junior high school   -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Senior high school or above   0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
Working    -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Farmer    0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Chronic diseases     0.005 0.005 0.005 
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Overweight      -0.003 -0.004 
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      (0.005) (0.005) 
Smoker      -0.001 -0.000 
      (0.007) (0.006) 
Daily alcohol drinker      -0.005 -0.004 
      (0.011) (0.009) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.000** 
       (0.000) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.010* 
       (0.005) 
Waiting time       -0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.000 
       (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       -0.001 
       (0.007) 
N 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.5: Robustness check of the impact of the NRCMS on the stated preference of village clinics using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 
2006 based on sample of Model 7 (logit marginal effects) 
Village clinics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 0.063 0.075 0.075 0.077 0.080 0.071 0.113** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) 
NRCMS 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.178*** 0.192*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
2006 -0.075** -0.087** -0.093** -0.091** -0.093** -0.088** -0.060 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) 
Time trends 0.006 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Age of household head 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  -0.096 -0.111* -0.113* -0.062 -0.062 -0.050 -0.050 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) 
Fraction age >55 -0.026 -0.055 -0.060 -0.036 -0.029 -0.020 -0.028 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) 
Female household head -0.074** -0.038 -0.045 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.012 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) 
Household size 0.011 0.015* 0.015* 0.019** 0.019** 0.017* 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.215*** -0.221*** -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.229*** -0.238*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Household head married -0.043 -0.037 -0.031 -0.044 -0.044 -0.049 -0.048 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Eastern provinces 0.075 0.057 0.055 0.063 0.065 0.030 -0.084* 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) 
Middle provinces 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.092** 0.065* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Household income   0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Asset index  -0.206*** -0.204*** -0.180*** -0.178*** -0.186*** -0.171*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
Household head completed primary school    -0.048 -0.048 -0.046 -0.050 -0.061* 
   (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
Household head completed junior high school   -0.023 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 
   (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   -0.041 -0.030 -0.028 -0.023 -0.024 
   (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) 
Working ratio    0.163*** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 
    (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) 
Household head is a farmer    0.052* 0.051* 0.062** 0.056* 
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    (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.017 -0.013 -0.000 
     (0.055) (0.056) (0.058) 
Chronic disease ratio      -0.056 -0.087 -0.058 
     (0.114) (0.114) (0.117) 
Household head is overweight      0.086*** 0.117*** 
      (0.026) (0.027) 
Household head is smoker      -0.022 -0.028 
      (0.025) (0.026) 
Household head is daily drinker      0.020 0.006 
      (0.031) (0.032) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       -0.008*** 
       (0.002) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.039* 
       (0.024) 
Waiting time        -0.000 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.006*** 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.243*** 
       (0.029) 
N 7984 7984 7984 7984 7984 7984 7984 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.6: ITT analysis of the NRCMS on use of folk doctors using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit marginal effects) 
Folk doctors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.026** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
NRCMS -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
2006 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Time trends 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.008** 0.008** 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household size 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority ethnicity -0.017** -0.017** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017** -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Married 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Eastern provinces 0.008 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Middle provinces -0.014** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014** 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household income   0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset index  -0.015*** -0.011** -0.010** -0.011** -0.010* -0.012*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Primary school    -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018** -0.014** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Junior high school   -0.019** -0.018** -0.019** -0.017** -0.009 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Senior high school or above   -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.020* 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Working    -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Farmer    0.010 0.010 0.011 0.007 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Chronic diseases     0.006 0.008 0.005 
     (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Overweight      -0.002 -0.004 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
Smoker      0.009 0.005 
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      (0.007) (0.005) 
Daily alcohol drinker      -0.007 -0.003 
      (0.009) (0.008) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.000 
       (0.000) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       0.001** 
       (0.000) 
Waiting time       -0.000 
       (0.000) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.000 
       (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.002 
       (0.005) 
N 4351 4351 4343 4331 4309 3988 3517 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.7: ITT analysis of the NRCMS on stated household preference of village clinics using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit 
marginal effects) 
Village clinics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 0.125*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.048) 
NRCMS 0.137*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.147*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) 
2006 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.040 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) 
Time trends 0.007* 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age of household head -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  0.033 0.004 0.003 0.067 0.060 0.066 0.058 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.058) 
Fraction age >55 -0.040 -0.066 -0.067 -0.032 -0.043 -0.037 -0.032 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) 
Female household head -0.113*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.052* -0.061** -0.066** -0.052* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) 
Household size 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.015** 0.016** 0.015** 0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.163*** -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.187*** -0.181*** -0.180*** -0.166*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Household head married -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.032 -0.043 -0.049* -0.047 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) 
Eastern provinces 0.121*** 0.086** 0.087** 0.104*** 0.096*** 0.068* -0.028 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) 
Middle provinces 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.097*** 0.125*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) 
Household income   0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Asset index  -0.198*** -0.196*** -0.181*** -0.182*** -0.188*** -0.176*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) 
Household head completed primary school    0.001 0.006 0.009 0.009 -0.006 
   (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) 
Household head completed junior high school   0.003 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.024 
   (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   -0.017 -0.004 0.004 0.006 0.019 
   (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
Working ratio    0.158*** 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.205*** 
    (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.043) 
Household head is a farmer    0.070*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 
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    (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.094** -0.091** -0.098** 
     (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) 
Chronic disease ratio      0.123 0.094 0.079 
     (0.087) (0.089) (0.098) 
Household head is overweight      0.060*** 0.071*** 
      (0.020) (0.023) 
Household head is smoker      -0.008 -0.017 
      (0.019) (0.022) 
Household head is daily drinker      -0.008 0.005 
      (0.024) (0.027) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       -0.007*** 
       (0.002) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.059*** 
       (0.021) 
Waiting time        -0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.005*** 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.210*** 
       (0.024) 
N 17938 17938 17907 14054 13671 13518 11063 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 




Table A 3.8: ITT analysis of the NRCMS on stated household preference of town hospitals using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit 
marginal effects) 
Town hospitals Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.063* -0.069* -0.068* -0.084** -0.078** -0.083** -0.121*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.042) 
NRCMS 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.029 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
2006 0.023 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.012 -0.005 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) 
Time trends -0.029*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.012** -0.012** -0.010* -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  0.051 0.036 0.037 0.040 0.046 0.040 0.065 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) 
Fraction age >55 -0.080** -0.092** -0.094** -0.089** -0.081* -0.091** -0.093** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) 
Female household head -0.059** -0.033 -0.047* -0.036 -0.033 -0.040 -0.021 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) 
Household size 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.093*** -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.084** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Household head married -0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.010 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) 
Eastern provinces 0.209*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.250*** 0.211*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) 
Middle provinces 0.142*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Household income   0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.011* 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Asset index  -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.058*** -0.039* 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Household head completed primary school    -0.066** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.106*** 
   (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
Household head completed junior high school   -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.127*** 
   (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   -0.031 -0.045 -0.049 -0.045 -0.074* 
   (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
Working ratio    -0.009 -0.018 -0.007 -0.020 
    (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) 
Household head is a farmer    0.147*** 0.152*** 0.140*** 0.150*** 
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    (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.008 -0.009 -0.021 
     (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) 
Chronic disease ratio      -0.117 -0.082 -0.027 
     (0.090) (0.091) (0.098) 
Household head is overweight      -0.090*** -0.081*** 
      (0.021) (0.023) 
Household head is smoker      -0.025 0.000 
      (0.019) (0.021) 
Household head is daily drinker      0.029 0.008 
      (0.024) (0.025) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.002 
       (0.002) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.018 
       (0.014) 
Waiting time        0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       0.000 
       (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.088*** 
       (0.023) 
N 17938 17938 17907 14054 13671 13518 11063 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.9: ITT analysis of the NRCMS on stated household preference of county hospitals using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 (logit 
marginal effects) 
County hospitals Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 0.151*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.156*** 0.162*** 0.113** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) 
NRCMS -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.079*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
2006 -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.112*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037) 
Time trends -0.012*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.044*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age of household head -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  -0.124*** -0.096** -0.099** -0.113** -0.107** -0.104** -0.123** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) 
Fraction age >55 0.042 0.073** 0.070** 0.068* 0.060* 0.061* 0.085** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) 
Female household head 0.101*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.047** 0.048** 0.061*** 0.065*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) 
Household size 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Minority ethnicity  0.087*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.123*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.124*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Household head married -0.006 -0.012 -0.017 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.017 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) 
Eastern provinces 0.205*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) 
Middle provinces -0.079*** -0.053** -0.056** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.090*** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Household income   0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Asset index  0.184*** 0.179*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
Household head completed primary school    0.027 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.046* 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
Household head completed junior high school   0.054** 0.061** 0.059** 0.060** 0.064** 
   (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   0.055* 0.050 0.049 0.054* 0.101*** 
   (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) 
Working ratio    -0.014 -0.013 -0.027 -0.031 
    (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) 
Household head is a farmer    -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.132*** 
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    (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.022 -0.020 -0.028 
     (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) 
Chronic disease ratio      0.152** 0.145* 0.127 
     (0.076) (0.077) (0.081) 
Household head is overweight      0.006 0.003 
      (0.017) (0.019) 
Household head is smoker      0.039** 0.039** 
      (0.017) (0.020) 
Household head is daily drinker      0.010 0.001 
      (0.021) (0.023) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.002*** 
       (0.001) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       0.003 
       (0.004) 
Waiting time        0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       0.000 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.063*** 
       (0.021) 
N 17938 17938 17907 14054 13671 13518 11063 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.10: Robustness check of the ITT analysis of the NRCMS on use of folk doctors using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 1991 to 2006 based on 
sample of Model 7 (logit marginal effects) 
Folk doctors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 -0.032*** -0.028** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
NRCMS -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2006 0.023** 0.020** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.018** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Time trends 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005* 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Household size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority ethnicity -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Married 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Eastern provinces 0.015** 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Middle provinces 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household income   0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Asset index  -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Primary school    -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** -0.014** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Junior high school   -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Senior high school or above   -0.023** -0.022** -0.023** -0.022** -0.020* 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Working    -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Farmer    0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Chronic diseases     0.003 0.004 0.005 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Overweight      -0.004 -0.004 
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      (0.004) (0.004) 
Smoker      0.005 0.005 
      (0.006) (0.005) 
Daily alcohol drinker      -0.003 -0.003 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       0.000 
       (0.000) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       0.001** 
       (0.000) 
Waiting time       -0.000 
       (0.000) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.000 
       (0.000) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.002 
       (0.005) 
N 3517 3517 3517 3517 3517 3517 3517 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.11: Robustness check of the ITT analysis of the NRCMS on the stated preference of village clinics using DID estimation weighted by NN matching from 
1991 to 2006 based on sample of Model 7 (logit marginal effects) 
Village clinics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NRCMS*2006 0.074* 0.080* 0.080* 0.078* 0.085* 0.082* 0.125*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) 
NRCMS 0.146*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
2006 -0.051 -0.066* -0.066* -0.059 -0.064* -0.061* -0.040 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) 
Time trends 0.002 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age of household head -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraction age <18  0.008 -0.027 -0.028 0.059 0.060 0.063 0.058 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
Fraction age >55 -0.028 -0.068 -0.069 -0.033 -0.036 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Female household head -0.124*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.049* -0.047 -0.046 -0.052* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) 
Household size 0.013* 0.014* 0.014* 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.014* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Minority ethnicity  -0.153*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.174*** -0.166*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Household head married -0.049 -0.037 -0.038 -0.050 -0.050 -0.055* -0.047 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
Eastern provinces 0.102** 0.065* 0.064* 0.072* 0.074** 0.051 -0.028 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) 
Middle provinces 0.141*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Household income   0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Asset index  -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.186*** -0.185*** -0.192*** -0.176*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Household head completed primary school    0.003 0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.006 
   (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Household head completed junior high school   0.013 0.027 0.031 0.032 0.024 
   (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Household head completed senior high school or above   -0.007 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.019 
   (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Working ratio    0.199*** 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.205*** 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
Household head is a farmer    0.074*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
    (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Household head has chronic disease     -0.099** -0.097** -0.098** 
     (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) 
Chronic disease ratio      0.057 0.036 0.079 
     (0.092) (0.092) (0.098) 
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Household head is overweight      0.055** 0.071*** 
      (0.022) (0.023) 
Household head is smoker      -0.008 -0.017 
      (0.021) (0.022) 
Household head is daily drinker      0.016 0.005 
      (0.026) (0.027) 
Travel time to nearest health facility       -0.007*** 
       (0.002) 
Travel cost to nearest health facility       -0.059*** 
       (0.021) 
Waiting time        -0.001 
       (0.001) 
Treatment cost of a common cold       -0.005*** 
       (0.001) 
Presence of public health facilities in the community       0.210*** 
       (0.024) 
N 11063 11063 11063 11063 11063 11063 11063 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant at 1% 
level. b The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement. 
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Table A 3.12: Impact of the NRCMS on medical care utilization and stated preference of different levels of health facilities using DID and NN matching with DID 
(logit marginal effects) 
 Formal care Preventive care Folk doctor use Inpatient care Village clinics Town hospitals County hospitals City hospitals Private clinics 
Difference-in-difference estimation           
NRCMS treatment effect -0.001 0.001 -0.020* 0.043 0.117 -0.160* 0.097 0.009 -0.000 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.035) (0.082) (0.087) (0.073) (0.017) (0.042) 
NRCMS treatment group 0.003 0.000 -0.009 0.008 0.154** -0.020 -0.110*** -0.021** -0.084** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.023) (0.060) (0.067) (0.041) (0.010) (0.036) 
After policy period 2006 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.012 -0.063 -0.028 -0.119** -0.009 -0.048* 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.032) (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.014) (0.026) 
N 3952 9480 4740 714 14793 14793 14793 14793 14793 
Difference-in-difference estimation weighted by nearest neighbour matching 
NRCMS Treatment effect 0.005 0.004* -0.030** 0.000 0.113 -0.195* 0.102 --- 0.002 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.013) (---) (0.097) (0.102) (0.102) (---) (0.049) 
Treatment group 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.192*** 0.022 -0.090* --- -0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005) (0.064) (0.070) (0.046) (---) (0.035) 
Policy period -0.006 -0.003 0.013 --- -0.060 0.019 -0.139** --- -0.060** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.016) (---) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (---) (0.029) 
N 1635 4394 2286 109 7984 7984 7984 --- 7984 
Notes: a Robust standard error clustered at community level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at the 5% level. *** indicates statistical significant 
at the 1% level. Control variables for DID models that are used in the model but not reported include: age, gender, household size, ethnicity, marital status, household income, asset index, education levels, 
occupation, chronic disease, community health facility characteristics and geographical dummies. b Since the question ‘Any formal medical care in last four weeks’ is only asked in survey waves 2004 and 
2006, samples used for formal care are only from these two waves. c The matching algorithm used here is nearest neighbour matching with caliper 0.01 without replacement.  
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Table A 4.1: Number of observations 
Data Number of observations Number remaining 
CHNS 2000~2006  50,944 
Restrict to observations living in rural areas 16,471 34,473 
Exclude if age younger than 18 5,341 29,132 
Exclude if covered by urban social health insurance  1,640 27,492 
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Figure A 4.1: Concentration curves of formal medical care use 
 
 

























































Figure A 4.3: Concentration curves of folk doctors use 
 
 

























































Figure A 4.5: Concentration curves of the use of village clinics 
 
 

























































Figure A 4.7: Concentration curves of the use of county hospitals 
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